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Preface
“I finish by expressing my hope that Industrial Organization returns to be a much
more empirically-oriented discipline, guided, of course, by sound theory. We all have
much to do to ensure that antitrust repeats the successes and avoids the mistakes of
its past.”
Timothy J. Muris, 2003.
The above statement finishes a speech Timothy J. Muris gave in January 2003 as
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in front of an auditorium of an-
titrust professionals.1 It reflects the development competition policy took in the last
twenty years: From a form-based assessment of competitive behavior, which deems
certain business practices to be anticompetitive per se, to an effects-based assess-
ment, which evaluates the positive and negative competitive effects of a given busi-
ness practice in a case-specific manner and weighs these effects against each other.
This change in the focus of competition policy expresses itself by a rapidly increasing
influence of economists in competition authorities - in the EU Directorate-General
for Competition, from the early 1990s to 2008 the ratio of economists to lawyers
rose from one to seven to one to two.2 The increasing importance of economics in
competition cases, and this is at the core of the quote I put at the beginning of
this preface, in turn makes an empirically well-founded understanding of the inner
workings of different markets all the more important.
This thesis sets out to expand the understanding of different markets by analyzing
three institutions: In the first chapter, I demonstrate that umbrella brands, which
mark several products as being from one product family, induce state dependence
1The speech is titled “Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy” and was
given at George Mason University Law Review’s Winter Antitrust Symposium.
2Lowri Evans, the then Deputy Director General of the EU DG Competition, pointed this out
in his 2008 speech “The role of economics in modern competition policy”. It was given at the
International League of Competition Law Congress 2008 in Hamburg.
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in consumers’ purchasing behavior over time. The second chapter, which is joint
work with Gregor Zo¨ttl, shows that the benefit of information dissemination in
non-binding procurement auctions depends critically on the weight buyers attach
to bidders’ non-price characteristics. The third chapter, which is joint work with
Dietmar Harhoff, exploits the concealment of a signal of patent value by the Eu-
ropean Patent Office in 2001 to give evidence that the European patent system is
inherently opaque. As the quote at the beginning of the preface asks for, the anal-
ysis in all three chapters is guided by theory but in the end all main findings are
based on empirical data. In the long run the insights presented in this thesis will
hopefully contribute to a better assessment of markets from a competition policy
perspective. In the following, each chapter is outlined in turn. The order of the
chapters corresponds to the order of their inception.
The first chapter of this thesis deals with a strategic instrument which - despite
being commonly used by firms - has not received a lot of attention in the economic
literature yet. This instrument is umbrella branding. Umbrella branding means the
use of recurring brand elements on different products so that consumers perceive
these products as being from one product family. I focus my analysis of umbrella
branding on its implications on consumers’ over-time purchasing behavior. In par-
ticular, I ask whether umbrella branding induces state dependence with respect to
product families. That is: Are consumers who switch from a product they previ-
ously purchased to another one more likely to switch to a product under the same
umbrella brand? I find that marking several products as related by the use of an
umbrella brand indeed causes consumers to stick to this family of products. The
important point to stress here is that this sticky behavior is not simply rooted in
consumers’ preferences but actually due to the fact that umbrella branding induces
switching costs. Also, loyalty to a product family induced by umbrella branding is
of an economically significant size - on average, it amounts to around 25% of the
mean product price.
Methodologically, at the core of identification of state dependence in consumers’
purchasing behavior with respect to umbrella brands lies the application of a dis-
crete choice model to a panel of households from which data about their grocery
purchases was collected. The critical point in identification is the separation of
preference heterogeneity from structural state dependence. In other words, if the
discrete choice model did not properly account for the fact that some consumers
might prefer one umbrella brand over the others, then it would falsely attribute re-
purchases of this umbrella brand by these consumers to structural state dependence.
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Thus, the choice model has to be able to flexibly capture different forms of prefer-
ence heterogeneity among consumers. In specifying a flexible model, I follow Dube
et al. (2010), who proposed to represent preference heterogeneity by a mixture of
normals distribution. The mixture of normals distribution is scalable to capture any
kind of preference distribution among consumers while still being computationally
feasible. With controls for preference heterogeneity in place, my model identifies
state dependence in consumers’ umbrella brand choices. The vast amount of data
available allows me to explore this result further. I find evidence that the observed
umbrella brand loyalty is rooted in psychological switching costs and not search or
learning cost, and that it is present both within and across product categories.
These findings add to the economic understanding of the practice of umbrella brand-
ing. So far, economic articles on umbrella branding, like Cabral (2000, 2009) and
Hakenes and Peitz (2008), focus on the function of umbrella brands as quality sig-
nals: Roughly put, the basic assumption there is that consumers expect the qualities
of products which are assembled under an umbrella brand to be correlated. Then,
in equilibrium firms choose high qualities for all products under an umbrella brand,
and consumers accordingly expect products under an umbrella brand to be of high
quality. Given the assumption that product quality is kind of a fixed cost invest-
ment and does not (or only slowly) change over time, the dynamic implications of
this view are restricted to an initial learning period. As soon as consumers are ex-
perienced with regard to umbrella brands (that is, the level of product quality these
stand for), umbrella branding should no longer have an influence on consumers’ pur-
chasing decisions. However, due to the length of the consumer panel I have available
I can show that also experienced consumers exhibit inertia in their umbrella brand
choices. This finding gives evidence to the fact that state dependence in umbrella
brand choice is neither rooted in learning nor search costs. Thus, in order to fully
assess the role the practice of umbrella branding plays in competition, the view of
umbrella brands as quality signals has to be complemented by the view of umbrella
brands as product characteristics which induce structural switching costs.
The second chapter is joint work with Gregor Zo¨ttl. In this chapter we analyze open
non-binding auctions, an auction format which dominates the rapidly expanding
online procurement market. Basically, open non-binding auctions are of a very
simple structure: Initially, a buyer publishes a description of the product or job he
wants to procure. During a predefined period of time, bidders can then put forward
price quotes. These price quotes are publicly visible and can be changed anytime.
At the end of the bidding period, the buyer freely decides for one of the participating
3
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bidders. Despite their very simple structure and their increasing importance, open
non-binding auctions are not yet well understood. The reason is that open non-
binding auctions do not fit into the traditional and well-established framework of
auction theory and thus elude the treatment with standard tools.
We develop a theoretical framework to describe open non-binding auctions. We do
this to assess the effects of availability of non-price information to the bidders -
as bidding takes place in an online environment, the distribution of information is
easy to manipulate by the creator of an auction, and we indeed observe different
informational arrangements in the field. In particular, we compare an informational
arrangement where bidders are informed about their rivals’ non-price characteristics
to one where this information is concealed from them. The questions we ask are:
Under what conditions does a buyer prefer to conceal information about their rivals’
non-price characteristics from the bidders? And: How large can welfare effects of a
change in the information structure expected to be in the field?
From our theoretical framework, we find that whether the buyer prefers to disclose
or to conceal non-price information depends on how the buyer weighs bidders’ non-
price characteristics against bidders’ prices. In case the buyer puts a lot of weight
on bidders’ non-price characteristics, he is better off when he conceals non-price
information. On the other hand, in case he puts only small weight on bidders’ non-
price characteristics, the buyer is better off when he discloses non-price information.
The intuition is simple: If bidders are mainly differentiated by their non-price char-
acteristics, then concealment of this fact makes them appear more similar to each
other, which intensifies competition and thus leads to lower price quotes. However,
if bidders mainly compete on prices, then disclosure of information about their non-
price characteristics softens the advantage of bidders who are able to offer low prices
due to low costs, which in turn again intensifies competition and decreases overall
prices.3
We use data on open non-binding auctions from a large European procurement
platform to quantitatively assess the effects of a change in information structure.
The information structure on this platform is such that bidders’ non-price charac-
teristics are public information. First, we establish that bidding behavior is in line
with our theoretical predictions for the case bidders are informed about their rivals’
non-price characteristics. We then employ our theoretical framework to perform a
counterfactual analysis. The first step in our counterfactual analysis is to derive
3The assumption here is that lower costs correlate with less favorable non-price characteristics.
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estimates of bidders’ costs using our framework for the case bidders are informed
about each others’ non-price characteristics. We use these cost estimates as inputs
for our framework for the case non-price information is concealed to derive counter-
factual outcomes. According to our intuition, for auction categories where bidders’
skills are relatively important to the buyer we expect buyers’ welfare to increase by
up to ten percent in case non-price is concealed, while for categories where bidders’
skills are of little importance we expect a decrease of up to ten percent.
As indicated above, despite the rapidly increasing importance of the open non-
binding auction format for both firms’ and private persons’ procurement activities,
the economic literature on them is still very scarce. To our knowledge, so far there
is only one article which explicitly deals with the structuring of information in open
non-binding auctions, which is Haruvy and Katok (2013). In this article the authors
report the results of an experimental study. For their setup they find that buyer
surplus increases when information about their rivals’ non-price characteristics is
concealed from the bidders. Our contribution places their result into a broader
context by demonstrating that the effect of a change in information structure is
not unambiguous but depends on the precise characteristics of the auction under
consideration. Thus, any recommendation on the information structure of open
non-binding auctions has to be based upon a thorough empirical analysis of the
specific auction environment.
The third chapter of this dissertation, which is joint work with Dietmar Harhoff,
sheds new light on the fundamental tradeoff of the patent system - that is, the
granting of exclusion rights in exchange to disclosure of technical knowledge. Many
authors in the patent literature take it as given that the patent system fully dis-
closes technical knowledge and concentrate on the incentive structures arising from
the granting of exclusion rights. We, however, differ from the widespread belief
that the patent system fully discloses critical information about the innovations
protected by patents. Instead, we argue that the patent system is indeed highly
opaque with respect to the technical and economical value of a patent. We base
our position on data from a quasi-experimental setting: In December 2001, the Eu-
ropean Patent Office (EPO) changed its information policy regarding requests for
accelerated patent examinations. While before December 2001 information about
whether a patent applicant requested accelerated examination was publicly avail-
able, this information was treated as confidential afterwards. In reaction to the
2001 concealment of acceleration information, in our data we observe the behavior
of patent applicants and their rivals to change in a way consistent with our assump-
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tion that the patent system is opaque with respect to patent value. That is, it seems
that the information conventionally generated by the EPO is not sufficient to allow
rivals to identify a patent’s actual contribution.
In particular, we start out by developing a theoretical model of the patent applica-
tion and opposition process. We model this process as a dynamic two-stage game,
where first a patent applicant draws either a high- or low-value patent and then
decides whether to request accelerated patent examination. Second, a rival of the
applicant decides whether to oppose the patent. We use this basic structure to com-
pare outcomes in case the patent system is fully transparent with respect to patent
value to outcomes in case it is opaque. In case the patent system is opaque, we in
addition compare outcomes in case the applicant’s acceleration decision is disclosed
to outcomes in case it is concealed. From this framework we derive predictions
about the way the behavior of applicants and rivals should change in reaction to the
EPO’s 2001 decision to conceal information about acceleration requests: Whereas
in case of a transparent patent system we expect to observe no changes in behavior,
in case of an opaque system we expect the rate of acceleration requests to increase
and the rate of oppositions to decrease. In our data, we indeed see the latter pre-
dictions confirmed: The frequency of acceleration requests is significantly higher
after the EPO’s 2001 policy change than it is before, and the frequency of oppo-
sitions is significantly lower. That is, the data supports our presumption that the
European patent system is opaque with respect to the value of patents. Our main
finding therefore is that the conventional data generated by the EPO is not suited
to identify competing approaches and firms easily, and that thus the patent system
is probably limited as a source of information.
Our model allows us to take a first step towards a welfare assessment of the result
that the European patent system is opaque with respect to patent value. Maybe
surprisingly, we find that opaqueness with respect to patent value might be ben-
eficial for the aggregate welfare of applicants and rivals. However, this is only a
partial welfare result, as our model focuses on the parties directly involved in the
application and opposition process and is agnostic with respect to the implications
of opaqueness of the patent system for third parties and thus for the progress of in-
novation in society. With respect to an assessment of the EPO’s 2001 policy change,
our model shows that the welfare implications of concealment of the acceleration
signal critically hinge on how strongly the value of a patent increases in case its ex-
amination is accelerated. Unfortunately, the issue of patent acceleration seems not
to have received significant attention in the patent literature so far. Thus, without
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further research into the issue of patent acceleration well-founded statements about
welfare changes due to the 2001 concealment of the acceleration signal cannot be
made.
The three chapters of this thesis are self-contained and include their own introduc-
tions and appendices. Hence, each chapter can be read on its own. References for
all three chapters are listed at the end of this thesis.
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Chapter I
Umbrella Branding and Consumer
Inertia
I.1 Introduction
Umbrella brands mark products as being from the same product family by the use
of recurring brand elements. As an example: The umbrella brand “Colgate” estab-
lishes a link between a “Colgate Active Angle” toothbrush and a “Colgate Total”
toothbrush. In this chapter I empirically analyze how umbrella brands influence
households in their over-time purchasing behavior. In particular, I am interested in
whether there is inertia in households’ umbrella brand choices. Inertia in umbrella
brand choice means that, conditional on a product change, ceteris paribus a house-
hold is more likely to switch to a product under the previously purchased umbrella
brand than to a product under another umbrella brand.
I show that there is significant inertia in households’ umbrella brand choices. By
making use of the length of the household panel I have available, I demonstrate that
inertia in umbrella brand choice can be rationalized by the existence of structural
(respectively psychological) switching costs, but not by search or learning costs. In
addition, availability of data from different product categories allows me to show that
inertia in umbrella brand choice exists both within and across product categories.
These results add to the economic literature on umbrella branding, which, despite
of the prevalence of umbrella branding in everyday life, is still quite scarce: So far,
umbrella brands have primarily been understood as quality signals. The finding
that firms can use umbrella brands to induce structural switching costs sheds a new
8
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light on the practice of umbrella branding, especially with respect to the assessment
of competitive behavior.
Specifically, I develop a dynamic discrete choice model to determine whether there is
inertia in households’ umbrella brand choices. In this model, besides product prices
and product-specific intercepts, I include covariates controlling for households’ pur-
chase histories: In particular, I include a covariate which controls for a households’
previous umbrella brand choice. The coefficient on this covariate captures inertia in
households’ umbrella brand choices. That is: Given that a household purchased a
product under a certain umbrella brand at his previous shopping trip, the coefficient
measures whether (respectively how much) the utilities of products which are not
under this umbrella brand are lowered at the household’s present shopping trip. It
is identified by changes in households’ product choices which are induced by price
variations.
A common concern in the empirical literature on state dependence in households’
choices is that a model spuriously identifies inertia in households’ choice behav-
ior. Reasons for spurious identification of choice inertia are unobserved household
heterogeneity or unobserved correlations in households’ tastes for the products con-
sidered (compare for example Dube et al., 2010). To address this concern, I specify
the model coefficients to follow mixtures of multivariate normal distributions, and
I allow the product specific intercepts to be correlated. That way I flexibly control
both for various forms of unobserved household heterogeneity and for unobserved
correlations in a household’s product tastes.
I estimate my model on household panel data from the IRI marketing dataset.
Specifically, I concentrate on data on toothbrush purchases. The toothbrush cate-
gory is well-suited for my research purposes: In this category, the use of umbrella
brands is common, and households’ shopping behavior fits the general assumptions
of a discrete choice framework very well. Also, availability of data on purchases
in the toothpaste category allows me to examine cross-category effects of umbrella
branding. The data on consumers’ shopping trips stems from two large metropolitan
areas in the US, Eau Claire, Wisconsin, and Pittsfield, Massachusetts, and comprises
the years 2001 to 2005.
I use a Bayesian estimation approach to derive posterior distributions of my model
coefficients. For computation of the posterior distributions I employ a Markov Chain
Monte Carlo algorithm. I find that if the average consumer changes from the product
he purchased in the previous period to some other product, then he is indifferent
9
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between a product being under the same umbrella as the previously purchased one
and a product being under another umbrella but with a by $0.69 lower price. (The
simplifying assumption here is that the products the household can choose from are
physically identical.) Put in slightly other terms, the dollar value of umbrella brand
loyalty on average amounts to 25% of the mean product price.
One concern with these results is that the lagged umbrella brand choice coefficient
does not capture inertia in households’ umbrella brand choices but in fact simply
picks up correlations in households’ product tastes. To counter this concern I es-
timate my model with and without the lagged umbrella brand choice coefficient.
Inclusion of the lagged umbrella brand choice coefficient significantly increases the
posterior probability of my model, which evidences that the lagged umbrella brand
choice coefficient actually captures dynamics in households’ choice processes. Fur-
thermore, my estimation results are robust under different prior specifications, and
do not change when I account for the possibility that besides by prices households’
decisions might be influenced by marketing activities on and above store-level. In
summary, there is strong evidence that my finding of inertia in umbrella brand choice
is not spurious but captures actual regularities in the dynamic choice behavior of
households.
The length of my observation period allows me to explore the behavioral under-
pinnings of my finding of structural inertia in households’ umbrella brand choices.
In particular, I split my observation period in two subperiods and estimate my
choice model only for the late subperiod and only on a subsample of experienced
households. Experienced households are those which in the early subperiod of my
observation period visited all stores in my sample and purchased products under all
umbrella brands. For the subsample of experienced households I still observe inertia
in umbrella brand choice. This excludes search and learning costs as possible expla-
nations for consumer inertia in umbrella brand choice. Thus, it seems that inertia
in umbrella brand choice is caused by the existence of structural (or psychological)
switching costs.
In practice, an umbrella brand often not only assembles products from one but
from several product categories. In my dataset, besides on toothbrush purchases I
have available data on toothpaste purchases, and there are umbrella brands which
are present in both the toothbrush and the toothpaste category. This allows me
to analyze whether besides within a product category inertia in umbrella brand
choice also exists across product categories. I find that households’ decisions for
10
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an umbrella brand in the toothbrush category are significantly affected by whether
they previously purchased a toothpaste product under this umbrella brand. Hence,
inertia in umbrella brand choice is a phenomenon which exists both within and
across product categories.
My work basically adds to two strands of literature: One which empirically deals
with state dependence in households’ purchasing behavior, and another which tries
to understand the economic rationale behind the use of umbrella brands. The
literature on state dependence in households’ purchasing behavior goes back to
Frank (1962) and Massy (1966). From then on, inertia in product choice has been
well documented by several authors, among those for example Keane (1997), Erdem
(1998) and Seetharaman et al. (1999). In a recent article, Dube et al. (2010) use a
discrete choice model with a flexible heterogeneity specification to show that inertia
in product choice is indeed a structural phenomenon and not caused by unobserved
heterogeneity in consumer preferences. They additionally explore possible economic
explanations for the existence of inertia in product choice and find that inertia in
product choice is most likely caused by structural (or psychological) switching costs
and not search or learning costs. This chapter is closest to their article.
In contrast to Dube et al. (2010), however, I do not treat products as single, dis-
connected entities. Instead, I explicitly take into account that often products are
marked as being related by an umbrella brand. To my knowledge, there is only one
other article on household inertia which also explicitly accounts for the fact that
products might be connected by an umbrella brand: For the yogurt product cate-
gory, Pavlidis and Ellickson (2012) show that households exhibit inertia in umbrella
brand choice. However, while their article is mainly concerned with the strategic
pricing issues arising from the existence of state dependence with respect to umbrella
brands, my contribution focuses on the analysis of whether the observed inertia in
households’ umbrella brand choices is indeed structural and not spurious, the isola-
tion of the effect of inertia in umbrella brand choice from that of inertia in product
or brand choice, and the exploration of the mechanisms behind the phenomenon
of household inertia in umbrella brand choice. In summary, I contribute to the lit-
erature on state dependence in households’ choice behavior by demonstrating that
choice inertia is not restricted to single products but also present with respect to
product families, and by analyzing the mechanics behind the observation of choice
inertia with respect to product families.
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The other strand of literature this chapter (more indirectly) adds to is that of
the economic theory of umbrella branding: The theoretical literature on umbrella
branding offers different economic explanations for its existence. One, put forward
for example by Andersson (2002), is economies of scope: several products under one
umbrella brand can easily be promoted by a single marketing campaign. Another,
which seems to be in the focus of recent research on umbrella branding, is the
possibility to signal product quality by the use of umbrella brands. Papers which
theoretically analyze the role of umbrella brands as signals for product quality are for
example Wernerfelt (1988), Choi (1998), Cabral (2000, 2009) and Hakenes and Peitz
(2008). There is some supporting empirical evidence indicating that households’
preferences for products linked by an umbrella brand are correlated (Sullivan, 1990;
Erdem, 1998; Seetharaman et al., 1999; Erdem and Sun, 2002; Balachander and
Ghose, 2003).
In contrast to these contributions, however, I show that even when controlling for
preference correlations a consumer’s previous-period umbrella brand choice has a
direct influence on his present shopping decision. That is, I contribute to this strand
of literature by offering a third rationale for the existence of umbrella brands: As
conditional on a product change households incur additional switching costs if they
also change umbrella brand, firms can use umbrella brands as lock-in devices for
families of products which are possibly located in several product categories. Other
than the rationales for umbrella branding established in the economics literature
so far, this new rationale has implications directly related to market structure and
competition between firms. It explains for example the observation of product
proliferation under established umbrella brands: In analogy to Klemperer (1995),
households who value variety and who incur umbrella brand-specific switching costs
prefer umbrella brands which assemble a lot of different products over umbrella
brands which assemble only a few.
The next section introduces the discrete choice model I use to examine whether there
is inertia in households’ umbrella brand choice. Section I.3 describes the household
panel data I apply this model on. Section I.4 presents my main estimation result:
There seems to be significant inertia in households’ umbrella brand choice. In section
I.5 I show that this result is not spurious due to misspecified household preferences
and that it is robust under different model and prior specifications. Section I.6
explores the behavioral underpinnings of the observation that households have a
tendency to stay with an umbrella brand. In section I.7 I show that inertia in
12
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umbrella brand choice occurs both within and across product categories. Section
I.8 concludes.
I.2 The Choice Model and its Econometric
Specification
 Model. In the following I will use the term product to denote the entity a
household can actually take away from the shelfs of a grocery store. A brand is a
symbol applied to a physical product to distinct this physical product from other
(possibly physically identical) products. An umbrella brand is a symbol common to
several brands which marks these brands as being from the same brand family.1 I
assume that there are J products, which are assembled under B brands, which in
turn are assembled under U umbrella brands.
I assume that there are H households h, each observed at Th storeweeks t. The
term storeweek denotes the visit of a certain store in a certain week.2 I assume the
storeweeks to be exogenously given. At a storeweek t a household h has the choice
among J products.3 The utilites household h derives from each of the products at
shopping occasion t are
uh0t = 
h
0t,
uh1t = α
h
1 + η
hp1t + β
h
1B(1)6=Bt−1 + γ
h
1U(1)6=Ut−1 + 
h
1t, (I.1)
...
uhJt = α
h
J + η
hpJt + β
h
1B(J)6=Bt−1 + γ
h
1U(J)6=Ut−1 + 
h
Jtt.
The index 0 denotes the household’s outside option, that is the decision of the house-
hold not to purchase any of the J products. The αhj are product specific intercepts
1As an example, a Colgate Active Angle toothbrush with a full head and a soft bristle is a
product, “Colgate Active Angle” is its brand, and “Colgate” its umbrella brand. Note that in the
literature the use of the terms product, brand and umbrella brand is not consistent. For example,
Dube et al. (2010) use the term brand where I use the term product, while Erdem (1998) uses the
term brand where I use the term umbrella brand.
2A storeweek is similar but not synonymous to a shopping trip, as at a storeweek t a household
could have visited the respective store several times the respective week. I use the term storeweek
because the finest temporal resolution in our data amounts to one week.
3Note that the extension of the model to the case that at storeweek t household h can only
choose among a subset of the J products is straightforward. In fact, to derive my estimation results
it is crucial to use a model which accounts for varying choice sets. However, as the extension of
the model to the case of a varying choice sets just brings about more involved notation, for the
sake of exposition I present the model for the case of a constant choice set.
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which capture household h’s intrinsic preferences for product j. pjt is the price of
product j at storeweek t. The price coefficient ηh measures the change in the utility
household h derives from product j if its price is altered by one dollar. 1B(j) 6=Bt−1 is
an indicator variable which establishes a connection between a household’s current
and its previous brand choice. It equals one if the brand of product j is equal to
the brand of the product the household purchased in the previous storeweek and
zero otherwise. Analogous, 1U(j) 6=Ut−1 is an indicator variable which establishes a
connection between a household’s current and its previous umbrella brand choice.
It equals one if the umbrella of product j is equal to the umbrella of the product
the household purchased in the previous storeweek and zero otherwise.4 Accord-
ingly, the coefficients βh and γh measure how the utility household h receives from
product j is altered if product j is under a different brand respectively a different
umbrella brand than the product household h chose in the previous period. If βh
is negative, household h exhibits inertia in brand choice. If γh is negative, house-
hold h exhibits inertia in umbrella brand choice. The hjt are error terms capturing
(storeweek-dependent) deviations in household h’s behavior. Note that I allow the
model coefficients θh ≡ (αh1 , ..., αhJ , ηh, βh, γh) ≡ (αh, ηh, βh, γh) to be household-
specific.
I assume that at storeweek t a household h makes a discrete choice among the J
products. That is, at storeweek t household h is assumed to choose exactly one of
the J products or the outside option. The household will choose the product which
maximizes its expected utility at storeweek t. Thus, household h’s choice problem
at storeweek t is
argmax
j∈{0,1,...,J}
uhjt. (I.2)
 Identification. The coefficients βh and γh in model (I.1) account for inertia
in households’ choice behavior: If there is inertia in brand choice, the coefficient
βh will be smaller than zero. If conditional on a brand change there is inertia in
umbrella brand choice, the coefficient γh will be smaller than zero.
Key for identification of the coefficients βh and γh is variation in product prices and
households’ choices. The following simple example illustrates the basic identification
mechanism: Assume that at storeweek one a given household chooses product one.
4Note that I also could include a covariate accounting for a household’s previous-period product
choice. However, as this covariate turned out to be of no influence on households’ purchasing
decisions, for the sake of clarity I did not include it in the present model.
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At storeweek two all prices stay the same, except that of product two, which is
decreased so far that the household now chooses product two. Product two shall
be under both another brand and another umbrella brand than product one. At
storeweek three the price of product two is increased again to a level slightly above
its price in storeweek one. Again, the prices of all other products shall stay the
same.
Now there are three different possible choices of the household in storeweek three,
each of which having different implications regarding the existence of inertia in
households’ choice behavior: First, the household might choose product one again.
That would either mean that there is no inertia or that it is too small to affect the
household’s behavior. Second, the household might stay with product two. That
would mean that there is inertia with respect to brands. Third, the household might
choose neither product one nor product two but might change to a third product
which is under the same umbrella as product two. That would indicate that there
is inertia with respect to umbrella brands.5
For the sake of exposition, in the example above I implicitly assumed that there
are no idiosyncrasies in the household’s decisions (that is hjt = 0 for all t and j).
This assumption is of no effect to the general logic of the example. If I allowed for
non-zero error terms, and if I assumed that the error terms were independently and
identically distributed and uncorrelated with product prices, then statements about
the existence of switching costs could be deduced from the “average behavior” of
the household. That is, if the household were repeatedly exposed to the pricing
dynamics above, and if in the third period of each pricing sequence the household in
“almost all” cases chose to switch to a product under the same umbrella as product
two, then that would hint to the existence of choice inertia with respect to umbrella
brands.
Like there are pricing patterns which are informative about the existence of choice
inertia, there are also pricing patterns which are informative about the households’
preferences: As a simple example, if at storeweek t a household changes from some
other product to product one, we know for sure that αh1 − ηhp1t ≥ αhj − ηhpjt for
all products j which are under the same umbrella as product one. As product
5Note that by varying the price of product two in storeweek three also the size of the inertia
coefficient relative to that of the price coefficient can be identified.
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prices are observable, we thus have information about the relationships between the
household’s preferences for all products under the same umbrella as product one.6
Put together, the household-specific coefficients in model (I.1) are identified if three
conditions hold: First, unobserved influences on the utilities households derive from
product purchases must not be correlated with each other (both in the product-
and the time-dimension) or with product prices. Second, there has to be sufficient
price variation in the data. Third, there has to be sufficient variation in households’
choices.
 Econometric specification. The above discussion revealed that it is possible
to draw conclusions about the coefficients of model (I.1) from the observation of
households’ choice behavior when households are faced with varying product prices.
As the amount of data available is not sufficient to make inferences about the co-
efficients of model (I.1) without further assumptions, I have to make parametric
assumptions.
Household panels are usually short, which means that meaningful coefficient es-
timates on the level of a single household cannot be derived. Instead, I retreat
to assumptions about the distribution of the model coefficients in the population
of households. As already shown for example by Dube et al. (2010), it is crucial
for the identification of choice inertia that the specified distribution of the model
coefficients captures heterogeneity in the preferences of the households sufficiently
well.
To make this clear, assume that there is no inertia whatsoever and that there are
two equally large groups of households in my data: One which likes products from
umbrella one but dislikes products from umbrella two, and another which dislikes
products from umbrella one but likes products from umbrella two. As a result,
simply because of these differences in preferences group one will on average stay with
products from umbrella one, whereas group two will on average stay with products
from umbrella two. Now, if I specified the distribution of the household coefficients
to be degenerate (meaning that each household has the same preferences for all
products), the only possible explanation for this behavior would be the existence
6As for the example above, which illustrates the identification of switching costs, the implicit
assumption made here is that hjt = 0 for all t and j. The generalization to non-zero error terms
again is straightforward: If I allowed for non-zero error terms, and if I assumed that the error
terms were independently and identically distributed and uncorrelated with product prices, then
statements about a household’s preferences could be deduced from the “average behavior” of the
household.
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of choice inertia with respect to umbrellas. That is, econometric specifications of
model (I.1) which do not account for heterogeneity in households’ preferences might
lead to spurious detection of choice inertia.
To avoid spurious detection of choice inertia I follow Dube et al. (2010) and specify
my model coefficients θh = (α
h, ηh, βh, γh) to follow a mixture of normals distribu-
tion:
p(θh|pi, {µk,Σk}) =
K∑
k=1
pikφ(θh|µk,Σk). (I.3)
The probability density of θh is given as the weighted sum of K multivariate
normal densities, each with mean µk and covariance matrix Σk. The weights
pi = (pi1, ..., piK) sum to one. A straightforward interpretation of specification (I.3)
is the following: One can think of K basic types of households, each of which char-
acterized by a multivariate normal distribution of the coefficients θh with mean µk
and covariances Σk. pik then is simply the probability that a given household is of
type k.
Note at this point that the covariance matrices Σk are not restricted. That means my
model specification is flexible enough to capture correlations in the brand preferences
of the households. This kind of flexibility is important for the identification of inertia
in households’ umbrella brand choices. In order to illustrate this, let us assume for
a moment that the covariance matrices Σk were restricted in a way which ruled out
correlations among households’ preferences for different brands. Assume further that
in our data the preferences of households for brands under a certain umbrella were
positively correlated. In that case my model would falsely attribute the tendency
of households to stay with this umbrella to the existence of choice inertia with
respect to umbrella brands. Not restricting the covariance matrices Σk controls for
the possibility of correlated brand preferences, and thus allows to separate effects
resulting from the existence of inertia in umbrella brand choice from effects resulting
from correlated brand preferences.
To complete the econometric specification of model (I.1), I specify the error terms hjt
to follow a type I extreme value distribution. The type I extreme value distribution is
similar to the normal distribution. It is common to assume the error terms of discrete
choice models to follow a type I extreme value distribution. The reason is that with
this specification closed form expressions for households’ choice probabilities can be
derived.
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 Bayesian estimation. I use a Bayesian estimation approach to derive the
posterior distribution of my model coefficients θh = (α
h, ηh, βh, γh). Bayesian esti-
mation is conceptually very simple - it is essentially just a straightforward applica-
tion of Bayes’ rule: Conditional on prior information about the model coefficients
θh, the posterior distribution of θh given data y = (y1, ...,yH) (that is, p(θh|y)) is
determined as
p(θh|y) = p(y|θh)p(θh)
p(y)
. (I.4)
p(y|θh) denotes the likelihood of the observed data y, which is conditional on the
model parameters θh, p(θh) is the prior on the model parameters, and p(y) is
the unconditional probability to observe the data y, which simply as normalizing
constant.7 In essence, equation (I.4) captures the whole estimation process. That
is, given some prior information the posterior follows directly. What makes the
Bayesian estimation approach computationally involved is just the computation of
the right-hand side of (I.4). However, apart from the matter of specifying a sensible
prior, this is only a technical matter. In the following I discuss how the prior p(θh)
is formed and how I compute the right-hand side of (I.4).
Specifying a prior directly on the distribution of the θh would mean specifying
prior values for the moments {µk,Σk} of the normal components and the mixture
probabilities pi. Problematic with this “direct” prior is that it treats every house-
hold in the same way regardless of the observations available for each household.
This means that via households for which only a few observations are available the
influence of the “direct” prior on the posterior might be quite strong.
An alternative approach is to make the prior on the household coefficients θh
household-specific. This can be achieved by the use of a two-stage prior. A two-stage
prior specifies that for each household the {µk,Σk} and pi are themselves drawn
from prior distributions with parameters h. This way only the parameters h have to
be directly specified for the whole sample of households, and the {µk,Σk} and pi are
specific for every household and influenced by the number of observations available.
Thus, the use of a two-stage prior allows more flexible adaptation to information in
the data and thereby reduces the influence of prior information on the posterior.
In specifying a two-stage prior, I follow the approach of Rossi et al. (2005) and Dube
et al. (2010) and specify a hierarchical prior with the mixture of normals (I.3) as first
stage and a prior h on the parameters τ ≡ {pi, {µk,Σk}} of the mixture of normals
7It can be computed as p(y) =
∫
p(y|θh)p(θh)dθh.
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distribution as second stage. The posterior distribution of my model coefficients θh
is then given as
p(θ1, ...,θH |y1, ...,yH ,h) ∼
[∏
h
p(yh|θh)p(θh|τ )
]
· p(τ |h). (I.5)
yh denotes the data available for household h. The normalizing constant, which is
not explicitly stated here, is the unconditional probability to observe the data y and
is given as the integral of the product of the data likelihood and the prior density
over the parameter space.
The posterior distribution cannot be expressed analytically. I therefore estimate the
posterior distribution of my model parameters θh by employing a modified version
of the Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) algorithm used by Dube et al. (2010)
and described in detail in Rossi et al. (2005).
In contrast to the algorithm used by Dube et al. (2010), my modification of it allows
for varying choice sets. This modification is important for my research purposes.
The reason is that other than Dube et al. (2010), who are only interested in house-
hold inertia with respect to single products, in order to identify household inertia
in umbrella brand choice I have to take into account a large number of products
which are assembled under different umbrella brands. The drawback with this need
to cover a large range of products is that only on rare occasions the whole set of
products I consider coincides with the set of products a household can choose from
at a given storeweek.8 My modification of the algorithm of Dube et al. (2010) al-
lows me to estimate choice model (I.1) also on storeweeks where only a subset of
the whole set of products I consider is available and thus drastically increases es-
timation efficiency. Note that allowing for a varying choice set is only a technical
matter which makes the algorithm which computes the posterior distribution more
involved. There is no conceptual reason stemming from discrete choice theory which
demands a constant choice set. Technical details on the prior specifications and the
MCMC algorithm can be found in appendices A.1 and A.2.
I.3 Household Panel Data on Grocery Purchases
 Data description. I estimate my choice model on household panel data on
toothbrush purchases. The household panel data on toothbrush purchases is part
8Of course I could estimate my model only on storeweeks where households can choose from
the whole set of products I consider. However, that would drastically reduce the number of
observations available for estimation and thus render estimation inefficient.
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of a large dataset collected by the IRI marketing institute. A detailed description
of the dataset can be found in Bronnenberg et al. (2008). Household panel data is
available for the years 2001 to 2005 for two metropolitan areas in the USA: Pittsfield,
Massachusetts, and Eau Claire, Wisconsin. The data gives information about how
many units of which product at what price were purchased by a certain household in
a certain store in a certain week. It contains extensive information on each product,
including information about its branding.
In particular, I use household panel data on toothbrush purchases in the seven
largest grocery stores of the two metropolitan which was collected during the years
2001 to 2005. I use data from the toothbrush category for three reasons: First,
the branding structure in this category is ideally suited for my research purposes
- products in this category are assembled under several brands and these again
under several umbrella brands. Second, households’ purchasing behavior in this
category fits the assumptions implicit in every discrete choice model very well. In
particular, in most storeweeks households purchase exactly one unit of one product.
Third, some umbrellas which are used in the toothbrush category are also used in the
toothpaste category, which will allow me to analyze cross-category effects of umbrella
branding. I supplement the panel data with store-level data to fill in information
about the availability and the prices of products which were not purchased by any
of the households in the panel in a certain storeweek. The store-level data contains
information about all purchases made in a certain store in a certain week. For my
estimations I use only households which were observed at least twice during the
sampling period. That leaves me with 775 households. Table I.1 depicts summary
statistics for these households.
I concentrate on the three largest umbrella brands in the market. In terms of
purchases these umbrellas cover 67.7% of the market. Per umbrella I concentrate
on products which account for at least 5% of purchases of this umbrella. This
leaves me with 23 products. A product is defined as a toothbrush with a certain
brand, a certain head size (compact vs. full) and a certain type of bristle (soft vs.
medium). For the largest umbrella I observe seven products which are assembled
under three brands, and for both the second- and the third-largest umbrella I observe
eight products each which are assembled under four brands. Table I.2 describes the
market for toothbrushes in the seven largest grocery stores in the metropolitan areas
Eau Claire, Wisconsin, and Pittsfield, Massachusetts, for the years 2001 to 2005.
The outside good is defined as any toothbrush sold in this market other than the 23
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Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
Households 775
No. of shopping trips 5,263
No. of shopping trips per hh. 6.8 6.8 5 2 101
No. of products purchased 6,930
No. of purchases per household 10.5 10.9 7 2 139
Share of shopping trips
where outside good was purchased 47.8%
Grocery stores 7
Share of purchases per store 14.3% 8.0% 10.2% 7.4% 27.8%
Table I.1: Descriptive statistics (purchases in the toothbrush category). The table gives
descriptive statistics for the purchases the households in my sample made in the toothbrush cate-
gory. My sample includes all households which were observed to shop toothbrushes at least twice
in one of the seven largest grocery stores in the metropolitan areas Eau Claire, Wisconsin, and
Pittsfield, Massachusetts, during the years 2001 to 2005.
toothbrushes considered. For confidentiality reasons I do not give umbrella/brand
names in table I.2.
In 5,263 storeweeks, the 775 households I observe made discrete choices among the
outside option and a certain subset of the 23 products I look at. The choice set
households were confronted with varied from storeweek to storeweek. I make the
assumption that every product in the choice set consumers were confronted with in
a certain storeweek was sold at least once in this storeweek. This assumption implies
that I can use store-level data to reconstruct the choice sets for every storeweek.
I observe every household in my panel for at least two storeweeks. In my estimations,
for each household I use all observations apart from the first one. In doing so
I circumvent the initial conditions problem. The costs are that I loose 15% of
storeweek observations, but as the remaining number of storeweek observations is
quite high that does not matter much in terms of estimation efficiency.
 Price variation. In section I.2 I discussed that one key for identification of
choice inertia and households’ product preferences is variation in the prices of the
observed products: For each household, the household’s purchasing decisions given
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Umbrella brand Brand Average Price Purchases share
($, per blister)
A A I 3.07 4.7%
A II 2.89 2.3%
A III 2.67 3.9%
B B I 2.85 7.1%
B II 3.18 1.7%
B III 4.66 1.8%
B IV 2.51 7.1%
C C I 2.38 3.1%
C II 2.39 1.1%
C III 3.69 0.5%
C IV 3.15 1.7%
Outside good 2.73 64.8%
Table I.2: Brand structure of the market for toothbrushes. The table displays the structure
of the market for toothbrushes in the seven largest grocery stores in the metropolitan areas Eau
Claire, Wisconsin and Pittsfield, Massachusetts, during the years 2001 to 2005. For confidentiality
reasons the umbrella/brand names are not given.
different product price vectors reveal information about the relationships among this
household’s product preferences. In addition, purchasing decisions given changing
price patterns reveal information about whether this household incurs switching
costs.
Figure I.1 exemplarily depicts price patterns for two products under different um-
brellas which were observed in the largest grocery store in the sample. As can be
seen, over time a household which shops in this grocery store is confronted with quite
different price vectors. The reactions of a household to the different price vectors
allow identification of the household’s product preferences. What is also evident is
that after a deflection product prices often return to their initial levels, which leads
to the occurrence of repeated price patterns. This repeated price patterns facilitate
the identification of choice inertia. Note that the pricing patterns depicted in figure
I.1 are representative for all products and all stores in my sample.
 Variation in households’ choices. Besides variation in prices, in order to
identify choice inertia I need to observe variation in households’ choices: Roughly
put, choice inertia is identified when a household stays with a product it switched to
in the previous period even when prices go back to their levels before the previous
period. Table I.3 shows that there is indeed a lot of variation in households’ choices.
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Figure I.1: Exemplary pricing patterns. The graph shows exemplarily pricing patterns for two
products. The depicted pricing patterns are observed in the largest grocery store for two products
under different umbrellas.
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B III O
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Figure I.2: Exemplary purchasing pattern. The timeline exemplarily shows the purchasing
decisions a randomly chosen household made during the five year observation period. “O” denotes
a purchase of the outside option. The capital letters mark umbrella brands, the latin numbers the
brands assembled under the respective umbrella brands (compare table I.2).
On average, a household is observed to purchase toothbrushes on six shopping oc-
casions. It changes the brand of the toothbrush roughly twice, and the umbrella
brand roughly once. From these changes information about the existence of choice
inertia can be inferred.
Figure I.2 exemplarily shows the purchasing behavior of a randomly chosen house-
hold. The depicted pattern is typical for the households in my sample. Clearly,
there is variation in household’s purchasing behavior: Over the five year observa-
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Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
Households 775
No. of shopping trips per hh. 5.8 6.8 4 1 100
Different products per household 2.9 1.5 3 1 11
Different brands per household 2.6 1.2 2 1 8
Different umbrellas per household 2.1 0.8 2 1 4
Table I.3: Descriptive statistics (product, brand and umbrella brand purchases). The
table gives descriptive statistics about the number of different products, brands and umbrella
brands purchased by the households in my sample. The sample includes all households which
were observed at least twice to shop toothbrushes in one of the seven largest grocery stores in the
metropolitan areas Eau Claire, Wisconsin, and Pittsfield, Massachusetts, during the years 2001 to
2005.
tion period the household changes both among umbrellas and among the brands
assembled under an umbrella. Together with the observed variation in prices (as
exemplarily depicted in figure I.1), these changes allow the identification of choice
inertia, both with respect to brands and umbrella brands.
 Indication for the existence of inertia in umbrella brand choice. Table
I.4 displays the results of a naive logit discrete choice estimation on all the households
in my sample. The results show that if we control for product prices households
actually seem to exhibit inertia both in their brand and umbrella brand choices, and
that the effect of inertia is quite strong. However, as the results in table I.4 are not
derived from the observation of one household but rather reflect the average behavior
of all households in my sample, the observed inertia in households’ choices cannot
be interpreted to be structural. Indeed, it might simply be rooted in differences
between households with respect to their brand and umbrella brand preferences or
in correlations among product tastes. Thus, the results in table I.4 give only a first
indication that structural choice inertia with respect to umbrella brands might exist.
In order to separate structural choice inertia from preference heterogeneity and
correlated product tastes I have to estimate a model which flexibly accommodates
different forms of household heterogeneity and preference correlations.
24
I. Umbrella Branding and Consumer Inertia
Covariates in Coefficient estimate Standard Error
household’s utility fct.
Product price ($) -.533∗∗∗ .049
Brand change -.778∗∗∗ .073
Umbrella change -.562∗∗∗ .063
Nbr. of observations 68,298
Nbr. of households 775
Table I.4: Results of naive logit estimation. The table gives results of a naive logit estimation.
The logit discrete choice model assumes the utility uhjt a household h derives from the choice of
product j at storeweek t to be given as uhjt = ηpjt+β1B(j)6=Bt−1 +γ1U(j)6=Ut−1 + 
h
jt. If the outside
option is chosen the household derives utility uh0t = v0 + 
h
jt. The 
h
jt are assumed to be iid type
I extreme value distributed. The value v0 of the outside option is not significantly different from
zero, for which reason I do not report its estimate here. The estimates are based on data on choices
775 households made on 5,263 shopping trips. Significance niveaus are reported by stars: ***: 1%,
**: 5%, *: 10%.
I.4 Main Results
I estimated choice model (I.1) on the household panel data described in chapter I.3
using the mixture of normals specification (I.3). With this specification model (I.1)
flexibly accommodates different forms of household heterogeneity and preference
correlations. I chose K, the number of normal components, to equal 5, and I chose
very diffuse and thus non-informative priors on the parameters {pi, {µk,Σk}} of the
mixture of normals distribution. The exact prior specification is given in appendix
A.1, and I will discuss the choice of this specification and the choice of the number of
normal components in section I.5. The upper-left graph in figure I.3 shows the key
result of my estimation: Most of the probability mass of the posterior distribution
of coefficient γh is on negative values. That is, most households exhibit structural
inertia in umbrella brand choice.
Besides the posterior distribution of γh figure I.3 depicts the posterior distribution of
coefficient βh, which captures inertia in brand choices, and the posterior distribution
of the price coefficient ηh. Most of the probability mass of the posterior distribution
of coefficient βh is on negative values, which means that besides inertia in umbrella
brand choice the majority of households also exhibits inertia in brand choice. As
is to be expected, the probability mass of the posterior distribution of the price
coefficient ηh is nearly entirely on negative values. The small part of the probability
mass which is on positive values is an artifact of my mixture of normals specification.
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Figure I.3: Main estimation results (posterior marginal distributions). The graphs depict
the pointwise posterior means and the 95% credibility regions of the marginal densities of the
price coefficient, the coefficient capturing inertia in brand choice, and the coefficient capturing
inertia in umbrella brand choice. In addition, in order to demonstrate the need for a flexible
preference specification, also the posterior distributions of the product-specific intercepts αh6 and
αh8 are shown. The results are based on 5,263 purchasing observations of 775 households, and
were derived by estimating choice model (I.1) given the non-informative five component prior
specification detailed in appendix A.1.
Table I.5 gives some summary statistics on the posterior distributions of γh, βh and
ηh. For the mean household the value of γh is of the same order of magnitude as
the value of ηh. That is, for the mean household inertia in umbrella brand choice
has a similar impact on its purchase decision as a price change of one dollar. Or,
in more illustrative terms: Based on the figures in table I.5, conditional on a brand
change the mean household is indifferent between changing to a brand under the
same umbrella as the previously purchased brand and changing to a brand under
another umbrella which is by $0.69 cheaper. (The simplifying assumption here is
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Price coefficient (ηh) Inertia in Inertia in umbrella
brand choice (βh) brand choice (γh)
Mean -0.864 -0.452 -0.594
Std. error of mean 0.049 0.103 0.099
Table I.5: Summary statistics of posterior marginal distributions. The table gives sum-
mary statistics on the posterior marginal distributions of the price coefficient ηh, the coefficient
βh which captures inertia in brand choice, and the coefficient γh which captures inertia in um-
brella brand choice (see figure I.3). In the limit of infinite observations these numbers would equal
traditional frequentist maximum likelihood estimates of model (I.1).
that a priori there is no difference between brands and prices.) Relative to the mean
product price of $2.73 a price reduction of $0.69 equals a price decrease by 25%.9
For completeness and in order to demonstrate the necessity of a flexible prefer-
ence specification, figure I.3 exemplarily depicts the posterior distributions of the
product-specific intercepts αh6 and α
h
8 . The product-specific intercepts α capture
households’ product preferences. As mentioned in section I.2, for the identification
of household inertia in brand and umbrella brand choice - that is, for the identifica-
tion of the coefficients γh and βh - it is crucial to capture heterogeneity in households’
product preferences. As can be seen from the distributions of the product-specific
intercepts αh6 and α
h
8 , standard distributional assumptions (like for example that
of a simple normal distribution) are obviously not suited to sufficiently capture
heterogeneity in households’ product preferences. Thus, it is important to use a
distributional specification which is able to flexibly accommodate various forms of
heterogeneity.
I.5 Robustness of Estimation Results
I derived the results given in section I.4 using choice model (I.1) with the non-
informative prior specification given in appendix A.1. In the following I will discuss
the robustness of these estimation results. The discussion will involve comparisons
of my model of choice to other possible models. In the Bayesian framework models
9The effect of inertia in brand choice, which is captured by coefficient βh, is on average equiv-
alent to the effect of a price change of 19%. This figures are of the same order of magnitude as
numbers from Dube et al. (2010), who find that switching costs with respect to single products
on average amount to 12% of mean product price in the margarine product category, respectively
21% of mean product price in the orange juice product category.
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Number of normal components:
1 component -6324.615
3 components -6121.99
5 components (BM) -6064.658
10 components -6004.293
Concentration parameter:
a = 0.1 (BM) -6064.658
a = 1.5 -6057.338
Model specification; addition of dynamic terms:
uhjt = α
h
j + η
hpjt + 
h
jt -6245.72
uhjt = α
h
j + η
hpjt + β
h
1B(j) 6=Bt−1 + 
h
jt -6247.769
uhjt = α
h
j + η
hpjt + β
h
1B(j) 6=Bt−1 + γ
h
1U(j)6=Ut−1 + 
h
jt (BM) -6064.658
Store-specific intercepts and advertising controls:
Addition of store-specific intercepts -5950.316
Addition of advertising controls -5916.405
Table I.6: Marginal log-likelihoods for different model specifications. The table displays
marginal log likelihoods of models which differ either with regard to their prior specifications or
the model specification itself. Apart from the deviations mentioned explicitly in the table, the
specification of the models equals (I.1), and the prior specifications are those given in appendix
A.1. The base model with which the main results from section I.4 were derived is marked by
“BM”.
can be compared based on posterior model probabilities. The posterior probability
of a model is simply the probability that this model is “true” given the data and
the prior information at hand. As detailed in Rossi et al. (2005) and Dube et al.
(2010), model choice on basis of posterior model probabilities is consistent, meaning
that with increasing sample size the probability of choosing the true model tends to
one.
Under the assumption of equal prior model probabilities model comparison on ba-
sis of posterior model probabilities is equivalent to model comparison on basis of
model marginal likelihoods. Following the treatment in Dube et al. (2010), technical
details regarding the equivalence of model comparison on basis of posterior model
probabilities and on basis of model marginal likelihoods and the computation of
marginal model likelihoods are given in appendix A.3. Important to keep in mind
for the following is that (under the assumption of equal prior model probabilities)
model choice on basis of model marginal likelihoods is consistent in the sense that
with increasing sample size the probability of choosing the true model tends to one.
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Finally, note that model marginal likelihoods automatically adjust for the param-
eter dimensions of models. That is, there is no positive discrimination of models
which are large in terms of their parameter dimensions.
Robustness against misspecification of preferences
One concern with my estimation results from section I.4 might be that the coeffi-
cients γh in model (I.1) do not pick up dynamic effects, but rather simply capture
some part of household heterogeneity or correlation among product tastes. If the
umbrella brand inertia coefficients γh simply captured some part of household het-
erogeneity or taste correlation, then their addition to model (I.1) should not higher
the posterior model probability: My econometric specification does not put any re-
strictions on the correlations among the αhj , and the mixture of normals specification
is able to very flexibly accommodate various forms of distributions. That is, the αhj
should fully capture both arbitrary correlations among product tastes and hetero-
geneity among households. Thus, if the γh simply picked up some part of household
heterogeneity or taste correlation, their addition would mean overfitting my model.
As shown by Dube et al. (2010), overfitting decreases the posterior probability of
a model. Table I.6 shows that on the contrary the addition of the umbrella brand
inertia coefficient γh strongly increases the posterior model probability. This indi-
cates that the umbrella brand switching cost coefficient γh does not simply pick up
heterogeneity in or correlations among households’ preferences but actually captures
structural inertia in umbrella brand choice.
Robustness under different prior specifications
 Prior on the number of normal components. In theory mixtures of nor-
mals distributions can be used to approximate any kind of continuous distribution
with full support. The quality of the approximation depends on the number of nor-
mal components used. In general, the higher the number of components the better
the approximation. However, with an increasing number of normal components the
problem of overfitting arises.10
10Overfitting means that the estimation results do not pick up general patterns in households’
preferences and choice behavior but capture noisy behavior. As an extreme example, this would
be the case if the number of components was equal to the number of households. Then every
component would simply pick up a specific households’ behavior, and the model would have no
explanatory and predictive power at all.
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For the derivation of the results given in section I.4 I used five normal components.
With five normal components overfitting does not pose a problem: Given the inter-
pretation that each component of the multivariate normal distribution represents
one basic type of household, and given that I have 775 households in my sample,
each component should capture general characteristics of households and should
not pick up noisy behavior. On the other side, this number of components seems
to be sufficient to fully capture heterogeneity in households’ preferences: Table I.6
displays the marginal log-likelihoods for models with one, three, five and ten nor-
mal components. The marginal log-likelihood, which is equivalent to the posterior
model probability, strongly increases from the model with one component to that
with five components. From the model with five normal components to that with
ten normal components there is only a slight increase in the marginal log-likelihood.
This pattern suggests that the basic heterogeneity pattern is picked up when five
components have been added to my model, and that the addition of further compo-
nents does not add much to the understanding of the general preference structure
of the households.
A look at figure A.1, which can be found in the appendix and which exemplarily
depicts posterior distributions for models with one, five and ten components, con-
firms the aforementioned. The posteriors of the five- and the ten-component model
clearly deviate from those of the one-component model. This emphasizes the need
for a heterogeneity specification more flexible than that of a simple normal distri-
bution. The posteriors of the ten-component model deviate in detail from those of
the five-component model but exhibit the same main characteristics. In particular,
addition of normal components beyond the fifth one is of insignificant effect on the
posterior distributions of γh, βh and ηh.
 Prior on composition of average household. The prior on how a household
is composed from the basic types of households (that is, the normal components)
determines in what way the basic household types are combined to produce a given
household: In expectation, a given household might either resemble one of the basic
types or a balanced mixture of all the basic types. I derived the results in section I.4
under the prior assumption that a given household in expectation resembles one of
the basic types of households. Concretely, I set the concentration parameter a of the
symmetric Dirichlet distribution, which determines the composition of an average
household, to 0.1. For details, see appendix A.1. I compared the posterior distri-
butions resulting from this prior assumption about the composition of an average
household to that that an average household is a balanced mixture of all basic types.
30
I. Umbrella Branding and Consumer Inertia
In more technical terms, I changed the concentration parameter a from 0.1 to 1.5.
It showed that different prior assumptions about how an average household is com-
posed from the basic household types do not have significant effects on the posterior
coefficient distributions. Figure A.2 in the appendix illustrates this by comparing
the posterior distributions for the different concentration parameters. The small in-
fluence of the concentration parameter is mirrored in the fact that the marginal log
likelihood does not significantly change when the concentration parameter is varied
(see table I.6).
 Prior on the distribution of household coefficients. In order to ensure
that the priors on the mean and the variance of the distribution of my model coef-
ficients are of negligible effect on my qualitative results I chose them to be neutral
and very diffuse. In particular, I used a prior specification such that in expectation
for every coefficient and every component the prior mean of the coefficient distribu-
tion is zero and the prior variance is five. A prior coefficient mean of zero implies
that a priori my model is neutral with respect to the direction of the effects the
coefficients are supposed to capture. The prior coefficient variance of five becomes
meaningful in relation to my estimation results: The average effect sizes seem to
lie in the range between around 0.5 and 1. Given these effect sizes prior coefficient
variances of five mean that my model is a priori quite non-informative with respect
to the exact location of the coefficients.
For the price coefficient ηh, the brand choice inertia coefficient βh, and the umbrella
brand choice inertia coefficient γh figure I.4 contrasts the (expected) prior coefficient
distribution to the posterior coefficient distributions. The posterior coefficient dis-
tributions strongly deviate from the prior coefficient distributions, both with regard
to location and spread. This demonstrates that my results are to a large extent
driven by information from the data and not by prior information.
Comparison of the prior specification which leads to prior coefficient variances of
five and which I used to derive my main results in section I.4 to a tighter prior
specification which leads to prior coefficient variances of 2.5 shows that the tighter
prior has no significant effect on the location of the posterior distributions. It has,
however, an effect on the spread of the posterior distributions: The tighter the prior
specification, the less wide-spread the posterior distributions. Although this effect
is not very strong I work with a very diffuse prior specification in order to render the
effect of prior information on my qualitative results as marginal as possible. Figure
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Coefficient prior (in expectation) → γh: Inertia in umbrella choice
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Figure I.4: Comparison of prior coefficient distribution and posterior coefficient distri-
butions. The upper-left graph shows the common prior marginal distribution (in expectation)
of the price coefficient, the brand choice inertia coefficient and the umbrella brand choice inertia
coefficient. The other graphs depict the posterior marginal distributions of these coefficients. The
results were derived with the base prior specification. The base prior specification is detailed in
appendix A.1. The results are based on 5,263 purchasing observations of 775 households.
A.3 from the appendix exemplarily displays posteriors for the diffuse and the tight
prior specification.
Robustness against marketing measures
The technical discussions above showed that the results given in section I.4 are
robust under different prior specifications, and that the choice inertia coefficients
βh and γh in model (I.1) actually pick up structural state dependence in brand
respectively umbrella brand choice. In this section I turn to a discussion of my
results from section I.4 which focuses more on the economic mechanics my model
tries to capture. In particular, I assess the key assumption which allows identification
of my model coefficients: This key assumption is that there are no influences on
households’ choice behavior which are systematically connected to the explanatory
variables of model (I.1) but unobserved by me as econometrician.
In particular, as pointed out by Dube et al. (2010), in order for my model to iden-
tify structural choice inertia it is necessary that the price coefficient estimates are
unbiased. The reason is that if the price coefficient (which measures a household’s
sensitivity to price changes) is not determined correctly, my model might interpret
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household behavior actually induced by price variations to be caused by inertia in
umbrella brand choice. As a simple example, if the estimate of the price coefficient
was biased towards zero and a household purchased a certain brand or umbrella re-
peatedly simply due to low prices, my model could attribute this behavior spuriously
to the existence of switching costs.
Price coefficient estimates are possibly biased when there are measures which are
controlled by the supply side, which influence a household’s inclination to purchase a
product, and which are accounted for when the product price is set. Such measures
can be taken on or above store-level. For example, a store whose strategy is to
increase households’ willingness to spend money by creating a pleasant shopping
experience (example through ample space and an appealing interior design) might in
turn demand product prices which are above average. Or, a producer who launches
a large marketing campaign in order to make households aware of his brand might
in turn demand a price premium for products under the advertised brand. In the
following I turn to a discussion of how marketing measures on or above store-level
might possibly affect the estimation results presented in section I.4.
 Marketing measures on store-level: Store characteristics. The house-
holds in my sample are observed to make purchases in seven grocery stores. Things
like the layout of these stores, the shelf design or the style of the interior might in-
fluence households’ willingness to spend money on the products offered in different
ways, and the way in which households’ purchasing decisions are influenced might
be accounted for when final product prices are set. If there actually is a systematic
but unobserved correlation between the characteristics of a store and the prices of
its products, then this would potentially bias the estimates of the price coefficients
ηh, which in turn could lead to spurious identification of choice inertia.
To account for influences of the characteristics of a store on the purchasing deci-
sions of households I introduce store-specific intercepts into my model, which make
the utilities households derive from product purchases store-dependent. In doing
so, I control for possible systematic correlations between store characteristics and
households’ purchasing decisions.
The prior settings for the store-specific intercepts are the same as for the price and
the switching cost coefficients. Figure A.4 compares posterior marginal distributions
derived from the model with store-specific intercepts to that derived from my base
model (I.1). Comparison of the posterior marginal distributions derived from the
model with store-specific intercepts to that derived from my base model (I.1) shows
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that inclusion of store-specific intercepts does not alter the marginal posterior distri-
butions in a significant way. Thus, store characteristics seem not to systematically
influence households’ choice behavior in a way which biases my main estimation
results given in section I.4.
 Marketing measures on store-level: In-store advertisement and dis-
play. With the introduction of store-specific intercepts I control for time-invariant
store characteristics which might be systematically correlated with households’ pur-
chasing decisions. Time-varying measures on the store-level which potentially influ-
ence households’ purchasing decisions are in-store advertisement and in-store display
of products. In my data I have available information on whether a certain product
was advertised or put on display in a certain store in a certain week. Basically, data
on in-store advertisement and in-store display is available separately. However, as in
the toothbrush category display occasions are very rare (they occur only in around
three percent of the storeweeks), for efficiency reasons I combine the data on in-
store advertisement and in-store display. In modeling terms, I introduce a flag fh
in the utility a household derives from a certain product whenever this product is
either advertised or put on display in a certain store in a certain week. In doing so
I am able to control for the effects of in-store advertising measures on households’
purchasing behavior.
The prior settings for the in-store advertisement flag are the same as for the price
and the switching cost coefficients. Figure A.4 displays the marginal posterior distri-
butions of the price coefficients ηh and the umbrella brand choice coefficients γh. As
with store-characteristics, inclusion of controls for in-store advertising and display
does not lead to posterior distributions which are significantly different from those
derived from my base model (I.1). Therefore, in-store advertisement and display do
not affect households’ decisions in a way which biases my main estimation results
from section I.4.
 Marketing measures above store-level: Mass media advertising. House-
holds’ purchasing decisions might not only be influenced by prices and by marketing
measures on the store-level, but also by product or brand advertising via channels
like newspaper ads or TV commercials. Erdem et al. (2008) conducted a study in
which they analyzed the effects of advertisement exposure on households’ willingness
to pay for products from four categories, among them toothbrushes. They exclu-
sively had available both scanner data and data from telemeters, which measured
each household’s specific exposure to TV commercials. They found that in general
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a household’s willingness to pay for a certain product is increased if this household
is exposed to advertisement of this product.
In terms of model (I.1) this can be interpreted as if exposure to product advertise-
ment constitutes a positive shock to the (expected) utility the household derives
from the purchase of the advertised product. In slightly more technical terms that
means that hjt is likely to be large if household h at shopping trip t has recently
been exposed to advertisement of product j. As I do not have available data on
the specific advertisement exposure of the households in my sample these shocks
are unobserved to me as econometrician. The question now is whether unobserved
shocks like these represent a serious obstacle to the identification of choice inertia.
Note first that as long as advertising has no dynamic effects on households’ pur-
chasing behavior its presence is unproblematic for the identification of choice inertia.
That is, as long as the effects of advertising vary only over the household or the prod-
uct dimension (for example, because households are exposed to different types of
mass media with different types of brands advertised in it, or because the adver-
tising intensities for different brands vary), then this variation is captured by the
intercepts αhj , which are household- and product-specific.
In contrast, problems would arise if a household’s decision to purchase a certain
brand systematically coincided with exposure to advertisement of this brand. In
this case my model would spuriously attribute repeated purchases of a brand or
umbrella brand to the existence of choice inertia. However, for two reasons I do
not think that there is a systematic correlation between households’ purchases of
certain brands and timely exposure to advertisement of these brands. First, I argue
that it is unlikely that households are induced to go on a shopping trip by the
exposure to advertisement of a toothbrush. Instead, as toothbrushes are goods with
a relatively low perishability, it suggests itself that from time to time they enter
a household’s shopping cart when it is shopping goods with a higher perishability.
This reasoning is confirmed by figures given by Bronnenberg et al. (2008), which
show that toothbrushes in general are bought besides other grocery products, and
that toothbrushes, like for example razors and blades, have relatively long purchase
cycles. Second, as reported by Erdem et al. (2008), the variation in advertising
exposure is quite high. Given (with respect to toothbrush purchases) exogenous
shopping trips, that makes it quite unlikely that a household’s shopping trips are
systematically correlated with exposure to advertisement of only one certain brand
or umbrella.
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Put together, a household’s purchasing decisions might of course be influenced by
its exposure to advertising of certain brands or umbrellas. This would bias my main
results from section I.4 if the timing of a household’s shopping trips was correlated
with its exposure to advertising of certain brands or umbrellas. However, as in
general a household’s decision to go on a shopping trip should be unrelated to its
exposure to the advertisement of a toothbrush, and as according to Erdem et al.
(2008) the variation in a household’s advertising exposure is very high, correlation
between a household’s exposure to the advertising of certain brands or umbrellas
and its shopping trips is quite unlikely. Thus, as with marketing measures on the
store-level, the observed choice behavior of households should not systematically be
influenced by large-scale advertising measures.
I.6 Analysis of Behavioral Mechanism
Former studies, like Keane (1997), Erdem (1998), Seetharaman et al. (1999) and
Dube et al. (2010), have shown that there is inertia in households’ product choices.
Simply put, households have a tendency to stay with the product they previously
purchased. So far, I have demonstrated that in addition to inertia in product choice
there is inertia in umbrella brand choice. That is, if households change away from
the product they previously purchased, they seem to have a tendency to change
to a product which is under the same umbrella brand as the previously purchased
product.
In order to assess the economic implications of the finding of household inertia in
umbrella brand choice it is necessary to get further insights into the mechanisms
behind this phenomenon. Dube et al. (2010) proposed three possible explanations
for household inertia in product choice: Search costs, learning about the quality
of products, and structural (respectively psychological) switching costs. They find
that the patterns in their data can most likely be explained by the existence of
structural switching costs. The length of my household panel (I observe a major
part of the households over the whole five year observation period) allows me to
test whether my finding of inertia in umbrella brand choice also is rooted in the
existence of psychological switching costs, or whether it can be explained by search
or learning costs.
The basic idea is to split the whole observation period into two subperiods, an early
one and a late one. For the late subperiod I then simply estimate choice model
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Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
Households 242
No. of shopping trips per hh. ...
...in years 2001 and 2002 6.1 6.3 5 2 78
...in years 2003 to 2005 5.5 6.4 4 1 71
No. of hhs. which in years 2001-2002 ...
...purchased two umbrella brands 199
...purchased three umbrella brands 43
No. of hhs. which visited...
...no new store in years 2003-2005 187
...one new store in years 2003-2005 48
...two new stores in years 2003-2005 7
Table I.7: Descriptive statistics for the subsample of experienced households. The table
shows descriptive statistics for the subsample of experienced households. The subsample includes
all households which purchased at least two of the three umbrella brands in the sample in the
years 2001 and 2002 and who were observed at least once in the years 2003-2005. It consists of
242 households. The figures depicted relate to shopping trips made in the seven largest grocery
stores in the metropolitan areas Eau Claire, Wisconsin, and Pittsfield, Massachusetts.
(I.1) on a panel of experienced households, where experienced means that during
the early subperiod these households have purchased products under at least two
of the three umbrella brands considered, and that they have shopped in the same
set of grocery stores during the early and the late subperiod. I argue that in the
late subperiod these households have fully formed preferences regarding the different
umbrella brands, and that they also know about the set of products available and
where to find each product in each store. That is, for experienced households search
and learning costs should play no role during the late subperiod . In consequence,
if I estimate choice model (I.1) on the subsample of experienced households for
the late subperiod only, and if the choice inertia I observed for the full sample of
households was solely caused by search or learning costs, then I should no longer
find household inertia in umbrella brand choice. If, however, I still observe inertia
in umbrella brand choice for the subsample of experienced households, this will be
evidence for the existence of structural (respectively psychological) switching costs.
Concretely, I split my data into an early subperiod covering the years 2001 and
2002, and a late subperiod covering the years 2003 to 2005. Into my subsample of
experienced households I take all households who purchased at least two of the three
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Full sample of hhs. Selected sample
of experienced hhs.
γh: Inertia in umbrella choice -0.594 -0.343
(0.099) (0.151)
βh: Inertia in brand choice -0.452 -0.090
(0.103) (0.179)
ηh: Price coefficient -0.864 -1.095
(0.049) (0.089)
Table I.8: Comparison of the estimation results for the full sample and for the sub-
sample of experienced households. The subsample of experienced households contains 242
households and is a subset of the full sample of households (775 households). Depicted are the
means of the marginal posterior coefficient distributions. The standard error of the means are
given in parentheses. Both the results for the subsample and the full sample were derived from
shopping trips in the seven largest grocery stores in the metropolitan areas Eau Claire, Wisconsin,
and Pittsfield, Massachusetts. The results for the full sample of households were derived from data
on shopping trips in the years 2001-2005, those for the subsample of experienced households from
data on shopping trips in the years 2003-2005.
umbrella brands in the sample during the early subperiod, and who at least once
are observed to make a purchase during the late subperiod. This leaves me with
242 households. As shown in table I.7, 199 households have purchased two umbrella
brands during the early time segment. The remaining 43 households have purchased
all three umbrella brands. 187 of the 242 households visited the same set of grocery
stores during the late subperiod and the early subperiod. The remaining 55 panelists
went to at most two new stores during the second subperiod (48 tried one new store,
7 tried two new stores). Based on these facts I make the assumption that from the
year 2003 on the households in the subsample are experienced with respect to both
the umbrella brands and the grocery stores. Thus, during the second subperiod if
at all these households should only slightly be affected by search or learning costs.
I estimated choice model (I.1) on the subsample of experienced households. Com-
pared to the results derived with the full sample of households some estimation
efficiency is lost, and the prior is of stronger influence. As can be seen in figure A.5,
this shows itself by larger credibility regions and more widespread distributions.
However, the credibility regions still remain quite narrow, and information from the
data clearly overwhelms the prior information. Thus, despite a considerably smaller
dataset the results remain meaningful. Important to note is that also for the sub-
sample of experienced households I find inertia in umbrella brand choice: Most of
the probability mass of the coefficient γh is on negative values. Also, as can be seen
from table I.8, the effect of inertia in umbrella brand choice is of similar size for both
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the subsample of experienced households and the full sample.11 As the households
in my subsample are experienced with respect to umbrella brands and grocery stores
when they enter my estimation sample, this finding excludes both search and learn-
ing costs as possible explanations for household inertia in umbrella choice. Instead,
it seems that inertia in umbrella brand choice is caused by structural (respectively
psychological) switching costs.12
I.7 Cross-Category Inertia in Umbrella Brand
Choice
Above I have used data on toothbrush purchases to show that households incur
switching costs when they change umbrella brands. More specifically, I have shown
that apart from the costs from a change of toothbrush products households incur
additional costs when they switch from one family of toothbrush products marked
by a certain umbrella brand to another family marked by another umbrella brand.
That is, so far I have put forward evidence for the existence of umbrella brand
related switching costs within a product category.
It is quite common that firms use umbrella brands to mark products from several
product categories as being from the same product family. Erdem (1998) has already
demonstrated that a link established by an umbrella brand connects households’
quality perceptions of products from different product categories.13 A related but
open question is whether a cross-category link of products by an umbrella brand
in addition leads to structural inertia in umbrella brand choice across categories.
11Actually, the effect of inertia in umbrella brand choice seems to be slightly less pronounced
for the subsample of experienced households than for the full sample. This hints to the fact that
to some smaller extent also search or learning costs might play a role.
12This finding is in line with that of Dube et al. (2010), who showed that inertia in product
choice can most likely be explained by the existence of structural switching costs.
13Theoretically model (I.1) in combination with specification (I.3) is suited to replicate Erdem
(1998)’s study, that is to analyze whether households’ quality perceptions of products which are
assembled under an umbrella brand are connected: If households’ quality perceptions of products
under a certain umbrella were connected, then one should observe that for one normal compo-
nent (respectively one base type of household) the preference coefficients αj are correlated for
all products j under this umbrella. However, in practice the hybrid MCMC algorithm used to
estimate the posterior does not necessarily identify the single normal components, as during the
iterations switches between component labels might occur (for details compare Rossi et al., 2005).
This behavior of the MCMC algorithm hinders the researcher to make statements about isolated
normal components (respectively the base household types). However, as the households’ prefer-
ence distribution as a whole is identified (and thus controlled for), the possible occurrence of label
switching does not put any restrictions on statements about the existence of household inertia.
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Mean SD Median Min. Max.
Households 775
No. of households (hhs.) which...
... bought toothpaste (tp.) 763
... bought tp. under umbrella A 614
No. of shopping trips with tp. purchase 13,956
No. of shopping trips with tp. purchase per hh. 28.25 19.65 24 0 111
No. of toothpastes purchased 19,029
No. of toothpastes purchased per hh. 42.89 32.40 35 0 198
Market share of umbrella brand A
in toothpaste category 41.01%
Percentage of purchase observations
in toothbrush category with previous
purchase of toothpaste under umbrella A 27%
Table I.9: Descriptive statistics for households’ purchases in the toothpaste category.
The table gives descriptive statistics for the purchases households made in the toothpaste category
during the observation period (that is, the years 2001 to 2005).
That is: When controlling for preference heterogeneity, is a household which in the
previous period purchased a product under a certain umbrella in a certain category
ceteris paribus more likely to buy a product under the same umbrella when it makes
a purchase in another category?
The dataset I use contains household panel data from several product categories.
Besides data from the toothbrush category I have available data from the toothpaste
category. One of the umbrella brands in my toothbrush sample, umbrella brand A,
is also present in the toothpaste category, with a market share of around 40%.14
The occurrence of umbrella brand A both in the toothbrush and the toothpaste
category offers the possibility to study whether inertia in umbrella brand choice can
be observed not only within but also across product categories.
Table I.9 describes the purchasing behavior of households in the toothpaste cate-
gory. Nearly all households purchased a toothpaste at least once during the five
year observation period. Around 80% of the households at least once purchased
a toothpaste which is under umbrella brand A. Compared to the numbers about
14There are also toothpastes which are sold under umbrella brand B. However, the market share
of umbrella brand B in the toothpaste category is marginal (only about 0.03%).
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toothbrush purchases given in table I.1 it is also evident that households purchase
toothpastes more frequently than toothbrushes: They purchase toothpastes around
four times as often as toothbrushes. These facts - that households can be expected
to have purchased a toothpaste before they purchase a toothbrush, and that in
around 40% of the cases this toothpaste can be expected to be from umbrella A -
allow me to analyze whether previous purchases in the toothpaste category have an
effect on purchases in the toothbrush category.
If inertia in umbrella brand choice across categories exists, then a previous pur-
chase of a toothpaste under umbrella brand A should have a different effect on a
household’s decision for toothbrushes which are also under umbrella A than on its
decision for toothbrushes which are under different umbrellas: Ceteris paribus, the
household’s inclination to purchase a toothbrush which is also under umbrella brand
A should be higher than his inclination to purchase a toothbrush which is under an-
other umbrella brand. In terms of model (I.1) this means that a previous purchase
of a toothpaste under umbrella A should have a positive impact on the household’s
(expected) utility from a toothbrush which is under umbrella A, whereas it should
have a negative impact on the expected utility from a toothbrush which is under
another umbrella brand.
I model the effect of a previous purchase of a toothpaste under umbrella A on a
household’s decision among toothbrush products by including a covariate into model
(I.1) which equals one if a household purchased a toothpaste product under umbrella
A in the previous period, and zero otherwise. As I expect the effect of a previous-
period purchase of a toothpaste under umbrella A to be different for toothbrushes
also under umbrella A and for toothbrushes under other umbrella brands, I allow
the coefficient on this covariate to be different for toothbrush products which are
under umbrella A and which are under different umbrella brands. I estimate this
model using the prior specifications detailed in appendix A.1.
Figure I.5 and table I.10 show the estimation results. The first thing to note is that
when accounting for toothpaste purchases my main estimation results change only
to some small extent. This is reassuring, as it means that the estimation results
described in section I.4 are not strongly biased by not accounting for cross-category
inertia effects, and it also does not come as a surprise: For less than one-third of the
observed toothbrush purchases in the previous period a toothpaste under umbrella
A had been purchased. Thus, in order to strongly bias the estimation results the
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Figure I.5: Posterior marginal distributions for model which accounts for cross-category
inertia in umbrella brand choice. The choice model is based on model (I.1) but includes a
covariate indicating whether the household previously purchased a toothpaste under umbrella A.
The coefficient on this covariate is allowed to be different for utilities from toothbrush products
also under umbrella A (δhA) and for products under umbrellas B and C (δ
h
B,C). All graphs depict
pointwise posterior means and 95% credibility regions of marginal posterior densities. The results
are based on 5,263 purchasing observations in the toothbrush category of 775 households. In 27%
of these observations the households previously purchased a toothpaste under umbrella A. All
results were derived with the base prior specification (detailed in appendix A.1).
effect of choice inertia across categories would need to be far stronger than the effect
within a category, and there is no reason to expect such a pattern.
The second and more important thing to note is that purchases in the toothpaste cat-
egory actually have a significant influence on purchases in the toothbrush category:
A look at the posterior distributions of the coefficients capturing cross-category
inertia in umbrella brand choice (compare figure I.5) reveals that a previous pur-
chase of a toothpaste under umbrella A increases the expected utilities of products
under umbrella A and decreases those of products under other umbrella brands.
The figures in table I.10 show that the effect of cross-category choice inertia is of
similar size as the effect of within-category inertia. However, the number of obser-
vations suited for the identification of cross-category inertia is far smaller than the
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γh: Inertia in umbrella choice -0.58
(0.088)
βh: Inertia in brand choice -0.43
(0.089)
ηh: Price coefficient -0.81
(0.043)
Effect of previous purchase of toothpaste
under umbrella A on purchase of
... toothbrushes under umbrella A (δhA) 0.45
(0.148)
... toothbrushes under umbrella B or C (δhB,C) -0.33
(0.106)
Marginal log-likelihood of...
... model which accounts for cross-category inertia -5989.285
... base model -6064.658
Table I.10: Summary statistics for posterior marginal distributions of model which
accounts for cross-category inertia in umbrella brand choice. The table gives summary
statistics of the posterior marginal distributions depicted in figure I.5. The numbers in parentheses
are the standard errors of the means. In the limit of infinite observations the numbers given would
equal traditional frequentist maximum likelihood estimates of the model which accounts for cross-
category inertia in umbrella brand choice (described in section I.7).
number of observations which can be used for the identification of within-category
inertia. This is reflected in the relatively large standard errors of the means of
the coefficients capturing cross-category inertia and advices caution when making
quantitative comparisons.
In section I.6 I demonstrated that within-category inertia in umbrella brand choice
can be explained by the existence of structural (or psychological) switching costs.
In principle, I could repeat the analysis from section I.6 also for the dataset which
contains information about toothpaste purchases. However, the necessary concen-
tration on experienced households drastically reduces the number of observations
available for the identification of cross-category inertia. Furthermore, inclusion of
coefficients capturing cross-category inertia increases the degrees of freedom of my
model. In effect, information from the data no longer dominates prior information,
and statements regarding structural relationships can no longer be made. Thus,
although it might seem suggestive that the same mechanisms are at play both for
within- and across-category inertia, in order to give a definite answer to the question
about the mechanism behind cross-category inertia in umbrella brand choice more
data has to be collected.
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I.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I analyzed how the widespread practice of marking products to be
from one product family by the use of an umbrella brand influences households’
purchasing behavior. I showed that households incur structural (or psychological)
switching costs when they change umbrella brands. That is, besides the switching
costs they incur from switching from one product to another, households incur
additional switching costs when this other product is under another umbrella brand
than the previously purchased product. These additional switching costs due to an
umbrella brand change are of an economically significant size: I find that conditional
on a product change a household ceteris paribus is indifferent between changing to
a product also under the previously purchased umbrella brand and changing to a by
25% cheaper product outside the previously purchased umbrella brand. This effect
of umbrella branding on households’ purchasing behavior can be observed not only
within a product category but also across product categories.
My findings add to the economic understanding of the practice of umbrella branding.
So far, in the literature umbrella branding is primarily understood as a means of
quality signaling (see for example Wernerfelt, 1988; Cabral, 2000, 2009; Hakenes
and Peitz, 2008). The quality signal framework can rationalize household inertia
in umbrella brand choice only as caused by learning about the quality of products
linked by an umbrella brand. However, as shown in section I.6, also experienced
households exhibit inertia in umbrella brand choice. In order to explain this fact
one has to adapt the notion that apart from its quality signaling function umbrella
branding also induces structural (respectively psychological) switching costs. One
interpretation in the sense of Stigler and Becker (1977) would be that households
choose among commodities which are composed of both the physical products and
their brands - that is, the brand of a product is not only a signal of origin or affiliation
to a product family, but an essential part of a household’s consumption experience.
This implies that households incur structural (or psychological) switching costs not
only when they change physical products (as, amongst others, demonstrated by
Dube et al., 2010), but also when they change umbrella brands.
The economic implications from the view of umbrella brands as quality signals are
quite different to those from the view of umbrella brands as constituents of commodi-
ties which cause structural switching costs: First, in the quality signaling framework,
umbrella branding only has dynamic implications as long as households are not
fully informed about quality yet. In contrast, if umbrella brands are constituents
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of commodities which cause structural switching costs, the dynamic implications of
umbrella branding are not restricted to a “learning period”. Second, in the quality
signaling framework the effects of umbrella branding are directly intertwined with
product quality: In general, umbrella brands only assemble high-quality products.
When umbrella brands are parts of commodities which cause switching costs, how-
ever, the effects of umbrella branding are not directly related to product quality.
That is, whether households incur switching costs from changing umbrella brands
is independent from the kind of products assembled under the umbrella brand.
Accordingly, whereas the existing theoretical literature on umbrella branding is
mainly concerned with the interplay of a firm’s decision whether to use umbrella
branding and which quality to produce, theoretical studies adapting the view of
umbrella brands as constituents of commodities which cause structural switching
costs might focus more on the effects of umbrella branding on market structure.
Klemperer (1995), for example, points out that the existence of switching costs
might be a rationale for multi-product firms, as households who value variety and
who incur firm-specific switching costs prefer multi-product firms over single-product
firms. By analogy, the existence of switching costs due to the use of umbrella brands
in the toothbrush category might explain the large variety of different toothbrush
types assembled under each umbrella brand (up to 16, without counting different
types of bristles and different sizes).
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Chapter II
Information Disclosure in
Non-Binding Auctions*
II.1 Introduction
When procuring a contract, the buyer often is not only interested in the price of
an offer but also in other, non-price dimensions such as technical characteristics
of the good or time of delivery. A by now quite well studied multidimensional
auction format is given by scoring auctions where buyers prior to the bidding process
establish a binding scoring rule. Besides such highly structured auctions, recently
“non-binding” or “buyer-determined” auctions became increasingly important. In
these auctions buyers can freely assign the contract after bidding has taken place.
Currently this auction format seems to establish itself as the most prominent one
for online marketplaces both for private and commercial contractors.1
When designing non-binding procurement auctions, typically no structure is im-
posed on the buyer’s decision process - he is entirely free to choose any of the
submitted bids. Important design questions arise, however, with respect to the
optimal information structure for the bidding process. That is, bidders can be pro-
vided with different levels of information regarding the prices and the non-price
characteristics of rival offers. Non-binding procurement auctions can be open-bid
or sealed-bid auctions. If a non-binding auction is a sealed bid auction, bidders are
usually neither informed about their rivals’ prices nor their rivals non-price charac-
*This chapter is based on joint work with Gregor Zo¨ttl.
1See Jap (2002, 2003), Jap and Haruvy (2008), and compare for example the platform FedBid,
Inc., where US government agencies have procured more than $4.1 billion worth of purchases since
2008 using non-binding auctions.
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teristics. However, in this chapter we do not deal with sealed-bid auctions. Instead,
we are interested in open non-binding procurement auctions. In open non-binding
auctions bidders are informed about their rivals’ prices throughout the bidding pro-
cess. The design question which arises here with regard to the information structure
is whether information about their rivals’ non-price characteristics is disclosed to or
concealed from bidders.
In the present chapter we shed light on the optimal design of the information struc-
ture of open non-binding reverse auctions, using an extensive dataset from a large
European online procurement platform. Our analysis focuses on the impact of trans-
parency of the auction design with respect to bidders’ non-price characteristics. In
particular, we are interested in the effect of concealment of non-price information
on the auction outcome. Theoretically, we find that the effect of concealment of
non-price information depends on how the buyer weighs bidders’ non-price char-
acteristics against bidders’ prices. We then do a counterfactual analysis to assess
the relevance of this finding for applications in the field. If non-price information
were concealed from the bidders, we would expect aggregate welfare of the buyers to
decrease by up to 9% for auction-categories where buyers put only small weight on
bidders non-price characteristics. In contrast, for auction-categories where buyers
put a lot of weight on bidders’ non-price characteristics we would expect aggregate
welfare of the buyers to increase by up to 9%.
Our analysis proceeds as follows: First, we establish two different formal frameworks
which describe two limiting cases of information structures. In the first case, bidders
are fully informed about the non-price characteristics of their rivals. In the second
case, all non-price information is concealed from the bidders. We show that whether
it is beneficial for buyers to reveal non-price information depends on characteristics
of the market considered, namely the relationship between the differences in the
bidders’ costs and that in their qualities, where a bidder’s quality simply denotes
how buyers value that bidder’s non-price characteristics. The main intuition here is
that when bidders are quite different in terms of how their non-price characteristics
are valued by the buyers, then concealment of non-price information makes bidders
appear more similar than they actually are, which toughens competition among
bidders and in turn increases buyers’ welfare.
Our empirical analysis is based on a detailed data set of an online procurement
platform, where subscribed buyers post their tenders and can freely choose among
the posted bids. For the period of observation all non-price information is publicly
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available to bidders. As a first step of our empirical analysis, for different auction
categories we analyze how buyers value bidders’ non-price characteristics. We then
verify whether bidders indeed are aware of the buyers’ preferences over their own and
their rivals’ non-price characteristics. Our theoretical frameworks imply that in this
case, contrary to the case where non-price information is concealed from the bidders,
the bids should directly take into account the non-price characteristics of rivals’ bids.
By exploiting the fact that a subset of bidders is observed to participate in several
auctions we are able to identify the bidders’ reactions to changing compositions of
their rivals’ non-price characteristics. We find that bidders submit significantly lower
bids when confronted with rivals whose non-price characteristics are very valuable
for the buyer.
After showing that bidders’ observed behavior is indeed in line with our model
for the case of disclosed non-price information, we conduct a counterfactual analy-
sis and determine the impact concealment of quality information from the bidders
would have on the welfare of the buyers for applications in the field. Using our
model for the case of disclosed non-price information, we first derive estimates of
the bidders’ costs. We find that bidders’ markups, which we compute using our cost
estimates, are of expected size and in line with economic intuition - in particular,
the average hourly profit is in the range of common net wages, and in auctions
where bidders’ qualifications matter markups are higher than in auctions in which
jobs for low-skilled workers are procured. We then use these cost estimates together
with our model for the case of concealed non-price information to compute bidders’
counterfactual prices. With these we are finally able to calculate the change in the
aggregate welfare of the buyers in case non-price information is concealed from the
bidders. We do this for several job-categories which differ in the relevance of non-
price characteristics. As we find, our theoretical predictions are of direct practical
relevance for the dataset considered: For those job-categories where non-price char-
acteristics are highly relevant (in our sample car repairs), buyers’ welfare increases
by up to 9%. In contrast, for those job-categories where non-price characteristics
are of rather low importance (in our sample painting), buyers’ welfare decreases by
up to 9%.
Our work adds to a relatively new strand of literature which analyzes non-binding
auctions. We are especially interested in the effect of different information struc-
tures in this auction format, however. There already are some interesting articles
in this context. Several theoretical papers analyze the conditions under which it
is beneficial for the buyer in non-binding auctions to inform bidders about their
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qualities. Gal-Or et al. (2007) show for sealed bid auctions that the buyer is better
off when he discloses quality information to the bidders. Extensions such as the
inclusion of risk averse bidders are provided in Doni and Menicucci (2010). Colucci
et al. (2011) extend the setting of Gal-Or et al. (2007) by introducing heterogeneity
in bidders’ costs. They demonstrate that for the case of large cost differences and
a comparatively small weighting of quality aspects it is in the best interest of the
buyer to conceal quality information. In the opposite case, he is better off disclosing
information about the bidders’ quality.2
In a recent article, Haruvy and Katok (2013) are the first ones to shed more light
on those issues from an empirical perspective. Based on controlled laboratory ex-
periments, they analyze both open and sealed bid non-binding auctions and assess
the impact of information revelation on bids submitted. For the parameter environ-
ments chosen in their laboratory experiments they find that in their open auction
design due to more aggressive bidding buyers are better off if they keep informa-
tion about bidders’ qualities concealed. Our work differs from their contribution
since our analysis is based on field data of indeed conducted auctions. Our analysis,
moreover, is conducted for several different services to be procured, and thus allows
us to identify under which conditions information revelation indeed is desirable in
open non-binding auctions. That is, for the case of car repairs our results are in line
with those obtained by Haruvy and Katok (2013), whereas for the case of painting
we obtain opposite results.
Several recent articles compare the performance of non-binding auctions with reg-
ular price only auctions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) is one of the seminal
articles in this context. They analyze both analytically and experimentally under
which conditions the buyer would want to commit to a price only mechanism which
ignores all non-price attributes. As the authors establish, such commitment is only
desirable when competitive pressure is important (few bidders) and expected qual-
ity of the low-cost-bidders is not too low (limited negative correlation between cost
and quality).3 Fugger et al. (2013) find in a recent contribution that when bidders
2For a similar setting Rezende (2009) shows that when the buyer and the suppliers have the
possibility to renegotiate, it can be optimal for the buyer to fully reveal the information about the
suppliers’ qualities.
3In principle, also our setting compares a non-binding auction (with informed bidders) with a
“price-only”-regime. In our setting, however, “price-only” refers solely to the information held by
the bidders, who know that prices matter, but are uncertain with respect to all other criteria. The
buyers always do choose the ex post best offer, taking into account all non-price characteristics
(as in Gal-Or et al., 2007; Doni and Menicucci, 2010; Haruvy and Katok, 2013). The fundamental
insights obtained in our analysis are thus clearly quite different. As one consequence, for example,
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are uncertain about the exact way different criteria enter the final decision of the
buyer, there are cases where a non-binding auction enables them to coordinate on
high prices. In that case the buyer would prefer binding price-only auctions over
non-binding auctions.
Wan and Beil (2012) and Wan et al. (2012) analyze related but slightly different
problems. They study auctions where bidders in order to win the auction addition-
ally have to meet certain quality standards. Those articles explore theoretically and
experimentally under which conditions it is optimal to provide information with
respect to the screening among bidders either prior or after bidding has taken place.
Our work in general contributes to the literature which analyzes efficient ways to
procure contracts when the buyer’s valuation of an offer depends on additional di-
mensions besides price. Scoring auctions (where binding scoring rules take price
and non-price characteristics into account) have already received significant atten-
tion in the literature and by now are quite well understood. Asker and Cantillon
(2008, 2010) show that for the case when suppliers have multi-dimensional private
information, this procurement mechanism dominates others like sequential bargain-
ing and price-only auctions. Different scoring auction designs are compared in Che
(1993), Branco (1997), Chen-Ritzo et al. (2005) and Kostamis et al. (2009). Empir-
ical analysis of scoring auctions can be found in Athey and Levin (2001) and Lewis
and Bajari (2011), the first using data from US timber auctions and the second data
from US highway procurement auctions. Practical implementability of scoring auc-
tions through iterative process is analyzed for example in Bichler and Kalagnanam
(2005) or Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005).Finally, in a theoretical contribution Che
(1993) compares scoring auctions with non-binding auctions. He shows that when
bidders bid on all dimensions of their offers, from the buyer’s perspective scoring
auctions dominate non-binding auctions.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section II.2 introduces our theoretical frameworks
for the case of disclosed and that of concealed non-price information and derives
under what conditions a buyer prefers which information regime. Section II.3 intro-
duces our dataset. In section II.4, for different auction categories we analyze how
buyers value bidders’ non-price characteristics, and in section II.5 we use a reduced-
form model to show that bidders’ behavior is indeed in line with our framework for
the case of disclosed non-price information. Based on these preparations, in section
the correlation between cost and quality, which is crucial in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007), is
not of central importance in our setting since foregone quality is not an issue.
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II.6 we perform a counterfactual analysis to assess how strongly buyers’ welfare can
be expected to change if non-price information gets concealed from the bidders.
This is done for several auction categories. Section II.7 concludes.
II.2 Theoretical Framework
 Framework. We consider a non-binding and open procurement situation where
a buyer wants to procure some contract among J participating firms. Each firm
has some cost cj for providing the service. For the sake of exposition, we initially
assume that costs are known among firms. Below we will show that all our results
also hold in case costs are unknown but bidders are myopic or as one possible
equilibrium in case costs are unknown and bidders are perfectly rational. Bidding
takes place throughout different rounds r = 1, ..., R of the auction. In each round,
each firm j = 1, ..., J can successively update its publicly observable price-bid bj,r.
We denote the vector of final bids bj,R quoted by each firm once bidding has stopped
by p = (p1, ..., pJ). Once price submission has finished the buyer can freely choose
to award the contract to some firm j at price pj.
For the buyer’s decision not only the final price pj quoted by firm j matters but
also its non-price characteristics, which we denote by Aj and which we assume to be
exogenously given. In analogy to the existing literature on non-binding procurement
auctions, we call the value of these non-price characteristics to the buyer a firm’s
quality qj. Given the buyer’s preferences regarding these non-price characteristics,
which we denote by α, we assume that the quality of firm j is a linear function
of that firm’s non-price characteristics, Aj, and the respective preferences α of the
buyer. That is, qj = αAj.
Throughout our analysis, we assume that the buyer is always fully informed about
each firm’s non-price characteristics. However, with respect to the information
firms receive about other firms’ non-price characteristics we differentiate between
two cases: In the first case, which we call information case (IC), each firm is in-
formed about each other firm’s non-price characteristics. That is, in the information
case A = (A1, ...,AJ) is common knowledge. In the other case, which we call no
information case (NIC), the firms are not informed about each other’s non-price
characteristics. That is, in the no information case firm j does not know about the
non-price characteristics Ak of each of his rival firms k.
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We assume that the buyer can choose among J firms and an outside option. He
receives a certain amount of utility uj when he chooses firm j. This amount of
utility depends on the price pj put forward by this firm and the firm’s exogenous
non-price characteristics Aj. We model the utility a buyer receives from a certain
firm as being linearly dependent on the price pj, the firm’s non-price characteristics
Aj, and an error term j. With that, we assume the buyer’s decision process to be
given as
max
j∈{0,1,...,J}
uj, where
u0 = v0 + 0
u1 = −p1 + αA1 + 1
... (II.1)
uJ = −pJ + αAJ + J
α denotes the vector of the buyer’s preferences regarding firms’ non-price character-
istics. v0 denotes the value of the buyer’s outside option. For simplicity and without
loss of generality we normalize the price coefficient to −1. The error terms j cap-
ture uncertainty in the buyer’s decision due to unobserved influences unrelated to
price or non-price characteristics.4 We assume that the j follow a symmetric dis-
tribution with mean zero. When making his decision, the realizations of the j are
known to the buyer, but they always remain concealed from the firms while bidding.
The buyer is assumed to choose the option which maximizes his utility, that is, the
option k for which
uk > uj ∀j 6= k, j, k ∈ {1, ..., J}.
 Information case. We assume that in the information case firms have full
information about both their own and their rivals’ non-price characteristics A. In
a non-binding auction, in contrast to a scoring auction, there is no binding and
publicly known scoring rule. That is, firms are not explicitly informed about the way
the buyer makes his decision. Instead, we assume that firms collected information
about the buyer’s decision process by observing past auctions. Thus, each firm’s
4For example, the buyer might be influenced in his decision by his (unobserved) taste regarding,
for example, the username firm j chooses at a bidding platform.
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model of the buyer’s decision process is given as
max
j∈{0,1,...,J}
uj, where
u0 = v0 + 0
u1 = −p1 + αA1 + 1
... (II.2)
uJ = −pJ + αAJ + J .
Note that in contrast to the buyer, who knows the realizations of the j when making
his decision, from the firms’ perspectives the j are random. We assume that the
unobservables j follow some distribution, and that the firms know the distribution
of the j. In consequence, given some bid pj of its own, firm j can derive all winning
probabilities Pk(p,A), k ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}. These winning probabilities are functions
of all firms’ final price bids p = (p1, ..., pJ) and all firms’ non-price characteristics
A = (A1, ...,AJ). We assume that the winning probability Pk of each firm k is log
concave in its final price quote.5 Expected profits pij of firm j are given by
pij = Pj(p,A)(pj − cj).
Within our framework, we obtain a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium b∗ of
submitted bids. Since throughout the chapter only final price bids are relevant for
the decison of the buyer, we explicitly focus on the final price bids p∗ arising within
this equilibrium. These are given as the mutually best responses to the final price
bids of all rivals and are characterized by the following expression:
pj +
Pj
∂Pj/∂pj
− cj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}. (II.3)
The winning probabilities Pj follow from (II.2) and depend on all bidders’ prices p
and non-price characteristics A. Existence and uniqueness of p∗ as characterized by
(II.3) has already been shown in the literature, compare Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)
and Mizuno (2003).
 No information case. We assume that in the no information case firms are
not informed about each other’s non-price characteristics Aj. Analogous to the
information case we assume that there is no binding and publicly known scoring
rule, but that firms instead had to collect information about the buyer’s decision
process from observing past auctions. As in the no information case non-price
5Notice that the logit framework referred to from section II.6 onwards satisfies this assumption.
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information is concealed, in their model of the buyer’s decision process firms can
only take into account the observable prices. That is, we assume firms’ model of the
buyer’s decision process to be:
max
j∈{0,1,...,J}
uj, where
u0 = v˜0 + ˜0
u1 = −p1 + ˜1
... (II.4)
uJ = −pJ + ˜J .
Note that in contrast to the buyer firms do not know about the realizations of
the terms ˜j. Given final price bids p, firm j can derive winning probabilities P˜k,
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}. These winning probabilities are functions of only the firms’ price
bids. We assume that the winning probability P˜k of each firm k is log concave in its
final price quote.6 The expected profit p˜ij of firm j is given by
p˜ij = P˜j(p) · (pj − cj) . (II.5)
In analogy to the information case discussed above we obtain a unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium b∗ also for the no information case. The final price bids
p∗ arising within this equilibrium are mutually best responses to the final price bids
of all rivals. They are characterized by the following expression:
pj +
P˜j
∂P˜j/∂pj
− cj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}. (II.6)
That is, the equilibrium is obtained analogous to the information case. However,
the winning probabilities as perceived by the bidders, P˜j, are now determined by
(II.4) and depend only on bidders’ final price bids p.
Robustness - alternative framework formulation. When establishing tractable
and thus necessarily stylized frameworks it is always highly debatable whether the
chosen framework best approximates the real world economic interaction in a mean-
ingful way. In the context of modelling auctions, this problem clearly is much more
pronounced when analyzing open and thus in principle dynamic auction settings
(the case of the present chapter). Let us emphasize that the final price quotes (as
characterized in expressions (II.3) and (II.6)) arise as an equilibrium outcome also
6Notice that the logit framework referred to from section II.6 onwards satisfies this assumption.
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under modified assumptions for example with respect to the precise endpoint of the
auction and with respect to the information structure for procurement costs.
To this end consider for example the framework where each firm has some private
costs cj with distribution Fj(c) with positive and bounded support for providing
the service. Bidders j = 1, ..., J can successively update their publicly observable
price-bids bj,r throughout different rounds r > 2 of the auction. The bidding stops
when neither of the bidders updates his price bid in a specific round.
Notice that the final price vector p∗ characterized in expressions (II.3) and (II.6)
respectively results as the equilibrium outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
the induced auction game. An equilibrium strategy profile supporting this outcome
is given as follows: Whenever it is a bidder’s turn he sets his currently active bid
such as to be a best response to the currently active bids of all rival bidders (clearly
this is also well defined in case no or only few active bids are already submitted when
bidding just started). Beliefs with respect to rivals’ costs are updated consistently
given the observed bids of rivals. The above characterized final price vector results
from those equilibrium strategies when none of the bidders wants to update his
bid any more. The fact that for given p∗ none of the bidders wants to update his
bid any more obtains by construction, since each price is the best response given
all rivals’ price bids. Notice, however, that for the case of fully rational bidders
also other equilibria of the above specified auction framework can obtain. Consider,
for example, some vector of (collusive) prices pC which for each bidder (and each
cost type) grants expected profits strictly above those obtaining for p∗. A perfect
Bayesian strategy profile supporting the above characterized equilibrium outcome
pC is given as follows: Independently of their cost type bidders in the first round
submit prices pCj , in the second round no bids are submitted and the auction stops.
If any bidder deviates from this strategy, all bidders will start to submit bids such
as to be a best response to all currently active bids.
Finally notice, for the case of myopic bidders (and also for fully rational bidders
which consider all their rivals to behave myopically7) we obtain the final price vector
p∗ characterized in expressions (II.3) and (II.6) as the unique outcome of the above
specified alternative framework. As shown by Sobel and Wei (2010) equivalent
results obtain when restricting attention to markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic
auction game.
7Empirical evidence that players indeed significantly underestimate their rivals’ rationality can
be found, for example, in Weizsaecker (2003).
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In summary, we see that also for other reasonable framework and equilibrium refine-
ment choices the price vector p∗ characterized in expressions (II.3) and (II.6) always
arises in equilibrium. Not surprisingly, for deliberately general settings of dynamic
and strategic interaction among bidders uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome can-
not always be guaranteed for all in principle plausible settings, however.
 Comparing both information regimes. We are interested in whether the
buyer prefers to disclose or to conceal non-price information. We assume that this
decision has to be made prior to knowing the precise number and identity of the
participating firms and their characteristics. In this case, the buyer prefers the
information structure which gives him the highest expected utility. It is easy to
show that there is no information structure which dominates the other. Appendix
B.1 proofs this by example.
The central intuition is that the informational arrangement which creates the highest
competitive pressure among firms is best for the buyer. Which information regime
creates more competitive pressure as perceived by the firms depends on the specific
situation considered, as we show. First, consider a situation where firms have similar
production costs but are quite heterogenous with respect to how the buyer values
their non-price characteristics. In short, using the definition of a firm’s quality as
the buyer’s valuation of its non-price characteristics, that means a situation where
firms have similar production costs but very different qualities. A regime which con-
ceals non-price information suggests tough competition and induces more aggressive
bidding. Second, consider a situation where firms have quite different production
costs but quality differences are such as to compensate for those differences (that
is, the more expensive producer also has higher quality). In this case full revelation
of non-price information induces more aggressive bidding. In the following section
we offer an analytical illustration of these tradeoffs.
 Illustration of tradeoffs and model mechanics. The standard assumption
about the distribution of the j is either normal or type I extreme value. Bidders’
winning probabilities Pj depend on the differences of the j. In case the error terms
are assumed to follow a normal distribution also their differences follow a normal
distribution, and in case the error terms are assumed to follow a type I extreme
value distribution their differences follow a logit distribution. In consequence, the
Pj either cannot be expressed in closed form or contain exponential terms which
lead to transcendental equations. Thus, for any standard assumption about the
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distribution of the j the first order conditions (II.3) respectively (II.6) cannot be
solved analytically.
To illustrate the mechanics of our model we make the simplifying assumption that
the differences of the error terms j follow a uniform distribution. With this assump-
tion we analyze bidding in an auction where the buyer can choose among two firms
only.8 Each firm has non-price characteristics Aj. The respective preferences of the
buyer are denoted by α. The buyer’s valuation of a firm’s non-price characteristics,
that is its quality qj, is given as qj = αAj. We assume that firm 1 is of low quality
and low costs, while firm 2 is of high quality and high costs. That is, q1 < q2 and
c1 < c2. 2 − 1 shall follow a uniform distribution with mean zero and variance ν.
˜2− ˜1 shall follow a uniform distribution with mean zero and variance ν˜. As in the
no information case bidders are missing non-price information they should perceive
the buyer’s decision to be more noisy. Thus, we assume that ν˜ ≥ ν. With these
assumptions it is possible to derive illustrative analytical results. Their derivation
can be found in appendix B.2.
 Relationship between firms’ equilibrium bids. By making use of the first
order conditions (II.3) and (II.6) we derive equilibrium bids for the information
case and the no information case. We directly turn towards the comparison of the
equilibrium bids. The pi denote the equilibrium bids in the information case, the p˜i
the equilibrium bids in the no information case:
p∗1 = p˜
∗
1 −
1
3
(q2 − q1)−
√
3(
√
ν˜ −√ν), (II.7)
p∗2 = p˜
∗
2 +
1
3
(q2 − q1)−
√
3(
√
ν˜ −√ν). (II.8)
The intuition behind expressions (II.7) and (II.8) is straightforward: The first term
added to p˜∗2 respectively subtracted from p˜
∗
1 captures that in case of disclosed non-
price information firms become aware of firm two’s competitive advantage in terms
of quality: The net competitive pressure on the low-quality firm (firm one) increases,
while that on the high-quality firm (firm two) decreases. The last term in expres-
sions (II.7) and (II.8) captures that in case of concealed non-price information firms
perceive the buyer’s decision to be more noisy and thus add a markup on their costs.
 Relationship between buyer’s expected utilities. The relationship between
the expected utility of the buyer in the information case, EU, and that in the no
8We implicitly assume that the value of the outside option is so low that the upper limit to the
prices of firm 1 and 2 is above the equilibrium prices. The outside option simply leads to upper
limits for the prices of firm 1 and 2. Thus, its explicit treatment would only make our analysis
more complicated without delivering further insights.
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Figure II.1: Preferences of the buyer regarding the information structure as a function
of the auction parameters. The graph shows the indifference line of the buyer. The indifference
line of the buyer represents the parameter set at which the buyer is indifferent between disclosing
and concealing non-price information. We assumed that c1 = 4.5 and q1 = 0.3. The chosen
parameters sizes resemble typical parameter sizes from our application. For all q2-c2-combinations
above the indifference line the buyer prefers to conceal non-price information, whereas for all
combinations below he prefers to disclose non-price information.
information case, E˜U, is given as
EU− E˜U = 1
3
√
12ν
(q2 − q1) [(c2 − c1)− 2(q2 − q1)]
+3(2
√
νν˜ + ν˜ − 3ν) (II.9)
+(
√
ν˜
2
√
ν
− 1
2
)(c2 + c1 − q2 − q1).
Equation (II.9) shows that the net change in the expected utility of the buyer de-
pends on three factors: The first term captures the tradeoff between the competitive
advantage of the low-cost firm and that of the high-quality firm. If the difference in
costs is small but that in qualities is very high, disclosure of non-price information
weakens competition because firms become aware of the high-quality firm’s large
net advantage. If in contrast the difference in costs is very high and that in qualities
small, disclosure of non-price information strengthens competition as it mitigates
the net advantage of the low-cost firm. The second term captures that in the no
information case firms perceive the decision of the buyer to be more noisy. In the
no information case they thus demand a markup on their prices which in turn de-
creases buyer’s welfare. The third term weighs the effect of uncertainty (term two)
against that of quality information (term one). The weight of either effect depends
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on how strong relative to costs firms’ pricing decisions are influenced by non-price
information. The smaller the influence of non-price information, the more the effect
of noise in the buyer’s decision outweighs that of non-price information.
The graph in figure II.1 illustrates how the buyer’s preferences regarding the infor-
mation structure change as a function of the auction parameters, namely the firms’
costs and their qualities. The parameter sizes used for this example resemble typi-
cal parameter sizes from our application.9 The important take-away is that which
information structure to choose for a certain application is not clear ex ante but
depends on the setting. In general, if the difference in qualities is high and that in
costs is low, the buyer prefers the no information case over the information case.
In contrast, if the difference in qualities is low and that in costs is high, the buyer
prefers the information case over the no information case.
II.3 Data
We have available an extensive dataset from a popular European online procurement
platform. On this platform private customers tender jobs ranging from construction
over general repair and renovation to teaching. Jobs are awarded through an open
non-binding auction.
The exact procedure is as follows: A private customer (the buyer) posts a description
of the job he wants to procure. This description is entered into a free-text field and
usually contains job details (for example, the area to be painted, whether or not
cleaning is required, and so on), the job site, a price expectation (termed “startprice”
in the following) and an announcement of the time span during which tradesmen (the
bidders) can put forward quotes. All this information is available to all tradesmen
registered at the platform. During the defined time span all interested tradesmen can
publicly announce prices for which they are willing to do the offered job. Announced
prices can be changed at any point during the auction. The current price quote
of each bidder and all his non-price characteristics are publicly observable on the
website. The non-price characteristics of a bidder include the number of positive
and negative ratings the bidder received so far, his home location, qualifications like
the possession of certain degrees, his area of expertise, and so on. At the end of the
auction the buyer is free to award the job to one of the bidders or to withdraw his
9The average value of αAj in our data (that is, the average quality qj) is 0.3. The average
(estimated) costs are e 450. In “utility-units” this is 4.5 (which equals the average value of ρcj).
For our example, we set c1 = 4.5 and q1 = 0.3.
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Figure II.2: Distribution of auctions over startprice categories. Displayed is the distribu-
tion of all auctions which were conducted during the second half of 2008 (187,747 auctions) over
startprice-categories. Startprice-category 0 ranges from e 0-99, startprice-category 1 ranges from
e 100-199, and so on.
offer. In case of an award the platform obtains a certain percentage of the successful
bid as commission.
We have available data on auctions which were conducted during the years 2007
and 2008. In this time span the auction platform experimented with some rule
changes. In order to exclude the possibility that our results are influenced by these
rule changes we focus our analysis on auctions which took place during the second
half of the year 2008. In this period there were only minor rule changes. like for
example a slight reduction of the time span after which the buyer has to decide
whether to withdraw his offer or award the job to one of the participating bidders.
Minor changes like these should have no effect on our results.
In the second half of 2008 we observe around 180,000 auctions. These are grouped
into a number of categories like “painting”, “moving”, and so on. Besides by the kind
of job offered auctions are differentiated by the value of the jobs offered. We use the
price expectation the buyer states at the beginning of the auction (the startprice)
as a proxy for the value of the job offered.10 Startprices can be chosen freely but
10The level of the startprices put forward by the buyers is highly correlated with the level of the
prices the bidders put forward, which reassures us that startprices are indeed good proxies for the
value of the jobs procured. Note also that the startprice is set purely for informational reasons,
it neither puts any restriction on bids submitted nor on the award decision made by the potential
buyer.
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are typically set in multiples of e 100 (respectively e 50 for auctions with values
below e 500). More than half of all auctions have a startprice which is below e 300.
We sort the auctions into different startprice-categories: Category 0 ranges from
e 0-99, category 1 from e 100-199, and so on. Figure II.2 depicts the distribution
of the auctions over these startprice-categories. As can be seen, nearly 30% of all
auctions have startprices between e 0-99, and of all these auctions with startprices
between e 0-99 around 80% have a startprice of e 50 or less. We expect the bidding
behavior in these very low valued auctions to be fundamentally different from the
bidding behavior in auctions with higher stakes and thus drop all auctions from
startprice-category 0 from our analysis.
For every auction in each job-startprice-category we have available information
about the number and the identities of the participating bidders, the prices put
forward, the bidders’ non-price characteristics (like the number of positive and neg-
ative ratings, the possession of certain degrees and qualifications, and so on) and
the final choice of the potential buyer (including whether he chose to withdraw his
job offer). For our analysis we focus on the four top categories with respect to the
number of auctions. These are “moving”, “painting”, “car” and “plumbing and
heating”. We use only auctions in which at least two bidders participate. Descrip-
tive statistics for each auction-category are given in table II.1. The left part of figure
II.3 shows the spatial distribution of all auctions conducted, the right part gives an
exemplary impression of the course of an auction.
As already mentioned, on the auction platform we have our data from both buyers
and bidders are fully informed about each bidders’ non-price characteristics. We are
interested in what would happen to the welfare of the buyers if these non-price infor-
mation were concealed from the bidders. Our theoretical considerations in section
II.2 show that, among other things, the answer depends on how buyers value bidders’
non-price characteristics. We think it is reasonable to expect buyers’ preferences α
regarding bidders’ non-price characteristics to depend both on the job category and
on the value of the job offered. For example, whether a bidder has undergone pro-
fessional training should matter more for jobs from the “plumbing and heating”
category than for jobs from the “moving” category. Similarly, whether a bidder has
liability insurance might matter more for a buyer when he procures a high-value
job than when he procures a low-value job. To capture that the choice behavior of
a buyer (and in consequence the behavior of the bidders) possibly depends on the
type and the value of the job offered, we will perform separate analyses for each of
the four most frequent job categories (“moving”, “painting”, “car”, “plumbing and
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“Moving” Mean SD Median Min Max
Nbr. of auctions 16,841
Nbr. of bidders 4,564
Nbr. of buyers 15,076
Nbr. of bidders per auction 5.1 3.1 4 2 27
Bid amount 556.7 463.7 450 1 3000
Nbr. of auction participations per bidder 5.3 35.8 1 1 1748
Auctions per buyer 1.1 0.5 1 1 23
Auction duration (days) 10.6 9.6 8.7 0 144.0
Last bid placement (hours till auction end) 88.5 160.8 20.0 0 1,883.7
“Painting” Mean SD Median Min Max
Nbr. of auctions 11,434
Nbr. of bidders 5,800
Nbr. of buyers 10,614
Nbr. of bidders per auction 6.4 4.2 5 2 31
Bid amount 606.2 496.3 450 0 3000
Nbr. of auction participations per bidder 5.2 21.9 1 1 793
Auctions per buyer 1.1 0.3 1 1 8
Auction duration (days) 11.4 9.3 10 0 120.0
Last bid placement (hours till auction end) 84.2 162.4 12.3 0 1,891.8
“Car” Mean SD Median Min Max
Nbr. of auctions 3,413
Nbr. of bidders 1,541
Nbr. of buyers 3,216
Nbr. of bidders per auction 2.8 1.2 2 2 12
Bid amount 398.0 449.4 250 1 3000
Nbr. of auction participations per bidder 2.7 12.4 1 1 397
Auctions per buyer 1.1 0.3 1 1 4
Auction duration (days) 15.3 12.1 14 0 118.1
Last bid placement (hours till auction end) 150.8 215.5 53.2 0 1,786.7
“Plumbing and Heating” Mean SD Median Min Max
Nbr. of auctions 2,962
Nbr. of bidders 2,161
Nbr. of buyers 2,831
Nbr. of bidders per auction 2.9 1.3 2 2 13
Bid amount 471.4 604.9 198 1 3000
Nbr. of auction participations per bidder 2.3 6.5 1 1 156
Auctions per buyer 1.0 0.3 1 1 7
Auction duration (days) 13.1 10.9 10.0 0.1 109.4
Last bid placement (hours till auction end) 112.2 183.1 30.3 0 1,518.3
Table II.1: Descriptive statistics for auctions from job categories “moving”, “painting”,
“car” and “plumbing and heating”. The table displays descriptive statistics for auctions from
the four most popular job categories (“moving”, “painting”, “car” and “plumbing and heating”).
Considered are all auctions with startprices ranging from e 0-2000 and with at least two partici-
pating bidders.
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Figure II.3: Spatial distribution of auctions and exemplary bidding process. On the left,
the spatial distribution of all auctions from job category “painting” for which we have collected
cost information is displayed. On the right, an example of a typical bidding process is shown. The
different symbols stand for different bidders, the auction is from the job category “painting”, and
the startprice set was e 200.
heating”) and for each of the four most frequent startprice-categories (1, 2, 3 and
5).
For a sample of around two-thousand auctions from the job category “painting” we
manually extracted information about cost factors from the job descriptions. These
cost factors include for example the area to be painted, whether paint is provided
by the buyer, and so on. We do not need this information for our counterfactual
analysis in section II.6, where for each job-startprice-category we analyze the change
in aggregate welfare of the buyers in case non-price information gets concealed.
However, before doing our counterfactual analysis in section II.6, in section II.5
we use information about cost factors to verify a fundamental assumption of our
counterfactual analysis. This assumption is that bidders know about the preferences
of the buyers regarding their non-price characteristics and that thus their behavior
is in line with our information case model.
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II.4 Analysis of Buyers’ Preferences
Besides price information buyers have available information about the non-price
characteristics of the bidders. We assume that when making their decisions buyers
use both price and non-price information. In particular, we assume that a buyer’s
ranking of a given bidder depends on both the price that bidder puts forward and
how he values that bidder’s non-price characteristics. With Aj denoting the vec-
tor of bidder j’s non-price characteristics and α denoting the vector of the buyer’s
respective preferences, we assume the buyer’s valuation of bidder j’s non-price char-
acteristics (that is, bidder j’s quality) is equal to αAj. We observe each bidder’s
non-price characteristics, but we do not observe the preferences of the buyers. In
this section we use a logit discrete choice model to elicit buyers’ preferences α. We
do this in order to see whether buyers indeed behave in accordance with our as-
sumption that they account for non-price information when making their decisions.
Furthermore, information about buyers’ preferences is at the core of our counter-
factual analysis in section II.6, as we assume the bidders to base their behavior on
a rational model of buyers’ behavior.
 Econometric model. For a given auction n we model the decision of the
buyer as a discrete choice among all participating bidders and an outside option.
We assume the buyer to base his decision among bidders on both their prices and
their non-price characteristics. Bidders’ non-price characteristics comprise binary
characteristics, indicating for example the possession of certain degrees, discrete
characteristics like the number of positive and negative ratings, and a continuous
measure for the distance between a bidder’s home location and the job site.11
We estimate buyers’ preferences along the lines of the model we developed in section
II.2: In a given auction n, buyer’s utility from choosing bidder j is assumed to be
linearly dependent on the bidder’s price pnj, how he values the bidder’s non-price
characteristics, and an error term nj. We assume that the buyer’s valuation of
a bidder’s non-price characteristics is a linear function of that bidder’s non-price
characteristics and the buyer’s respective preferences. With Anj subsuming the non-
price characteristics of bidder j in auction n, and α denoting the preferences of the
buyer over these characteristics, the buyer’s valuation of the non-price characteristics
11The distance measure is constructed from the buyers’ and the bidders’ zip-codes. As such it is
only approximate. However, given the assumption that also the buyers can in general be expected
to base their decision on a rough distance estimate and not an exact calculation, it should suffice
to capture the respective part of the buyers’ decisions.
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of bidder j in auction n is given by αAnj.
12 With ρ denoting the price elasticity
of the buyer in auction n,13 the utility he derives from each of the Jn participating
bidders can explicitly be formulated as
un0 = n0
un1 = t+ ρpn1 + αAn1 + n1
... (II.10)
unJn = t+ ρpnJn + αAnJn + nJn .
The constant t captures the value of the outside option. It holds that the lower t the
higher is the value of the outside option. The error terms nj capture unobserved
influences on the buyer’s decision unrelated to bidders’ prices or their observed non-
price characteristics. The buyer is assumed to choose the bidder which offers him
the highest utility. By assuming the error terms nj to be independently, identically
type I extreme value distributed we obtain the standard logit model: The choice
probabilities are given as
Pnj =

1
1+
∑Jn
k=1 e
t+ρpnk+αAnk
if j = 0,
et+ρpnj+αAnj
1+
∑Jn
k=1 e
t+ρpnk+αAnk
if j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}.
Estimates of the model parameters {ρ,α} can be obtained by maximizing the like-
lihood
L =
N∏
n=1
Jn∏
j=0
(Pnj)
ynj , ynj =
1 if alternative j is chosen in auction n,0 otherwise.
 Estimation results. We estimate our model for each combination of the job
categories “moving”, “painting”, “car”, “plumbing” and the startprice-categories
1, 2, 3, 5. Table II.2 displays the results for startprice category 1 (which covers
all auctions with startprices ranging from e 100-199) and all job categories. Table
II.3 displays the results for job category “moving” and all startprice-categories. The
12For simplicity, we are assuming that each buyer has the same preferences α. We could replace
this assumption by assuming that the preferences α of the buyers follow a normal distribution and
accordingly estimate a mixed logit model. However, this more involved approach does not deliver
significantly different results.
13We use a logit discrete choice model to elicit the preferences of the buyers. The scale of the
logit discrete choice model is determined by the variance of the error terms j . Thus, for our
empirical analysis we can no longer use the convenient normalization of the price coefficient ρ to
-1.
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Job category
Covariates in
buyer’s utility fct. “Moving” “Painting” “Car” “Plumbing”
Bid amount (e 100) -2.17∗∗∗ -2.00∗∗∗ -1.54∗∗∗ -1.73∗∗∗
Nbr. of positive ratings .16∗∗∗ .23∗∗∗ .26∗∗∗ .21∗∗∗
Nbr. of negative ratings -.19∗∗∗ -.26∗∗∗ -.20∗ -.21∗∗
Nbr. of employees -.06 .02 -.28∗∗ .06
Distance (km) -.04∗∗ -.07∗∗ -.07 -.02
Trade License .05 .17 -.07 -.11
Master craftsman company .01 -.14 -.14 .10
Senior journeyman company .11 -.08 -.17 -.23
Engineer -.43 .28 -1.93∗ .18
Technician 1.01 1.25∗ -.56 -.10
Craftsman card -.43 -.17 .08 .14
In craftsmen register .07 -.05 .03 -.01
Certified registrations .04 -.43 .53 .29
Other certifications -.12 .03 -.04 -.17
Liability insurance .43∗∗∗ .06 -.02 .28
Certified membership -.04 .10 .39∗∗ .06
Constant 1.79∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗
Nbr. of observations 12,161 6,119 2,614 2,435
Nbr. of auctions 2,599 1,140 702 606
Table II.2: Preference estimates for startprice-category 1 and all job-categories. The
table gives the results of estimations of the logit discrete choice model given by (II.10) for startprice-
category 1 and all job-categories. Displayed are the coefficients on the covariates in the utility
functions of the buyers. Significance niveaus are reported by stars: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%.
results for all other job-startprice-categories are similar and due to reasons of brevity
not displayed here.
The estimates for all job-startprice-categories exhibit the same general pattern: The
coefficients on the price coefficient, the ratings coefficients and the constant are
highly significant, while the coefficients on the other covariates are mostly insignif-
icant. That does not come as a surprise, as the information about bidders most
prominently displayed in the auction overview screen are bidders’ prices and the
number of their positive and negative ratings. Information on bidders’ other non-
price characteristics like the possession of certain degrees or the membership in
certain institutions is only available after some additional clicks. The constant is
highly significant because in about half of all auctions buyers choose to withdraw
their job offers. It holds that the higher the value of the constant (which appears
in the utility a buyer derives from a certain bidder), the lower is the value of the
outside option.
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Startprice category
Covariates in
buyer’s utility fct. 1 2 3 5
Bid amount (e 100) -2.17∗∗∗ -1.42∗∗∗ -1.32∗∗∗ -.67∗∗∗
Nbr. of positive ratings .16∗∗∗ .21∗∗∗ .24∗∗∗ .28∗∗∗
Nbr. of negative ratings -.19∗∗∗ -.14∗∗∗ -.22∗∗∗ -.28∗∗∗
Nbr. of employees -.06 -.05 -.03 .02
Distance (km) -.04∗∗ -.04∗ -.07∗∗∗ -.12∗∗∗
Trade License .05 -.03 .12 .02
Master craftsman company .01 .33 -.71∗ -.86∗∗
Senior journeyman company .11 .25 -.25 -.43
Engineer -.43 .24 .02 -.09
Technician 1.01 -.03 1.31 1.85∗∗∗
Craftsman card -.43 -.24 .12 .15
In craftsmen register .07 -.09 -.07 -.26
Certified registrations .04 -.37 -.08 .47
Other certifications -.12 -.25∗∗∗ .10 .18∗
Liability insurance .43∗∗∗ .11 .70∗∗ .76∗
Certified membership -.04 .26∗∗∗ .03 .01
Constant 1.79∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗
Nbr. of observations 12,161 9,037 8,092 8,573
Nbr. of auctions 2,599 1,665 1,358 1,209
Table II.3: Preference estimates for job-category “moving” and all startprice-
categories. The table gives the results of estimations of the logit discrete choice model given
by (II.10) for the job-category “moving” and all startprice-categories. Displayed are the coeffi-
cients on the covariates in the utility functions of the buyers. Significance niveaus are reported by
stars: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%.
The numbers given in tables II.2 and II.3 are coefficient estimates and as such not
directly interpretable. In order to get an impression of the effect of a decrease
of a bidder’s price by e 10 or an increase in his positive or negative ratings, we
computed average marginal effects. For startprice-category 1 (table II.2) we find
that a decrease of a bidder’s price by e 10 increases his winning probability by
around 2%. This holds for all job-categories. Over all job-categories, one additional
positive rating increases a bidder’s winning probability by around 1%, while an
additional negative rating decreases a bidder’s winning probability by around 2%.
The influence of the number of ratings is most pronounced for the “plumbing”
category, where one additional negative rating lowers a bidder’s winning probability
by even 3%.
For the job-category “moving” (table II.3), with respect to ratings we get the result
that for all startprice-categories an additional positive rating increases a bidder’s
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winning probability by around 1%, while an additional negative rating decreases a
bidder’s winning probability by around 2%. As might be expected, we find that the
effect of a decrease in a bidder’s price depends on the value of the auction (as is
proxied for by the startprice) - the higher the value of the auction, the lower the
effect of a certain price decrease. In particular, we find that while a price decrease
of e 10 increases a bidder’s winning probability by 2% for startprice-category 1, it
only increases a bidder’s winning probability by 0.5% for startprice category 5.
We think it is reasonable to assume that on average jobs from the categories “mov-
ing” and “painting” require less skills than jobs from the categories “car” and
“plumbing and heating”. That is, for the latter categories we expect buyers to
put more weight on the qualifications of bidders. This presumption is confirmed
by our results - a look at table II.3 shows that the influence of a bidder’s ratings
relative to his price (as expressed by the relationship between the coefficient on a
bidder’s positive respectively negative ratings and the price coefficient) is indeed
significantly higher for the categories “car” and “plumbing” than for the categories
“moving” and “painting”.
The results discussed above hinge on the assumption that the error terms nj in
(II.10) are neither correlated with the prices pnj nor with the bidders’ attributes
Anj. In other words, for our estimation results to be consistent there must be no
unobserved factors which influence buyers’ utilities in a way systematically con-
nected to our observables. However, as we analyze auctions conducted on an online
marketplace, and as we were provided with very detailed recordings of these auc-
tions, we are convinced that we are able to control for all factors which have a
systematic influence on the buyers’ utilities: Our data contains exactly the amount
of information about bidders buyers have available when making their decisions.
Thus, there should be no influences on buyers’ utilities which are both unobserved
and in some way systematically connected to bidders’ attributes.
II.5 Analysis of Bidders’ Information State
In section II.2 we proposed two models to describe bidders’ behavior in open non-
binding auctions. On the auction platform we have our data from bidders are in-
formed about each other’s non-price characteristics. Thus, their behavior should be
in line with the predictions of our information case model. To verify this hypothesis,
in this section we use a reduced form model to check whether the observed behavior
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of the bidders is indeed in line with the predictions of our information case model.
In particular, we exploit contrasting testable predictions of both the information
case and the no information case framework: If bidders behave according to our
information case model, they should react to changes in the quality composition of
an auction. In particular, in reaction to the appearance of a high quality opponent
they should strongly decrease their prices. In contrast, if bidders behave according
to our no information case model, they should show no reaction at all.
 Econometric model. We test for these contrasting implications by using the
following reduced form model of bidders’ pricing behavior:
pnj = ξKnj + βSnj + aj + νnj. (II.11)
This model describes bidders’ pricing behavior along the lines of our theoretical
frameworks from section II.2. Basically, we assume that the price bidder j puts
forward in auction n depends on his costs cnj and, in case of disclosed quality
information, on his quality relative to that of his rivals. We assume the costs cnj to
depend both on the observable cost factors Knj and on the unobserved opportunity
costs of bidder j. How bidder j fares in terms of the buyer’s valuation of his non-
price characteristics (that is, in terms of quality) relative to his rivals is assumed to
depend on bidder j’s strength in terms of quality relative to the whole population
of bidders and an unobserved auction-specific deviation. Bidder j’s overall strength
in terms of quality is captured in the bidder specific constant aj. The error term
νnj captures bidder j’s opportunity cost for the job offered in auction n and the
auction-specific deviation to this “overall strength”.
The binary variable Snj indicates whether bidder j has to face a rival bidder who
is strong in terms of quality. We know from our theoretical considerations that if
in case of disclosed quality information a rival of bidder j is replaced by one who
is stronger in terms of quality, bidder j should react with a decrease in his price.
In contrast, if quality information is concealed, bidder j should show no reaction.
That means we expect β < 0 if bidders behave according to our information case
model, and β = 0 otherwise.
 Identification strategy. We restrict our analysis to bidders which are observed
to participate in several auctions. In doing so, we are able to estimate equation
(II.11) by mean-differencing (that is, employing a fixed effects estimator). By that
we get rid of the individual specific and unobserved constants aj. The assumption
which has to hold for our estimates to be consistent is that the nj are mean-
independent from the observable cost elements Knj and the strong rival indicator
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Snj. As we will discuss in more detail below, this assumption is likely to hold in our
case.
 Estimation. Our results from section II.4 show that throughout all job-startprice-
categories the decisions of the buyers are strongly influenced by the number of pos-
itive and negative ratings bidders have. Thus, we define that a given bidder j
encounters a strong rival in auction n if at least one of the other bidders in auction
n has a difference of positive and negative ratings of at least 90:14
Snj =
1 if encounter with strong bidder (ratings difference ≥ 90),0 otherwise.
In order to estimate equation (II.11) we need information about cost factors Knj.
Thus, we have to restrict our estimation to auctions from the job category “paint-
ing”. In section II.4 we saw that the number of positive and negative ratings a bidder
has is of similarly strong influence on buyers’ decisions over all startprice-categories.
This allows us to use auctions from all startprice-categories for the estimations in
this section. We want to estimate equation (II.11) by a fixed effects estimator, which
means that we have to restrict our sample to bidders which are observed in at least
two auctions. This leaves us with a sample of 941 bidders, taking part in 1,498
auctions from job category “painting” (the mean number of auction participations
is 10, the median number is 6). In 22.2% of these auctions a bidder with a ratings
difference of at least 90 takes part.
Table II.4 shows our estimation results. The first column displays our base specifi-
cation. In column two we add dummies to control for auction size and for regional
influences.15 The coefficients on the cost factors do not vary much between the
specifications, and they are of reasonable size: A professional tradesman in Ger-
many charges on average e 5-6 per painted square meter. This includes painting,
paint, cleaning and travel. The average area to be painted in our data set is 138.3
m2, the average travel distance 45.0 km (one-way). Together with our estimation
results in table II.4, this implies that the average price per square meter painted,
including paint and travel, is about e 3-4 on the auction platform. Given that most
of the bidders on the platform are non-professionals,16 this number seems to be
plausible. In both specifications the coefficient on the strong rival indicator Snj is
14For comparison: The mean difference of positive and negative ratings in our sample is 5.8.
1% of the bidders in our sample have a ratings difference of at least 90.
15We define auctions to be from the same region when the first digit of their zip code is identical.
1678% of the bidders in our sample are neither master craftsmen nor senior journeymen.
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Dependent variable:
Bid amount of bidder j
in auction n (1) (2) (3)
Encounter with -82.85∗∗∗ -91.57∗∗∗ -93.79∗∗∗
strong rival (dummy) (14.89) (17.73) (17.77)
Controls:
Area to paint (m2) 1.72∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗
Area to paper (m2) 1.41∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗
Paper removal (m2) 2.72∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗
Cleaning (dummy) 77.63∗∗∗ 64.08∗∗ 54.01∗
Reparation (dummy) 40.60∗∗∗ 56.39∗∗∗ 42.30∗∗∗
Priming (dummy) 124.60∗∗∗ 125.44∗∗∗ 114.41∗∗∗
No. of windows 10.41 11.00 13.39
No. of window frames 34.31 25.40 19.41
No. of doors 45.78∗∗∗ 46.23∗∗∗ 42.22∗∗∗
No. of door frames 17.72∗∗∗ 18.56∗∗∗ 18.21∗∗∗
Nbr. of radiators 85.33∗∗∗ 85.58∗∗∗ 78.91∗∗∗
Paint by contractor (dummy) 25.99∗∗ 14.97 18.89∗
Varnish by contractor (dummy) 125.58∗ 116.82 102.01
Distance (km) 1.15∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ .76∗∗∗
Dummies for nbr. of bidders X X
Dummies for region X X
Controls for bidder composition X
Bidder FE’s X X X
R2 0.292 0.300 0.341
N 9,546 9,546 9,546
Table II.4: Identification of the bidders’ reaction to a strong rival; results of fixed
effects estimation. The table shows the results of a fixed effects estimation of the reduced-form
model (II.11). The dependent variable is bid amount. Covariates are a dummy indicating the
appearance of strong rival (a rival with a difference between positive and negative ratings of at
least 90) and costs controls. The panel consists of 941 bidders who on average take part in 10
auctions each. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For all results: both
within- and between-R2 are close to the overall R2. Significance niveaus are reported by stars:
***: 1%, **: 5%, *: 10%.
highly significant and strongly negative, meaning that bidders bid more competitive
if they encounter a strong rival: they lower their bids by around e 90, which is a
quite strong reduction if one considers that the average bid amount in our sample
is about e 550.
 Discussion of estimation results. Our estimation results suggest that bidders
react to the appearance of a strong rival by lowering their bids. This verifies our
assumption that bidders behave according to our information case model. However,
as mentioned during the derivation of equation (II.11) above, the coefficient at the
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strong rival indicator Snj, β, can only be interpreted as the direct causal effect of
the appearance of a strong rival on bidder j’s bidding behavior if the unobserved
part of equation (II.11), νnj, is mean independent from the observables Knj and
Snj. νnj captures two unobserved influences on bidder j’s bid: One stems from the
composition of auction n in terms of the qualities of bidder j’s rivals, the other
stems from bidder j’s cost components.
It might be that either strong bidders select themselves into certain auctions, or
that certain types of bidders select themselves into auctions where a strong bidder
is present. In effect, that would lead to a correlation between the appearance of
a strong bidder and the auction-specific composition in terms of bidders’ qualities.
To be sure that we actually capture the bidders reaction to the appearance of a
strong rival, in column 3 of table II.4 we control for the bidder composition of the
different auctions. We do so by taking the averages over the attributes of all “weak”
bidders (bidders with a difference of positive and negative ratings of less than 90),
and using these averages as further controls in our fixed effects regression. As can
be seen, controlling for the auction composition does not change our results. In
addition, a large difference in positive and negative ratings is not correlated with
any other of a strong bidder’s attributes. Also, besides the prices put forward, the
most prominent information auction participants are given is their rivals’ ratings.
Thus, we are pretty sure we are capturing the bidders’ reaction to their rivals’
differences in positive and negative ratings.
In contrast, possibly problematic for the identification of the bidders’ information
state is correlation between the covariates and the unobserved part of equation
(II.11) which stems from bidders’ cost components. If the unobserved deviation in
bidders’ costs from their expected value is systematically connected to the appear-
ance of a strong rival, significance of β would no longer indicate that bidders are
informed about their qualities. However, there are two reasons why we do not think
that the appearance of a strong rival is correlated with unobserved cost factors:
First, we collected our data by extracting cost information from the job offers as
they were available to the bidders. It is quite unlikely that we systematically missed
a factor which is observable to the bidders and which indicates a deviation in costs.
Second, even if we missed a factor of this kind, it should be known to the buyers.
Before an auction starts, the buyers announce a startprice. This startprice is an-
nounced for informational purposes, and it should be reasonable to assume that,
when setting the startprices, besides at strategic considerations buyers orientate
themselves at the costs of their job. So, if there is a cost factor which is unobserved
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by us as researchers but known to the buyers and bidders, this cost factor should
be reflected in the level of the startprice. Auctions in which a strong rival appears
actually do systematically differ from auctions in which there is no strong rival in
terms of the startprice. However, auctions in which a strong rival appears do not
have a lower, but a higher startprice, indicating that strong rivals select themselves
into auctions which seem to be quite valuable relative to the observable costs el-
ements. This kind of selection should work against the hypothetical effect of the
appearance of a strong rival in the case of informed bidders. As we are still able to
observe more competitive bidding when a strong rival appears, we are quite certain
that the coefficient on Snj identifies strategic bidding behavior.
To summarize, our results strongly indicate that bidders have information about
their qualities and that they behave as implied by our model for the information
case: If a strong rival appears, bidding behavior becomes far more competitive. The
competitive effect of the appearance of a strong rival is highly significant and robust
against several controls. It manifests itself by price decreases of around 16%.
II.6 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section we determine the impact of availability of quality information on the
aggregate welfare of the buyers. In our data, information about bidders’ non-price
characteristics is publicly available, and bidders can infer information about the
preferences of the buyers regarding their non-price characteristics from observing
buyers’ former decisions. Thus, bidders’ behavior should be in line with the in-
formation case model we developed in section II.2. In section II.5 we verified this
assumption. We are interested in how buyers’ welfare would change if non-price
information was not available to the bidders. That is, we are interested in a coun-
terfactual scenario where bidders are informed about each other’s prices but not
about each other’s non-price characteristics. The buyers on the other hand shall
always be informed about all bidders’ prices and non-price characteristics.
In order to calculate the change in buyers’ welfare if quality information was con-
cealed, we need information about bidders’ counterfactual prices. With information
about bidders’ costs cnj we could calculate these counterfactual prices by employ-
ing our no information case model. We do not have explicit cost information, but
as observed bidders’ behavior seems to be in line with our model for the case of
73
II. Information Disclosure in Non-Binding Auctions
Data
from job-
startprice-category.
p, A
Information case model
pnj +
Pnj
∂Pnj/∂pnj
− cnj = 0,
Pnj = Pnj(pn,An; tˆ, ρˆ, αˆ)
Cost estimates
cˆ
Preference estimates
tˆ, ρˆ, αˆ
Logit model,
full
unj = t− ρpnj +αAnj + nj
No information case model
pˆnj +
P˜nj
∂P˜nj/∂pˆnj
− cˆnj = 0,
P˜nj = P˜nj(pˆn; t˜, ρ˜)
Preference estimates
t˜, ρ˜
Logit model,
prices only
unj = t˜ − ρ˜pnj + ˜nj
Counterfactual
price estimates
pˆ
Figure II.4: Sketch of the course of the counterfactual analysis.
disclosed quality information, we can use this model to derive estimates of bidders’
costs cnj from the observed actual prices pnj.
Our counterfactual analysis proceeds as follows: In our data we have information
about bidders’ prices and bidders’ non-price characteristics. We use this information
together with the information on buyers’ preferences from section II.4 to solve our
information case model (II.3) after estimates of bidders’ costs cˆnj. We then use
these cost estimates as input and solve our no information case model (II.6) after
estimates of bidders’ counterfactual prices pˆnj. Finally, we use our estimates of
bidders’ counterfactual prices pˆnj to compute how buyers’ welfare would change in
case non-price information was concealed from the bidders. Figure II.4 depicts this
course of our counterfactual analysis schematically.
 Estimation of bidders’ costs. Our assumption that bidders’ behavior can
be described by our model for the information case implies that the observed bids
pnj are equilibrium bids which for every auction n solve the bidders’ first order
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Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
Moving Painting
Actual bidamounts (pnj) e 260.00 e 84.36 e 249 e 256.80 e 81.49 e 248
Estimated costs (cˆnj) e 179.41 e 90.15 e 167.25 e 191.30 e 85.64 e 179.65
(e 4.64) (e 3.64)
Counterfactual e 263.80 e 83.67 e 252.00 e 266.83 e 81.04 e 256.09
bidamounts (pˆnj) (e 2.02) (e 1.97)
Car Plumbing and Heating
Actual bidamounts (pnj) e 235.94 e 74.73 e 225 e 233.38 e 72.86 e 224
Estimated costs (cˆnj) e 135.71 e 82.30 e 123.64 e 146.92 e 79.61 e 136.93
(e 13.93) (e 11.29)
Counterfactual e 235.58 e 74.48 e 223.22 e 242.74 e 71.97 e 232.99
bidamounts (pˆnj) (e 4.52) (e 6.50)
Table II.5: Estimated costs and counterfactual bidamounts for startprice-category 2.
Displayed are summary statistics for the actual bidamounts, the estimated costs and the estimated
counterfactual bidamounts for all four job categories and for startprice-category 2 (which includes
startprices from e 200-299). The results are based on 1,665 auctions for job category “moving”,
on 1,457 auctions for job category “painting”, on 516 auctions for job category “car”, and on
260 auctions for job category “plumbing and heating. Bootstrapped standard errors are given in
parentheses.
conditions
pnj +
Pnj
∂Pnj/∂pnj
− cnj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}. (II.12)
Besides on the bid amounts pnj and the bidders non-price characteristics Anj, which
we observe in our data, the winning probabilities Pnj depend on the preferences
{ρ,α} of the buyer. By inserting our estimates {ρˆ, αˆ} from section II.4, we directly
arrive at estimates Pˆnj for the winning probabilities:
Pˆnj =

1
1+
∑Jn
k=1 e
t+ρˆpnk+αˆAnk
if j = 0,
et+ρˆpnj+αˆAnj
1+
∑Jn
k=1 e
t+ρˆpnk+αˆAnk
if j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}.
(II.13)
With these, the first order conditions (II.12) can be solved for estimates ĉnj of the
bidders’ costs cnj.
Table II.5 displays summary statistics of our cost estimates for startprice-category
2 and all four job-categories. To account for the fact that our cost estimates (as
well as all other results of our counterfactual analysis) are based on estimates of
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Figure II.5: Distribution of bidders’ markups. Displayed is the density distribution of bidders’
markups on their (estimated) costs for all four job categories and startprice-category 2 (which
includes startprices from e 200-299). Due to the sensitivity of our cost estimation to extreme
bidamounts, for up to 5% of the bidders we get cost estimates close to zero and in thus in turn
quite high markups. These are omitted here for the sake of illustration.
the buyers’ preferences, we applied bootstrapping to get standard errors for our
estimates. The standard error of the mean of our cost estimates ranges from e 4-14.
Thus, the estimates of bidders’ costs are quite precise. The same holds true for the
counterfactual results shown later on. The cost estimates become more meaningful
if we look at the markup bidders demand on their costs. Figure II.5 displays the
estimated distribution of bidders’ markups on their costs for startprice-category 2
and all four job-categories. The median markup in the “moving” category is 47%,
in the “painting” category it is 34%, in the “car” category it is 74%, and in the
“plumbing” category it is 61%.
Now, are these markups of a sensible order of magnitude? From the cost information
we manually collected for a part of the auctions from the “painting” category we
know that for auctions from startprice-category 2 the average area to paint equals
around 80 m2. In more illustrative terms, that could mean, for example, to paint
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the walls and the ceilings of two small rooms of around 16 m2 floor space each. We
assume that, depending on the level of practice, a job like this could be done by
one person in between four to eight hours. Startprice-category 2 includes auctions
with startprices ranging from e 200-299, and the level of bidders’ prices is highly
correlated with the level of the startprice. Given a markup of 30% to 40%, this would
roughly amount to an hourly profit somewhere in the range of e 10-20. Given that
the median hourly wage before taxes in Germany is around e 15 these seem to be
plausible numbers.
As can be seen from figure II.5, for the job-categories “moving” and “painting”
the majority of bidders demands markups of up to 50%. In comparison, in the
job-categories “car” and “plumbing” the cost markups are significantly higher, with
a major part of the bidders demanding markups between 50% and 100%. These
results are in line with economic intuition: The qualifications required for jobs
from the categories “car” and “plumbing” should on average be higher than that
required for jobs from the categories “moving” and “painting”. Thus, differences in
qualifications among the bidders in the two former job-categories should be more
pronounced than in the two latter categories, which in turn allows highly qualified
bidders to demand larger markups in the categories “car” and “plumbing”.
 Counterfactual Simulation. Our counterfactual assumption is that non-price
information is concealed from the bidders. In this case, the bidders’ model of the
buyers’ decision process in a certain auction n is
max
j∈{0,1,...,Jn}
unj, where
un0 = ˜n0, (II.14)
unj = t˜− ρ˜pnj + ˜nj for j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}. (II.15)
Like in the information case, also in the no information case we assume that bidders
gather information about buyers’ decision processes by observing past auctions.
We can put ourselves in the bidders’ position in the counterfactual no information
case by ignoring the non-price information available to us as econometricians and
estimating choice model (II.15) only using price information. With our estimates t˜
and ρ˜ we then can formulate the bidders’ first order conditions in the no information
case as
pˆnj +
P˜nj
∂P˜nj/∂pˆnj
− cˆnj = 0, j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}, (II.16)
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where
P˜nj =
et˜+ρ˜pˆnj
1 +
∑Jn
k=1 e
t˜+ρ˜pˆnk
. (II.17)
We solve conditions (II.16) numerically for estimates pˆnj of bidders’ equilibrium
prices in the no information case.
With estimates pˆnj of the counterfactual bids we can calculate the counterfactual
aggregate utility of the buyers: Following Small and Rosen (1981), for type I extreme
value distributed error terms j the change in expected utility of the buyer in an
auction n can be calculated as
∆EUn = EUn − E˜Un = ln
(
1 +
Jn∑
j=1
etˆ+ρˆpnj+αˆAnj
)
− ln
(
1 +
Jn∑
j=1
etˆ+ρˆpˆnj+αˆAnj
)
.
The change in buyers’ aggregate utility if quality information was concealed is then
simply given as
∆EUtotal =
N∑
n=1
∆EUn (II.18)
Division by ρˆ delivers the monetary equivalents of the changes in utility.
 Results. Table II.6 displays the result of our counterfactual. For each job-
startprice-category welfare changes are expressed in percentages of total revenues
made (in monetary terms) in the respective category during the observation period.
Total revenues range from around e 180,000 in job-category “moving”, startprice-
category 1, to around e 20,000 in job-category “plumbing”, startprice-category 5.
To account for uncertainty due to the fact that our results are based on estimates
of the buyers’ preferences, we computed bootstrapped standard errors. These are
given in parentheses, together with the number of auctions on which the results for
each job-startprice-category are based.
The changes in aggregate welfare of the buyers range from −8.6% in job-category
“painting”, startprice-category 5, to +8.7% in job-category “car”, startprice-category
2. For each job-category there is a certain pattern of welfare changes: Roughly, for
job-categories “moving” and “plumbing” the information structure does not con-
siderably affect the aggregate welfare of the buyers. In contrast, for job-categories
“painting” and “car” concealment of non-price information seems to have a clearly
directed impact: While concealment of non-price information decreases buyers’ wel-
fare by up to around 9% for job-category “painting”, it increases buyers’ welfare
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Job-category
Startprice-
category Painting Moving Plumbing Car
1 -3.2% 2.6% 3.4% 2.0%
(e 100-199) (1.2%, 1,140 auct.) (0.8%, 2,599 auct.) (3.4%, 606 auct.) (3.4%, 702 auct.)
2 -4.5% -0.1% -4.4% 8.7%
(e 200-299) (0.9%, 1,457 auct.) (0.9%, 1,665 auct.) (4.1%, 260 auct.) (6.5%, 516 auct.)
3 -3.9% 0.1% -1.0% 4.6%
(e 300-399) (0.9%, 1,302 auct.) (0.9%, 1,358 auct.) (5.8%, 135 auct.) (5.4%, 362 auct.)
5 -8.6% -2.0% 12.2% 3.6%
(e 500-599) (1.1%, 1,099 auct.) (1.1%, 1,209 auct.) (17.4%, 119 auct.) (23.6%, 179 auct.)
Table II.6: Estimated changes in buyers’ aggregate welfare in case non-price informa-
tion gets concealed from the bidders. For all job-startprice categories considered, the table
displays the expected changes in buyers’ welfare in case non-price information gets concealed. The
percentage changes were derived by computing the monetary equivalent of the total change of
buyers’ welfare and then relating it to total auction turnover in the job-startprice-category con-
sidered. All auctions were conducted during the second half of 2008. The number of auctions and
bootstrapped standard errors are given in parentheses.
by up to around 9% for job-category “car”. With a look at the bootstrapped stan-
dard errors, for the “painting” category the results are significant throughout all
startprice categories. For the “car” category the results are less pronounced, as the
number of available observations is considerably lower there.
The pattern of welfare changes depicted in table II.6 can be explained along the
lines of our considerations from section II.2. The level of skills required for jobs
from categories “moving” and “painting” is lower than that required for jobs from
categories “car” and “plumbing”. Thus, for the two latter categories bidders should
be more differentiated in terms of their qualities (that is, the buyers’ valuations
of their non-price characteristics) than for the two former categories. Hence for
categories “moving” and “painting” we expect buyers’ welfare to decrease when
non-price information is concealed, while for categories “car” and “plumbing” we
expect it to increase. The numbers in table II.6 show that for categories “painting”
and “car” that is actually the case: When non-price information is concealed, for
category “painting” we expect buyers’ welfare to decrease by up to 9%, while for
category “car” we expect it to increase by up to 9%. That we do not observe buyers’
welfare to change in one clear direction for categories “moving” and “plumbing” can
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be explained by the fact that for these categories the relationship between bidders’
costs and qualities is such that we are near the indifference line in figure II.1.
 Discussion. The results of our counterfactual simulation are only meaningful if -
although necessarily stylized - our theoretical framework captures the fundamental
mechanics of the application at hand sufficiently well. We argue that this is the
case: Our framework abstracts from inter-auction dynamics. That is, we assume
that both buyers and bidders do not behave strategically across auctions. We think
this assumption is reasonable for our application: First, as during the time period
considered each buyer on average auctions off only one contract, we can exclude
strategic inter-auction behavior of buyers. Second, the probability of repeated en-
counters between bidders is quite low: On average, a given bidder encounters only
12% of his rivals at least twice. Thus, it should be reasonable to assume that, if at
all, phenomenons like tacit collusion play a negligible role. We also do not think that
explicit collusion in a given auction plays a role: For once, bidders are not able to
communicate with each other on the online platform. Then, as shown on the map in
figure II.3, most auctions are procuring jobs in large cities respectively metropolitan
areas. There, in contrast to rural areas, bidders should not know about the whole
pool of potential rivals, what makes interactions between them apart from that on
the platform unlikely.
A slightly different concern might be that some bidders behave strategically across
auctions due to capacity constraints, like in for example Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer
(2000). However, the auctions we consider are about smaller jobs which should take
about one to at most three days to complete, and in the time span we consider (half
a year) the average number of auction participations is around four. Thus, we do
not think that capacity constraints do play a major role here. To summarize, we
think that modeling each auction in an isolated manner is a reasonable approach
for our application.
We further made the assumption that a bidding equilibrium emerges in each auction.
In particular, this assumption implies that dynamic phenomenons like sniping do
not occur in our application. Given the numbers in table II.1 this assumption seems
to be justified: On average, the last bid is placed well before the end of an auction,
meaning that sniping seems to play no role in our data. Thus, the assumption that
in each auction in our application an equilibrium is achieved should be justified.
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II.7 Conclusion
Non-binding reverse auctions are establishing as one of the most prominent tools
for electronic procurement activities both for firms and government organizations.
Whereas in non-binding auctions typically no structure is imposed on the buyer’s
decision process, important design questions arise, however, with respect to the in-
formation regime throughout the bidding process. We added to the understanding
of this auction format by analyzing the effects of different designs of the information
structure of an open non-binding auction. In particular, under the assumption that
prices are always visible, we examined what effects disclosure respectively conceal-
ment of information about bidders’ non-price characteristics has on the aggregate
welfare of the buyers.
After establishing a formal framework, we first observed that buyers prefer that in-
formational arrangement which creates higher competitive pressure among bidders.
As we showed, which of the informational regimes indeed induces more competitive
pressure crucially depends on the precise situation considered. Thus, from a theory
point of view none of the regimes dominates.
To obtain further insights on the impact of the information regimes in non-binding
auctions for real market situations, we then conducted an empirical analysis based
on an extensive data set from a large European online procurement platform. The
informational setup on this platform is such that bidders are informed about each
other’s non-price characteristics. Building on our formal framework, we performed
a counterfactual welfare analysis to assess the consequences of concealing non-price
information from the bidders. We find that our theoretical result - that the effect of
concealment of non-price information depends on how strong buyers weigh bidders’
non-price characteristics - also matters for applications in the field. In case buyers
put a lot of weight on bidders’ non-price characteristics, we find that if non-price
information was concealed, buyers’ welfare would increase by up to 9%. Contrary, if
buyers put only low weight on bidders’ non-price characteristics, we expect buyers’
welfare to decrease by up to 9%. The latter is the case in the by far most popular
job-categories on the platform.
The final policy recommendation implied by those results clearly depends very much
on the final objectives of the online platform. Especially for business models in the
very dynamic online markets, often rapid growth is much more important than in-
stantaneous profits. In a recent interview for HBR IdeaCast from Harvard Business
Review, Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, for example states: “Percentage margins
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are not one of the things we are seeking to optimize. It’s the absolute dollar-free
cash flow per share that you want to maximize, [...]” And later on: “[W]e believe by
keeping our prices very, very low, we earn trust with customers over time, and that
that actually does maximize free cash flow over the long term.” 17 A formal con-
sideration of the dynamic aspects such as the long run profitability of firm growth
in a specific sector by far exceeds the bounds of our structural analysis. Never-
theless, our analysis can contribute to questions arising in this broader context. If
the most challenging task to achieve the long run growth objectives of the online
platform indeed is to attract as many buyers as possible, then our results clearly
show that the current information regime to reveal all non-price information is the
one to best implement this objective, as it maximizes buyers’ welfare in the most
popular auction categories.
17Source: Interview with Jeff Bezos, HBR IdeaCast from Harvard Business Review, January 3,
2013.
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Chapter III
Exploring the Opaqueness of the
Patent System - Evidence from a
Natural Experiment*
III.1 Introduction
The fundamental “deal” between the applicant of a patent and society is often
stated as the granting of exclusion rights in exchange of the disclosure of a technical
teaching that underpins the patented invention. In the assessment of the patent
system’s welfare balance, most work has focused on the incentive effect for inventors
(respectively, applicants) - the “bait” of the promised exclusion rights is supposed
to motivate inventors to spend more resources on research and development than
they would in the absence of patent rights. The corresponding disclosure effects
have received considerably less scrutiny, but many authors take as given that they
exist and that they are sizeable.
Currently, the underlying assumption of policy makers and researchers alike is that
the patent system is relatively transparent, that is, that searching for information on
potentially conflicting prior art (which would limit the patentability of an invention)
is rather costless. The patent system is apparently made to fulfill this ideal - dis-
closure by patent applicants is supposed to be complete, and insufficient disclosure
can be held against the applicant by the examiner, leading to a refusal of the patent
grant. At the same time, some users of the patent system have complained that
the relevance of inventions is skillfully disguised by applicants who use arcane and
*This chapter is joint work with Dietmar Harhoff.
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complex language in order to avoid in-depth scrutiny by rivals. Bessen and Meurer
(2008), for example, explicitly recommend a reform which would require patent ap-
plicants to use “plain language” in order to avoid intransparent descriptions of the
patented invention and excessive opaqueness of the overall patent system.
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the notion that the patent system
is highly opaque. We use a quasi-experimental setting in which publicly available
information - the request for acceleration - became private information at the EPO.
Ex ante, the observability of the acceleration may have guided rivals of a patent
applicant in detecting particularly valuable inventions. The information may have
contributed to an above-average rate of oppositions against these patents (once
granted).
We develop a theoretical model of the ex ante and ex post applicant and opponent
behavior. Using aggregate data computed by the EPO from the non-public informa-
tion on accelerations, we show that absent an observable signal of patent value, the
likelihood of a patent being opposed drops sharply. The reduction in oppositions
once the signal is no longer available suggests that potential opponents face problems
in finding substitute signals or identifying the patent’s contribution merely from the
conventional data generated by the patent office. Given the quasi-experimental set-
ting used here, we argue that our results provide fairly strong evidence in favor of
the opaqueness presumption.
The chapter proceeds in four subsets. Section III.2 describes the institutional setting
and thus the nature of the quasi-experiment. In section III.3, we specify a theoretical
model in which requests for acceleration are related to patent value, and thus the
likelihood of opposition. The model lends itself to developing a number of hypotheses
regarding the identification and extent of opaqueness in the patent system. Section
III.4 describes the empirical setup and provides a first set of descriptive results.
Section III.5 concludes.
III.2 Institutional Background
The legal foundation for the activities of the European Patent Office (EPO) is given
by the European Patent Convention (EPC) and a body of rules accompanying the
Convention. The timing of patent filings and subsequent actions by the EPO is
rather complex, but can be summarized as follows (see Harhoff and Wagner, 2009,
for more details). Patent filings at the EPO are typically based on previous priority
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filings at national patent offices. These filings are then forwarded to the EPO and
published there 18 months following the original priority date. With the publication
of the patent document, the EPO also publishes a search report. The report is
accessible to any third party and published prominently on the EPO’s websites.
Information contained in the search report may be crucial for the applicant in order
to assess his or her chances of obtaining a strong patent grant. The information can
also be crucial for rivals who wish to assess the legal strength of a particular patent.
Within six months of the publication, the patent applicant has to request the ex-
amination of the patent application, otherwise the patent filing will lapse. The
examination process itself can be rather lengthy, and in many cases, applicants seek
to delay the final decision by the EPO, since a patent grant with subsequent trans-
lation into national languages is rather expensive. However, some applicants are
interested in fast resolution of patent examination. Reasons for being interested in
a quick resolution may be that the patent holder wants to have the right to request
an injunction against an infringer. Injunctions are only available after the patent
application has been granted. Moreover, important investment decisions may have
to be made by the applicant in order to enter product markets with patent protec-
tion. This may again explain why some applicants would like to see an acceleration
of patent examination.
At the EPO, the applicant may request examination early (Article 96 (1) EPC).
He may also unconditionally waive his right to receive an invitation from the EPO
to confirm that he desires to proceed with the application. This waiver allows the
application to reach the examining division more quickly. Typically, the request is
made when filing the European patent application, but it can also be submitted
later by separate communication to the EPO.
In Rule 93(d) - OJ2001, 458 - published on September 7, 2001 - the President of
the European Patent Office announced that effective of December 3rd, 2001 (EPO
2001) requests for accelerated search and accelerated examination would no longer
be made public (as they had been before).1 This rule change meant that information
that had been observable by any third party was now private information between
the EPO and the applicant.
We exploit this setting by comparing statistics describing applicants’ and their ri-
vals’ behaviors before and after the rule had been changed at the EPO. To have a
1Accelerated search is usually a precursor to accelerated examination. Therefore, we do not
address any differences between the two institutions here. A differential treatment of the two
proceedings is planned for an extended version of this chapter.
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foundation for interpreting the statistics, we first develop a theoretical model in the
subsequent section.
III.3 Model of Application and Opposition
Process
We assume that there are two firms, firm A and firm B. Firm A shall have filed a
patent application.2 We further assume that firm A knows about the value of its
patent. The value of firm A’s patent is equivalent to the economic value of firm A’s
patent in case it gets granted. Besides by its value firm A’s patent is characterized
by its strength. The strength of the patent denotes the probability p that a patent
is found valid in opposition cases. We assume that firm A uses the technology
described in its patent to introduce an innovation into the market and that this
innovation is rivalrous to firm B. That is, its introduction leads to a decrease in firm
B’s profits.
Firm A shall be able to choose between accelerated (a) and standard (¬a) examina-
tion of its patent application. If firm A chooses accelerated patent examination and
its patent gets granted, the profit firm A gains from its patented technology will be
higher than in case of standard examination. Formally we will denote the profits
firm A reaps from its patented technology by pi
(·)
(·). These profits shall depend on the
value of the patent, which is either high (h) or low (l), and on whether the patent
examination has been accelerated (a) or not (¬a). Firm A’s costs of accelerated
patent examination shall be ca > 0. We assume that firm A is only interested in
accelerating a high-value patent: piah − pi¬ah > ca, and for simplicity pial = pi¬al = pil.
It shall hold that piah > pi
¬a
h > pil.
The present value of firm B’s profits shall decrease if firm A’s patent is granted. For
simplicity we assume that firm A and firm B play a zero-sum game, which means
that the gains of firm A in case of a patent grant equal firm B’s losses.3 That is, if
firm A successfully patents its technology the profit pi(v, a) it makes equals the losses
firm B incurs. To avoid reduction in its profits firm B has the possibility to oppose
2The assumption that the game starts after the patent application is filed simplifies the model,
as the initial decision whether to file the patent application has not to be considered. That is, we
consider the costs of filing the patent application to be sunk.
3For example, if firm A and firm B are the only players in a market of fixed size and firm A is
able to increase its market share by a certain amount due to its patented technology, the market
share of firm B decreases by the same amount.
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the patent of firm A. If firm B decides to oppose firm A’s patent both firms have
to pay co for the then enfolding opposition process. At the end of the opposition
process firm A’s patent remains granted with probability p. This probability is the
strength of firm A’s patent.
The timing of the game firm A and firm B play is as follows: First, nature draws
the value of firm A’s patent, which can be high (h) or low (l). h shall be drawn with
probability θ, l with probability 1− θ. Then, firm A gets informed about the draw
of the patent value, but firm B does not. After getting informed, firm A chooses
whether to accelerate patent examination (a respectively ¬a). If firm A chooses
accelerated patent examination it incurs costs ca. Next, firm B has the possibility
to oppose firm A’s patent. In case firm B decides to oppose firm A’s patent, both
firms have to pay costs co. At the end of the then enfolding opposition process firm
A’s patent remains granted with probability p. Finally, payoffs are realized. These
depend on the patent value (h respectively l) and whether patent examination has
been accelerated (a respectively ¬a).
In the following we will differentiate between two information structures, which we
call “public” and “private”. In information structure “public”, firm B is informed
about whether firm A chose to accelerate patent examination, but firm B is not
informed about the value of firm A’s patent. In information structure “private”, firm
B is neither informed about firm A’s acceleration decision nor about the value of
firm A’s patent. In other words, in information structure “public” there is a publicly
visible signal related to patent value, whereas in information structure “private”
this signal is concealed. The EPO’s 2001 decision to make information about the
applicant’s acceleration decision no longer publicly available is equivalent to shutting
down the value signal. Our main interest lies in a comparison of applicants’ and
rivals’ behavior in information structures “public” and “private”.
Before we sum up our game, we have to make some parametric assumptions. In
general, if firm A’s innovation is patented, firm A’s profits increase and firm B’s
profits decrease. We already made the simplifying assumptions that we have a zero-
sum game, which means that firm A’s increase in profits equal firm B’s decrease, and
that acceleration is only worthwhile for high-value patents, which means that if a
patent is of low value there is nothing to gain from acceleration. In order to establish
a clear payoff-structure for our game, we make two small additional assumptions.
First, we assume that the profits which can be gained from a low-value patent are
larger than opposition costs and acceleration costs combined. Second, we assume
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that opposition costs are larger than acceleration costs.4 Put together, all our
parametrical assumptions are:
A1 We have a zero-sum game, that is firm A’s gains from its patented innovation
equal firm B’ losses: piah(A) = pi
a
h(B) = pi
a
h, pi
¬a
h (A) = pi
¬a
h (B) = pi
¬a
h , pil(A) =
pil(B) = pil.
A2 Firm A shall only be interested in accelerating a high value patent: piah−pi¬ah >
ca, and for simplicity pi
¬a
l = pi
a
l = pil.
A3 The profit from a granted low-value patent is larger than opposition and ac-
celeration costs combined: pil > co + ca.
A4 Costs of acceleration are smaller than costs of opposition: ca ≤ co.
Given these parametrical assumptions, the assumptions about the timing of the
game, and the assumptions about the information structures, the extensive forms
of our game are given by the game-trees in figures III.1 and III.2. Figure III.1
displays the extensive form of the game for information structure “public”. First,
nature draws the value of firm A’s patent. With probability θ, the value is high
(h), with probability 1− θ it is low (l). Then, firm A gets informed about the value
of its innovation in case it is patented and has to decide whether to accelerate its
examination (a respectively ¬a). After firm A’s acceleration decision firm B has
to decide whether to oppose firm A’s patent (o respectively ¬o). When making its
decision, firm B is informed about whether firm A chose accelerated examination,
but not about the value of firm A’s innovation in case it is patented. The dashed
lines in figure III.1 represent firm B’s respective information sets: When firm B
has to decide whether to oppose firm A’s patent, it can base its decision only on
information about whether firm A chose accelerated patent examination, but not
on the actual value of firm A’s patent.
Figure III.2 displays the extensive form of the game for information structure “pri-
vate”. Initially, the game proceeds as for information structure “public”: Nature
draws the value of firm A’s patent, which is high (h) with probability θ and low (l)
with probability 1− θ. Then firm A gets informed about nature’s draw and, based
4These assumptions are made with a look at the field. Gambardella et al. (2008) estimate the
median patent value to be e 0.3 m. According to Levin and Levin (2002), opposition costs at the
EPA amount to around e 0.1 m. If a firm chooses accelerated patent examination it does not have
to pay an extra fee but only to cope with increased administrative effort, which makes it sensible
to assume that the costs of acceleration are smaller than those of opposition.
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Figure III.1: Extensive form of the game, information structure “public”. The graph
shows the extensive form of the game firm A (the patent applicant) and firm B (its rival) play for
the case that firm A’s acceleration decision is disclosed to firm B. That is, whether firm A chooses
accelerated patent examination (a respectively ¬a) is public information. The dashed lines mark
firm B’s information sets when it has to decide whether to oppose firm A’s patent (o respectively
¬o).
on this information, decides whether to accelerate patent examination. In contrast
to information structure “public”, however, firm B is neither informed about the
value of firm A’s patent nor about firm A’s acceleration decision. Accordingly, the
dashed ellipse in figure III.2 represents the single information set of firm B: Firm B
has to decide about opposing firm A’s patent without information about both the
value of firm A’s patent and firm A’s acceleration decision.
Solution
The game we set up above is a dynamic game of incomplete information.5 We
solve the game by applying the concept of the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(PBNE). The PBNE is a modification of the more general concept of the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (BNE), which in turn is a modification of the most general Nash
5More specifically, for information structure “public” it is a signaling game in the tradition of
Cho and Kreps (1987).
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Figure III.2: Extensive form of the game, information structure “private”. The graph
shows the extensive form of the game firm A (the patent applicant) and firm B (its rival) play
for the case that firm A’s acceleration decision is concealed from firm B. That is, whether firm A
chooses accelerated patent examination (a respectively ¬a) is private information to firm A. The
dashed ellipse marks firm B’s information set when it has to decide whether to oppose firm A’s
patent (o respectively ¬o).
equilibrium concept. The PBNE was introduced into game theory in order to rule
out implausible equilibria in dynamic games of incomplete information, and exactly
this is the purpose of its application here.
Figures III.1 and III.2 show that both for information structure “public” and “pri-
vate” we have information sets with several nodes. If an information set contains
several nodes, then the respective player has the same set of actions at every node
of his information set. However, the player does not know at which node of the
information set he actually is, but he has to form beliefs about his position inside
the information set. A PBNE now demands two things: First, the strategies of each
player have to be consistent with each player’s beliefs. Second, each player obtains
his beliefs from the equilibrium strategies and the observed actions by application
of Bayes’ rule. That is, strategies have to be consistent with beliefs, and beliefs have
to be consistent with strategies.
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Figure III.3: Outcomes for information structures “public” and “private” and low to
medium gains from acceleration. The upper graph displays the outcome structure in the p-θ-
space for low gains from acceleration (that is, values of piah ∈ Π3), the lower graph for medium gains
(that is, for values of piah ∈ Π4 ∪ Π5). For each subset of the p-θ-space, the groups of parentheses
show the outcomes for information structures “public” (above) and “private” (below). In each
parentheses, first the outcome in case firm A has a high-value patent and then the outcome in
case firm A has a low-value patent is given. An outcome is described by firm A’s action, that is
acceleration (a) or no acceleration (¬a), and firm B’s subsequent action, that is opposition (o) or
no opposition (¬o).
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Figure III.4: Outcomes for information structures “public” and “private” and high
gains from acceleration. The graph displays the outcome structure in the p-θ-space for high
gains from acceleration (that is, for values of piah ∈ Π6). For each subset of the p-θ-space, the
groups of parentheses show the outcomes for information structures “public” (above) and “private”
(below). In each parentheses, first the outcome in case firm A has a high-value patent and then
the outcome in case firm A has a low-value patent is given. An outcome is described by firm A’s
action, that is acceleration (a) or no acceleration (¬a), and firm B’s subsequent action, that is
opposition (o) or no opposition (¬o).
We apply the PBNE concept by first deriving BNE from the normal form of our
game. For each BNE we then check whether it fulfills the criteria of a PBNE -
that is, whether there is a belief structure which is consistent with this equilibrium.
In doing so we will concentrate on equilibria in pure strategies. In addition, in
order to rule out implausible equilibria we apply the “intuitive criterion”, which was
introduced in the context of signaling games by Cho and Kreps (1987). Roughly put,
the intuitive criterion eliminates an equilibrium as “implausible” if a player using
forward induction finds he would be better off if he deviated from that equilibrium.
In the end, the determination of the equilibria of our game hinges on payoff com-
parisons, and these payoff comparisons in turn depend on the specific relationships
among our model parameters. In the following we structure the parameter space
along three dimensions: The strength of the patent, that is the probability p with
which the patent is found to be valid in case of opposition, the probability θ with
which the patent is of high value, and the profit piah firm A can gain from acceleration
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of a high-value patent. Given assumptions A1 to A4 above, the game can be solved
for every subset of this parameter space. Appendix C.1 describes the solution of
our signaling game in detail.
Results
We determined the equilibria of our signaling game for information structures “pub-
lic” and “private” for all subsets of the parameter space. The parameter space is
spanned along three dimensions: piah, p and θ. Parameter pi
a
h denotes the profit firm
A gains from accelerating a high-value patent and spans from piah = pi
¬a
h + ca (com-
pare assumption A2) to infinity. Parameter p is the strength of firm A’s patent,
which is the probability that firm A’s patent is found to be valid in case of opposi-
tion, and parameter θ is the probability that firm A’s patent is of high value. Both
parameters range from from zero to one.
Figures III.3 and III.4 display cross-sections through the piah-p-θ space perpendicular
to the piah-axis. That is, each of the three depicted planes corresponds to one par-
ticular value of piah. As figures III.3 and III.4 show, these cross-sections are further
divided into subsets by cut-off values p
(·)
(·). The ordering of these cut-off values de-
pends on the value of piah at which a cross-section was produced. With respect to the
position of the cut-off values relative to each other we can divide the piah space into
several subsets. These subsets are described in detail in appendix C.1. In figures
III.3 and III.4 only representative cross-sections for subsets of the piah space which
are associated with substantial gains from acceleration are displayed.
 Outcome patterns. We find that only for patents of intermediate strength
our results do depend on the information structure. For the discussion of our results
we structure the subset containing patents of intermediate strength (pB1 < p < p
B
3 )
further into subsets I to IV.6 These subsets are marked in figures III.3 and III.4. Our
results with respect to firms’ behavior are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Outcome patterns.). The outcome patterns for weak (0 < p < pB1 )
and strong (pB3 < p < 1) patents do not depend on the information structure. For
patents of intermediate strength (pB1 < p < p
B
3 ), the behavior of the firms depends
on the information structure:
6There is no Nash equilibrium and thus also no PBNE for one of the subsets which contain
patents of intermediate strength. In the following discussion we therefore will ignore this subset.
As this subset describes the quite unrealistic situation that high-value patents occur with very
high probability, we do not lose information which is of economic significance.
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i) Outcome patterns in case information about firm A’s acceleration decision is
concealed:
Firm A does not accelerate low-value patents but accelerates high-value patents.
If high-value patents are rare (subsets I and III), firm B does not oppose. If
high-value patents are more frequent (subsets II and IV), firm B opposes.
ii) Outcome patterns in case information about firm A’s acceleration decision is
disclosed:
If the patent is rather weak and gains from acceleration are rather low (subsets
I and II), firm A never accelerates and firm B never opposes.
In contrast, if the patent is rather strong and the gains from acceleration are
high (subsets III and IV), then firm A accelerates high-value patents only and
firm B opposes if it observes acceleration.
The derivation of the results in proposition 1 can be found in appendix C.1. Below
we discuss the outcome patterns in firms’ behavior.
The outcome patterns for weak and strong patents are the same for information
structures “public” and “private”. The reason is that for both weak and strong
patents firm B’s decision whether to oppose is not influenced by information possibly
emitted by firm A’s acceleration decision: If firm A’s patent is weak (0 < p < pB1 ),
then it is worthwhile for firm B to oppose firm A’s patent regardless of its value.
Accordingly, when deciding whether to accelerate the examination of its patent,
firm A does not have to take into account the signaling effect of its decision - firm A
simply chooses to accelerate patent examination when this decision makes it better
off in expectation conditional on opposition by firm B. The same logic applies if a
patent is very strong (pB3 < p < 1): In this case firm B never gains from opposition,
and again in its decision whether to accelerate patent examination firm A has only
to take into account its payoffs (conditional on no opposition by firm B). In effect,
for strong patents firm B never opposes and firm A accelerates only if it has a high-
value patent. In contrast, outcome patterns for patents of intermediate strength
(pB1 < p < p
B
3 ) differ between the cases of concealed and disclosed acceleration
information.
 Concealed acceleration information. In case information about firm A’s
acceleration decision is concealed from firm B, for patents of intermediate strength
(that is, for subsets I to IV) firm A always plays a separating strategy. Firm A’s
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separating strategy in subsets I to IV is: Acceleration in case the patent is of high
value, no acceleration in case it is of low value. In contrast to firm A, which plays
the same strategy in all subsets, firm B plays different strategies in subsets I and III
and subsets II and IV: In subsets I and III, which are related to low probabilities
that a patent is of high value, firm B chooses not to oppose, whereas in subsets
II and IV, which are related to high probabilities that a patent is of high value, it
chooses to oppose.
We first explain why firm A plays a separating strategy in all subsets: As firm A’s
acceleration decision is concealed, by choosing to accelerate its patent it does not
transmit any information to firm B which could possibly trigger opposition. Also,
regardless of firm B’s action, in the end firm A is always better off if it chose to
accelerate a high-value patent. As firm A does not profit from accelerating low-
value patents, it is thus best for firm A to play a separating strategy: Accelerate
high-value patents, but do not accelerate low-value patents.
Let us now turn to firm B’s reaction: In the upper subsets I and III the probability
that a patent is of high value is low. That means it is far more likely that firm A
has a low-value patent, which firm B would not want to oppose, than a high-value
patent, which firm B would want to oppose. Thus, in the upper subsets I and III
firm B is better off in expectation if it does not oppose firm A’s patent. In contrast,
in subsets II and IV the probability that a patent is of high-value is relatively high.
That is, in subsets II and IV it is far more likely that a given patent is of high-value
(and accelerated) than that it is of low-value, and thus now firm B is better off in
expectation if it opposes firm A’s patent.
 Disclosed acceleration information. Let us first take a look at subsets
I and II, for which the gains from acceleration of a high-value patent are rather
small. For subset I and subset II the outcomes in case acceleration information is
public are the same: Firm A never accelerates its patent, and firm B never opposes.
The reasoning is as follows: Firm B knows that acceleration is only worthwhile for a
high-value patent. Thus, if it observed firm A to accelerate patent examination, firm
B would conclude that firm A has a high-value patent. As firm B only gains from
opposing a high-value patent, it would oppose if firm A accelerated its patent, which
in turn would mean that firm A’s expected profits from acceleration (which are small
here) are offset by the costs of the then enfolding opposition process. Thus, firm
A plays a pooling strategy - it chooses not to accelerate its patent regardless of its
value. Given that firm A plays a pooling strategy, firm B cannot infer information
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about the value of the patent from firm A’s action, and therefore has to base its
decision whether to oppose solely on the prior probability of a high-value patent
(which equals θ). For subsets I and II the probability that firm A’s patent is of
high value is rather small, and therefore firm B, which in subsets I and II can only
profit from opposition of a high-value patent, is in expectation better off if it does
not oppose firm A’s patent.
Both in subset III and subset IV firm A accelerates high-value patents only and
firm B only chooses to oppose when it observes acceleration. The reason is that in
subsets III and IV additional profits of firm A from acceleration are so high that
the expected gains from acceleration of a high-value patent outweigh the costs of
an opposition process. Thus, firm A accepts that by accelerating it sends a signal
which induces firm B to oppose, because in expectation firm A is better off if an
accelerated high-value patent is opposed than if a not-accelerated high-value patent
is not opposed. Firm B, which still only can profit from opposition of a high-value
patent, reacts accordingly by opposing only when it observes acceleration.
 Partial welfare analysis. We conduct a partial welfare analysis with respect
to the applicant, firm A, and its rival, firm B. For all subsets of the parameter space
we make welfare comparisons between information states “public” and “private”.
The following proposition summarizes our results:
Proposition 2 (Partial welfare analysis.). For weak (0 < p < pB1 ) and strong (p
B
3 <
p < 1) patents there is no change in firms’ welfare between information structures
“public” and “private”. For patents of intermediate strength (pB1 < p < p
B
3 ), the
welfare of the firms depends on whether firm A’s decision to accelerate its patent is
concealed from firm B:
i) For low probabilities that a patent is of high-value (subsets I and III),
firm A is better off in case acceleration information is concealed, whereas firm
B is better off in case acceleration information is disclosed. If patents are weak
(subset I), the aggregate welfare of firm A and firm B is highest in information
structure “public”. If patents are strong (subset III), it is highest in information
structure “private”.
ii) For high probabilities that a patent is of high value (subsets II and IV)
firm A and firm B are better off in case acceleration information is concealed,
both if considered individually and if considered together.
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Analytical welfare comparisons can be found in appendix C.2. Table III.1 sum-
marizes the results. We find that for weak (0 < p < pB1 ) and strong (p
B
3 < p < 1)
patents the welfare of firm A and firm B is the same for both information structures.
The reason is simply that there is no difference in outcomes between information
structures (compare figures III.3 and III.4 and proposition III.3). Below we discuss
our welfare results for patents of intermediate strength.
 Welfare - Low probabilities of high-value patents. For patents of in-
termediate strength and for low probabilities that a patent is of high value (subsets
I and III) the welfare results follow clear patterns: Firm A is the better off the
less information is available to firm B about the value of firm A’s patent. The
intuition is pretty simple: The less information firm B receives about the value of
firm A’s patent, the more information rent firm A can extract - in a way, the less
information about the value of a patent is available, the better firm A can “hide”
its few high-value patents among the bulk of low-value patents. Conversely, with
more information available about firm A’s patent firm B becomes better off. The
reason is that firm B can only profit from opposing high-value patents. Thus, the
more information firm B has about the value of firm A’s patent, the more targeted
it can be in its opposition activities, and the less resources are wasted on low-value
patents.
So, for low probabilities that a patent is of high value the interests of firm A and firm
B diverge: While firm B prefers information structures which reveal information
about the value of firm A’s patent, firm A prefers information structures which
conceal this information. Thus, which information structure is best with a look at
the combined welfare of firm A and firm B depends on how large the gains of firm A
from concealed value information are relative to the benefits of firm B from disclosed
value information:
In subset I opposition by firm B is quite likely to be successful. As the probability
of successful opposition is rather high, firm A only accelerates its patent in case
information about its acceleration decision is concealed. Without an observable
signal transporting value information firm B refrains from opposition, as firm B can
only profit from opposition of a high-value patent, and as it is quite unlikely that a
given patent is of high-value. From an aggregate welfare perspective the additional
gains of firm A from acceleration of its high-value patent do not matter, as we made
the assumption that the gains of firm A from the introduction of its patent equal the
losses of firm B. Thus, in case the acceleration signal is concealed aggregate welfare
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Subset I Subset III
Firm A Private Private
Firm B Public Public
A + B Public Private
Subset II Subset IV
Firm A Public Public
Firm B Private/Public Public
A + B Public Public
Table III.1: Results of the partial welfare analysis. For subsets I to IV the table displays what
information structure results in the highest welfare for firms A and B if considered individually and
together. The result for firm B in subset II depends on p: Firm B is better off with information
structure “public” in case p > pW . Otherwise, firm B is better off with information structure
“private”. The cut-off value pW is given in appendix C.2.
is determined by the costs firm A directly incurs from accelerating its patent. In case
the acceleration decision is public information the threat of being opposed by firm
B lets firm A refrain from acceleration. Also, due to the low a-priori probability of
a high-value patent firm B still does not oppose. Thus, in subset I combined welfare
of firm A and firm B is highest for information structure “public”, as there firm A
does not incur acceleration costs.
In contrast to subset I, in subset III chances that opposition of firm B is success-
ful are small. Thus, firm A now accelerates its high-value patents both in case its
acceleration decision is disclosed and in case it is concealed. In case firm A’s accel-
eration decision is concealed firm B refrains from opposition due to the low a-priori
probability of a high-value patent. In contrast, in case firm A’s acceleration decision
is disclosed, firm B opposes if it observes acceleration. The probability that firm B
succeeds with opposition is rather low, but both firm A and firm B incur opposition
costs. That is, firm B’s opposition effort in case the acceleration signal is disclosed
is more or less “wasted”, and therefore combined welfare of firm A and firm B is
highest if information about firm A’s acceleration decision is hidden from firm B
(“private”).
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 Welfare - High probabilities of high-value patents. For patents of in-
termediate strength (pB1 < p < p
B
3 ) and for high probabilities that a patent is of
high value (subsets II and IV) firm B becomes better off the more information it
receives about the value of firm A’s patent. The reason is that firm B only profits
from opposition of a high-value patent, and thus more information about the value
of the submitted patent allows firm B to use its resources more efficiently. How-
ever, firm A no longer becomes better off the less information about the value of its
patent is available to firm B. To the contrary, it prefers information structures in
which information about the value of its patent is disclosed to firm B. The reason is
that without any discriminating information about patent value firm B opposes all
patents, as because of the high a-priori probability of high-value patents the number
of expected “hits” (opposition of a high-value patent) makes up for the “misses”
(opposition of a low-value patent). Given a signal about patent value, firm B can
use its resources more efficiently by restricting its opposition efforts to high-value
patents, and firm A gets at least its low-value patents granted for sure. Thus, in
subsets II and IV both firm A and firm B benefit when information about the value
of firm A’s patent is disclosed (information structure “public”). Of course that
means that also the combined welfare of firm A and firm B is highest if information
about the patent value is transmitted by the acceleration signal.
 Opaqueness - welfare implications. Above, we maintained the assumption
that the patent system is opaque with respect to the value of patents. Given that
the patent system is opaque, we analyzed how firms’ behavior and firms’ welfare
change in case information about the applicant’s acceleration decision becomes con-
cealed. Here, we compare an opaque patent system (with and without a publicly
observable acceleration signal) to a transparent patent system where both the value
of firm A’s patent and its acceleration decision. That is, we turn our attention
to the implications of opaqueness of the patent system. The following proposition
summarizes our results:
Proposition 3 (Welfare implications of opaqueness of the patent system.). For
weak (0 < p < pB1 ) and strong (p
B
3 < p < 1) patents outcomes in case the patent
system is opaque with regard to patent value are equal to outcomes in case the patent
system is transparent. For patents of intermediate strength (pB1 < p < p
B
3 ) the effect
of opaqueness on the aggregate welfare of firm A and firm B depends on whether the
probability of a high-value patent is low or high:
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i) For low probabilities that a patent is of high-value (subsets I and III),
aggregate welfare of firm A and firm B is (weakly) higher in case the patent
system is opaque than in case it is transparent.
ii) For high probabilities that a patent is of high value (subsets II and
IV), the effect of opaqueness on the aggregate welfare of firm A and firm B
depends on whether in case the system is opaque firm A’s acceleration decision
is disclosed or concealed:
In case firm A’s acceleration decision is disclosed, aggregate welfare of firm A
and firm B is (weakly) higher than in case the patent system is transparent.
In case firm A’s acceleration decision is concealed, aggregate welfare of firm A
and firm B is lower than in case the patent system is transparent.
The computation of the outcomes in case the patent system is transparent can be
found in appendix C.1.
It is easy to see why for weak and strong patents the outcomes in case the patent
system is transparent are equal to those in case the patent system is opaque: If
patents are weak (0 < p < pB1 ) or strong (p
B
3 < p < 1), firm B’s opposition decision
is independent from the value of firm A’s patent. In case patents are weak, it is
always worthwhile for firm B to oppose. On the other hand, in case patents are
strong, it is never worthwhile for firm B to oppose. That is, information about
patent value simply does not play a role and therefore outcomes in case the patent
system is transparent are equal to those in case the system is opaque. However,
for patents of intermediate strength (pB1 < p < p
B
3 ) aggregate welfare of firm A and
firm B depends on whether the probability of a high-value patent is low or high:
 Low probabilities of high-value patents. For low probabilities that a
patent is of high value (subsets I and III) aggregate welfare of firm A and firm B is
(weakly) higher in case the patent system is opaque than in case it is transparent.
In case of a transparent patent system the individual incentives are such that firm
A accelerates high-value patents and firm B opposes high-value patents. In subset I
patents are weak, whereas in subset III they are strong. If patents are weak, there
is a high probability that in case of opposition the patent is revoked. Thus, in case
of a transparent patent system acceleration efforts of firm A would be wasted on
average. In case of an opaque patent system firm A either refrains from acceleration
(information structure “public”) or it accelerates its high-value patents “in disguise”
(information structure “private”). In reaction, as high-value patents are hidden
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among the bulk of low-value patents, firm B refrains from opposition. In both cases
there is no waste of acceleration costs, and therefore from an aggregate perspective
firm A and firm B are better off with an opaque patent system.
In subset III patents are strong. That is, the probability that a patent remains
granted in case of opposition is high. Thus, in case of a transparent patent system
opposition efforts of firm B are wasted on average. If the patent system is opaque
and acceleration information is disclosed, the outcome is the same as in case of a
transparent patent system. If the patent system is opaque and acceleration infor-
mation is concealed, firm B refrains from opposition as it cannot target high-value
patents and the probability of a “hit” (that is, opposition of a high-value patent) is
low. In this case there is no waste of opposition efforts (relative to the situation of a
transparent patent system), and thus aggregate welfare of firms A and B is (weakly)
higher with an opaque than with a transparent patent system.
 High probabilities of high-value patents. For high probabilities that a
patent is of high value (subsets II and IV), the effect of opaqueness on the aggregate
welfare of firm A and firm B depends on whether in case the system is opaque
firm A’s acceleration decision is disclosed or concealed. In case the patent system
is opaque and firm A’s acceleration decision is disclosed, the outcome for strong
patents (subset IV) is the same as for a transparent patent system. The outcome
for weak patents (subset II) differs from that for a transparent patent system in
that high-value patents are neither accelerated by firm A nor opposed by firm B.
That is, acceleration costs are not wasted and thus aggregate welfare of firms A
and B is higher in case the patent system is opaque and information about firm A’s
acceleration decision is disclosed than in case the patent system is transparent.
In case the patent system is opaque and firm A’s acceleration decision is concealed,
firm B opposes all patents. The reason is that the probability of a “hit” (that is,
opposition of a high-value patent) is high in subsets II and IV. In contrast, in case
of a transparent patent system firm B focuses its opposition efforts on high-value
patents. As firm B does not profit from opposition of a low-value patent, in case
the patent system is opaque and there is no acceleration signal opposition costs are
inefficiently high. Thus, from an aggregate welfare perspective in subsets II and IV
firms A and B are better off with a transparent patent system.
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III.4 Empirical Evidence for Opaqueness of the
Patent System
In December 2001, the EPO changed its information policy regarding acceleration
requests of patent applicants: While before December 2001 information about ac-
celeration requests of applicants was publicly available, after December 2001 this
information was concealed from the public. If the European patent system is indeed
opaque with respect to patent value, we expect this change in the EPO’s informa-
tion policy to impact the behavior of both patent applicants and their rivals. In this
section, we use data provided to us by the EPO to look into empirical evidence on
opaqueness of the European patent system with respect to patent value. We first
use the theoretical framework developed above to structure our predictions about
the way the EPO’s 2001 policy change affected the behavior of the parties involved
in the patent application process. We then take a look at the data to see how
the behavior of applicants and rivals changed in reaction to the EPO’s 2001 policy
change. From the way behavior changes we can draw conclusions about whether the
European patent system is opaque with respect to patent value. Also, we can give
a first assessment of the welfare implications of the EPO’s 2001 decision to conceal
acceleration information.
Predictions from our model
In section III.3 we developed a model which captures the essential mechanics of the
patent application and opposition process: We assumed that there are two possible
types of patents (high-value and low-value), that each type occurs with a certain
probability, that there are certain gains and costs from patent acceleration, and
that opposition is costly and successful with a certain probability. The relationship
between these parameters determines the predictions of our model regarding changes
in the behavior of firm A (the applicant) and firm B (its rival) in case firm A’s
acceleration request gets concealed from the public. Instead of data on the behavior
of single applicants and rivals we have available aggregate data on the fractions
of yearly filings which were accelerated respectively opposed. Accordingly, when
deriving predictions about the effects of the EPO’s 2001 change in its information
policy, in the following we will interpret changes in the outcomes of our model as
changes in the respective frequencies which we observe in our data.
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 Statements about opaqueness of the patent system. Intuitively, one
might think that if the patent system was fully transparent with regard to patent
value we would observe no behavioral changes at all in reaction to concealment
of information about the applicants’ acceleration requests, and that we thus in
turn could infer from the observation of changes in either the acceleration or the
opposition frequency that the patent system is opaque. However, a closer look at
our model reveals that this intuition is not exactly right: Acceleration of patent
examination is assumed to increase the expected profits the submitting party can
reap from its patent. If we make the assumption that what the submitting party
gains when its patent is granted is at the expense of its rivals, then the incentive
to oppose the patent application might increase if accelerated examination (which
makes the patent more worthwhile for the submitting party and thus more hurtful
for its rivals) is requested. Thus, even if the patent system was perfectly transparent
with respect to the “base value” of a patent, we still might observe changes in the
behavior of the involved parties in case the EPO changes its information policy
and conceals the acceleration signal from rivals, simply because rivals are no longer
informed about the “net value” of the patent.
We can only be sure that behavioral changes as a reaction to the 2001 change in
the EPO’s information policy are solely caused by the loss of a signal about patent
value - and thus, on a more general level, by opaqueness of the patent system -
if competing parties have an incentive to oppose a high-value patent regardless of
whether it has been accelerated. Our model reveals that competing parties have
an incentive to oppose a high-value patent regardless of its acceleration status as
long as the probability that the patent is found valid in case of opposition is smaller
than the cut-off value pB2 . This value is determined by the relationship between the
value of a non-accelerated high-value patent and the costs of patent opposition. The
intuition here is that if the costs of opposition are sufficiently small in comparison to
the value of a non-accelerated patent (which corresponds to how much competing
parties get hurt in case the patent is granted), then competing parties have an
incentive to oppose both accelerated and non-accelerated high-value patents.
Put together: If the probability p that a patent is found valid in case of opposition
is not “too high” (that is, smaller than pB2 ), then changes in the behavior of both
the patent applicant and rivals can be attributed to the omission of a signal about
patent value. In this case, changes in the acceleration or opposition frequency due
to the 2001 change in the EPO’s information policy are evidence for opaqueness of
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the European patent system. Below we demonstrate that for our application we
indeed expect p to be smaller than pB2 .
 Predictions in case the patent system is opaque. We start with the initial
assumption that the European patent system is opaque with respect to patent value.
The graphs in figures III.3 and III.4 show that in case the patent system is opaque
and information about applicants’ acceleration decisions gets concealed, depending
on the underlying parameter relationships the behavior of applicants and rivals can
change in different ways. The pattern of expected changes is as follows: In case
the patent is either very weak (0 < p < pB1 ) or very strong (p
B
3 < p < 1), we do
not expect to observe changes in acceleration and opposition frequencies. In case
the patent is of intermediate strength (pB1 < p < p
B
3 - that is, for subsets I to IV
of our parameter space), however, our model predicts both the frequency of patent
applications and the frequency of opposition processes to change:
For small gains from acceleration of a high-value patent and small patent strength,
we expect to observe only the acceleration frequency to increase (subset I). In case
the probability that a patent is of high value is large, the increase in acceleration
frequency is accompanied by an increase in opposition frequency (subset II). For
large gains from acceleration and strong patents, we no longer expect to observe
changes in acceleration frequency but only in opposition frequency. In case the
probability that a patent is of high value is low, we expect the opposition frequency
to decrease (subset III), whereas in case the probability of a high-value patent is
high, we expect it to increase (subset IV). The reasons why these patterns develop
were given in section III.3. Figure III.5 summarizes the results.
In order to derive specific predictions about the way acceleration and opposition
frequencies change in reaction to concealment of the acceleration signal we need
priors on our model parameters. These parameters are the values pil and pi
¬a
h of the
patents, the probability θ with which a patent is of high value, the probability p with
which a patent withstands opposition, the costs co and ca of opposition respectively
acceleration, and finally the value piah of an accelerated high-value patent. In order
to come up with sensible priors, in the following we shortly extract some stylized
facts from the patent literature:
Regarding opposition costs co the literature is quite clear: According to for example
Graham et al. (2002), who interviewed senior representatives of the European Patent
Office, opposition costs co can be expected to be of a size of up to e 0.1 m. With
respect to the value of patents the literature is more ambiguous: The common
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Figure III.5: Expected changes in acceleration and opposition frequencies. The figure
shows the expected changes in acceleration and opposition frequencies in case the patent system
is opaque with regard to patent value and information about applicants’ acceleration requests gets
concealed. The upper entry in each subset depicts the change in the frequency of acceleration
requests, the lower entry the change in the frequency of oppositions. Depicted is the subset-
partitioning for medium gains from acceleration. For high gains from acceleration subsets I and II
disappear and only subsets III and IV remain between pB1 and p
B
3 .
finding here is that the distribution of patent value is heavily skewed - that is, the
bulk of patents is of relatively low value, whereas a few patents are of quite high
value. In studies on patent value the skewness of the value distribution is expressed
in the fact that the median of the value distribution is usually found to be far smaller
than its mean. However, due to different methodologies and data sets estimates of
these two quantities range from magnitudes of below e 0.1 m to an estimated median
of e 0.3 m and an estimated mean of e 3 m in Gambardella et al. (2008). At the
bottom line, the picture which emerges from studies on patent value is that the
value of the bulk of patents seems to be close to the costs of opposition, whereas
the value of a minority of patents exceeds the costs of opposition by more than one
order of magnitude.
With respect to oppositions of granted patents, a study by Harhoff and Reitzig
(2004) shows that the chances of successful opposition are good. In their sample,
opposed patents were revoked in around one third and amended in 40% of all cases.
Only in one fifth of the cases opposition was rejected. (In 10% of the cases the oppo-
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sition procedure was closed due to unspecified reasons.) Note that the amendment
of a patent can involve a narrowing of its scope, which might be counted as a (par-
tial) success of the competing party. With respect to the procedure of accelerated
patent examination information is scarce. Costs of acceleration costs solely arise
due to the need to cooperate closely with the EPO in case accelerated examination
is requested (there is no fee for accelerated examination), and thus should be quite
small. There are no numbers on the additional profits an applicant can gain in case
he requested accelerated examination and got his patent granted faster. However,
the reduction in examination time can be substantial (from an average of around 40
month down to around 12 month), and thus the gains from accelerated examination
should be economically significant. Put together, our stylized facts are:
SF1 While most patents are of low value, a minority of patents is of rather high
value.
SF2 The value of low-value patents is in the range of the costs of opposition.
SF3 There is a good chance that opposition is successful.
SF4 The costs of accelerated patent examination are low, the gains substantial.
In order to derive predictions we operationalize these stylized facts by the follow-
ing parameter assumptions: co=e 0.1 m, pil=e 0.15 m, pi¬ah = e 1 m, ca=e 0.05 m and
piah=e 2 m. Also, we expect θ to be smaller than 20% and p to be around 50%. It is
important to note that with respect to the mechanics of our model the exact numer-
ical values of the single parameters are not critical. What counts is the relationship
between different parameters as expressed in our stylized facts.7
Figure III.6 depicts the parameter space which follows from these assumptions to
scale. The gray area in figure III.6 marks the region where the probability θ that
a given patent is of high value is between 0% and 20% and the probability p that
a patent withstands opposition is around 50%. We do not mark a single point
but use the fading grey area in order to symbolize that in our application we do
not observe a single patent application process but many processes with different
applicants and rivals involved. We expect the values of our model parameters to be
different for each of these processes, but we make the assumption that the parameter
7In particular, these relationships are that between co and pil, that between co and pi
¬a
h , and
that between pi¬ah and pi
a
h. These relationships determine the relative positions of the cutoff-values
pB1 , p
B
2 , p
B
3 and p
A
2 .
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Figure III.6: Parameter space (to scale) for parameter assumptions which mirror the
stylized facts found in the literature. The graph displays the parameter space for the pa-
rameter assumptions we derived from stylized facts about the patent application and opposition
process in the European patent system. The parameter assumptions are co=e 0.1 m, pil=e 0.15 m,
pi¬ah = e 1 m, ca=e 0.05 m and pi
a
h=e 2 m, θ=20% and p=50%. As for each of the application and
opposition processes in our data we expect the specific parameter values to be different but on
average equal to our parameter assumptions, the fading grey area symbolizes where we expect
most of the application and opposition processes to lie.
values of the different application processes do not vary strongly around the values
we explicitly assumed. That is, the parameter values we explicitly assumed can be
interpreted as the “average” parameter values in our application. Respectively, the
fading grey area can be thought of to be a cloud of dots where each dot represents
one particular application process.
We are interested in how the EPO’s 2001 decision to conceal information about
applicants’ acceleration requests affected the behavior of applicants and rivals. In
case the European patent system is opaque, we expect to observe the behavior of
applicants and rivals to change. In particular, we expect the following changes:
H1 We expect a significant increase in the frequency of acceleration requests.
H2 We expect a significant decrease in the frequency of oppositions.
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Year Filings (#) Accelerated Accelerated Opposition (%)
search (%) examination (%)
1997 49,868 2.1 6.7 5.3
1998 53,350 2.6 7.4 5.1
1999 55,605 2.9 7.4 5.4
2000 59,193 3.0 7.0 5.1
2001 59,070 3.2 7.2 5.3
2002 55,822 3.2 7.3 4.9
2003 53,889 3.4 8.0 5.0
2004 51,323 3.7 8.8 4.7
2005 48,318 4.5 9.2 4.5
2006 44,321 5.0 9.5 4.3
Table III.2: Yearly data on the number of filings and acceleration and opposition fre-
quencies. For each of the years 1997 to 2006, the table displays the number of filed patent
applications (which were granted in the end), the fraction of these for which accelerated search
was requested, the fraction for which accelerated examination was requested, and the fraction
which was opposed after getting granted.
In the next subsection we use data on acceleration and opposition frequencies to
put these hypotheses to the test.
Data and empirical results
The European Patent Office provided us with data on acceleration and opposition
frequencies for the years 1997 to 2006. In particular, for each year we have informa-
tion on the fraction of that year’s filings for which applicants requested accelerated
search, the fraction for which applicants requested accelerated examination, and the
fraction which was opposed by rivals after getting granted. As our model abstracts
both from applicants’ decisions to withdraw their applications and the EPO’s grant
decision, and as we also do not have information about withdrawals in our data, we
focus our analysis on filings which actually got granted later on. Each year, around
53,000 patent applications were filed and granted later on. For the years 1997 to
2006, table III.2 shows the number of applications filed, the fractions for which ac-
celerated search and accelerated examination were requested, and the fraction of
filings which were opposed after getting granted.
Table III.2 shows that the frequencies of accelerated search and accelerated exam-
ination exhibit a similar pattern over time. That is not surprising, as accelerated
search is closely connected to accelerated examination: When a request for accel-
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Figure III.7: Frequencies of acceleration and opposition over time. For the years 1997 to
2006, the graphs depict the fractions of patents for which accelerated examination were requested,
the fractions for which accelerated search were requested, and the fractions which were opposed
after getting granted. At each data point a 95% confidence intervals is displayed.
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Figure III.8: Frequency of opposition conditional on acceleration status. For the years
1997 to 2006, the graphs display the development of opposition frequencies over time for the
fractions of patents for which accelerated examination were requested and for the fractions for
which there were no request. At each data point a 95% confidence intervals is displayed.
erated examination is filed together with a patent application, this automatically
induces an accelerated search process. For the sake of clarity, in the following we will
display data for both the frequencies of accelerated search and accelerated exami-
nation, but focus our discussion mainly on the frequency of requests for accelerated
examination.
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The graphs in figure III.7 show the developments of acceleration and opposition
frequencies over time. Up to the EPO’s policy change in December 2001 there
seems to be no significant change in acceleration and opposition frequencies. After
the EPO’s decision to conceal information about applicants’ acceleration requests,
however, there is a clear increase in the frequency of accelerated examination and a
little less pronounced decrease in opposition frequency. Figure III.8 takes a closer
look at the development of the opposition frequency over time. There, the graphs
display the development of opposition frequencies for the fraction of patents for
which accelerated examination was requested and for the fraction of patents for
which there was no request. Whereas there seems to be no change in opposition
frequency for the fraction of patents which were not accelerated, the opposition
frequency for the fraction of accelerated patents dropped considerably after the
EPO’s 2001 policy change.
In order to check whether the observed changes in acceleration and opposition fre-
quencies are significant, we interpret the EPO’s 2001 policy change as “treatment”
and divide our data into a “pre-treatment” period covering the years 1997 to 2000
and a “post-treatment” period covering the years 2002 to 2006. We leave out the
year 2001 because the EPO announced to change its information policy in October
2001 and we have only yearly data available. Thus, we do not know which fraction
of the 2001 filings was affected by the EPO’s policy change. In the first line of table
III.3 we report the p-values for a two-sample t-test. It tests the hypothesis that the
frequency in the pre-treatment period is equal to the frequency in the post-treatment
period. We do this test for the frequencies of accelerated examination requests and
oppositions. With respect to oppositions we do the pre-post-comparison for three
frequencies: The unconditional frequency of opposition, the frequency conditional
on accelerated examination had been requested, and the frequency conditional on
there had been no request for accelerated examination. For all acceleration and
opposition frequencies, it shows that all differences are statistically significant (with
respect to at least a 0.1% significance niveau). In addition, the differences in the fre-
quencies of requests for accelerated examination and the difference in the frequency
of oppositions conditional on accelerated examination had been requested are not
only of statistical but also of economic significance - the differences are in the order
of magnitude of around one percentage point. This is large compared to the level
of the frequencies, which ranges from around two to ten percent. Whereas being
statistically significant, the changes in the frequencies of opposition unconditional
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H0: Freq. pre-treatment period = Freq. post-treatment period.
Accelerated Opposition Opposition Opposition
examination (not accelerated) (accelerated)
1997-00 vs. 2002-06 0.071 vs. 0.085 0.052 vs. 0.047 0.048 vs. 0.044 0.100 vs. 0.084
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
2000 vs. 2002 0.070 vs. 0.073 0.051 vs. 0.049 0.047 vs. 0.046 0.092 vs. 0.085
0.024 0.298 0.439 0.273
1999 vs. 2002 0.074 vs. 0.073 0.054 vs. 0.049 0.051 vs. 0.046 0.095 vs. 0.085
0.559 <0.001 <0.001 0.115
1998-99 vs. 2002-03 0.074 vs. 0.076 0.053 vs. 0.050 0.049 vs. 0.046 0.098 vs. 0.086
0.026 0.001 0.007 0.009
Table III.3: Statistical significance of the changes in acceleration and opposition fre-
quencies. The table displays the p-values of two-sample t-tests. The t-tests were performed with
respect to the frequencies of requests for accelerated examination and oppositions (both uncondi-
tional and conditional on the acceleration status with respect to examination). For each test, the
null hypothesis is that frequencies are equal for the respective pre- and post-treatment periods.
on the acceleration status and conditional on that there had been no request for
accelerated examination are of minor economic importance.
The fact that the differences in frequencies are statistically significant if we define
the pre-treatment period to cover the years 1997 to 2000 and the post-treatment
period to cover the years 2002 to 2006 is actually not surprising: Because we cover
a long period of time, the number of observations and thus estimation efficiency is
very high. This gain in efficiency due to a long observation period, however, comes
with a major drawback: The more years we cover, the higher is the possibility that
we capture events in the development of the European patent system which are
unrelated to the EPO’s 2001 policy change, but which might have had an effect on
acceleration and opposition frequencies. That is, the longer the time period, the
higher the possibility that there is some bias in our results. In order to tackle this
potential problem we test whether there remains a statistically significant change
in frequencies if we define shorter pre- and post-treatment periods.
When we compare only frequencies of the years 2000 and 2002, we see that the
changes in opposition frequencies become insignificant. This might be due to the
loss of observations and thus estimation power. However, we suspect the reason
is different and indeed structural: The EPO recommends applicants to request
accelerated examination either when they file the patent application or when they
receive the search report. On average, applicants receive the search report 18 month
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after the filing of their application. That means, if an applicant filed an application
in 2000, it might well be that he received his search report after December 2001.
In this case, with respect to his acceleration decision the applicant would had been
affected by the EPO’s 2001 policy change. That is, filings of the year 2000 might
well have been affected by the EPO’s 2001 policy change, and in this case we would
expect to observe no changes in frequencies. Thus, instead of the years 2000 and
2002 we compare the years 1999 and 2002. Now, we indeed see that changes in
frequencies are significant (on a 5% significance niveau). The only exemption is
the change in the frequency of requests for accelerated examination. However, with
a look at figure III.7, we see that there is an irregular drop in the frequency of
accelerated examination in the year 2000. Also, acceleration frequencies begin to
significantly rise only from the year 2003 on.8 If we include one more year and
compare the years 1998-1999 to 2002-2003, also the change in the frequency of
requests for accelerated examination becomes significant again.
In summary, between the years before and those after the EPO’s 2001 policy change
we observe the frequency of requests for accelerated examination to increase. The
increase is significant both statistically and economically. Although statistically
significant, we observe only a slight decrease of the frequency of oppositions un-
conditional on acceleration status. If we condition the frequency of oppositions on
whether accelerated examination had been requested, we still observe only a slight
decrease of the frequency of oppositions against patents for which there had been
no requests for accelerated examination. However, for patents for which accelerated
examination had been requested our data shows an economically significant drop in
the frequency of oppositions.
Discussion and Interpretation
Our model predicts acceleration and opposition frequencies to change when informa-
tion about applicants’ acceleration decisions gets concealed. In our data we indeed
observe that acceleration and opposition frequencies are significantly different be-
tween the years before the EPO’s policy change in 2001 and the years afterwards.
However, a necessary condition to interpret these changes in the light of our model
8This might be related to the facts that applicants became aware of the EPO’s policy change
only after the EPO published a President’s Notice in October 2001 and that the EPO advices to
file requests for accelerated examination either when submitting the patent application or after
the receipt of the search report (which happens around 18 month after the initial filing of a patent
application).
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is that these changes are actually caused by the 2001 change in EPO’s information
policy. Thus, before we turn to an interpretation of these changes in the light of
our model, we first shortly discuss under what conditions the observed changes in
acceleration and opposition frequencies can be causally linked to the EPO’s 2001
policy change, and whether these conditions are likely to be met in our data.
 Causality. In principle, we could establish a causal link between changes in
behavior over our observation period and the EPO’s policy change in 2001 if our
data stemmed from an ideal experiment where both applicants and rivals were ran-
domly assigned to either a patent regime with disclosed acceleration information
(the non-treated control group) or a patent regime with concealed acceleration in-
formation (the treatment group). Given large enough numbers, this setup would
ensure two things: First, the composition of the non-treated and the treated group
would on average be the same. Second, applicants respectively rivals would not have
the possibility to select themselves into treatment. That is, given this ideal setup, if
hypothetically both the control and the treatment group were not treated, accelera-
tion and opposition frequencies would on average be the same for both groups. This
in turn ensures that if we observed differences between the treatment and the con-
trol group, we could interpret these as being causal effects of the treatment (that is,
in our case, of concealment of information about applicants’ acceleration requests).
The situation in our data differs from this ideal setup: Our data does not stem from
an ideal experiment but is quasi-experimental. Instead via a random generator
which by chance assigns applicants and rivals to either the treatment or the con-
trol group, treatment (that is, the EPO’s 2001 decision to conceal the acceleration
signal) happened in the time dimension and affected all parties without exception.
Thus, the control group is comprised of all applicants and rivals active before the
EPO’s new information policy came into effect in 2001, and the treatment group
is comprised of all applicants and rivals active afterwards. In order to establish
causality we have to check two conditions: The composition of applicants and rivals
before the 2001 change in EPO’s information policy has to be the same as that
afterwards (on average). Also, there must be no external shock unrelated to the
treatment which affected our outcomes of interest (that is, applicants’ propensity
to accelerate and rivals’ propensity to oppose).
So far the EPO has provided us with data on a quite aggregate level. This data
does not inform us about the identity of applicants and rivals, and thus it does
not allow us to explicitly control for changes in the composition of firms before
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and after the EPO’s 2001 policy change. However, judging from the EPO’s annual
reports, no major structural break in the European patent system seems to have
occurred during the years 1997 to 2006.9 As our observation period is also rather
short, we thus argue that it is not unreasonable to assume that the composition
of applicants and rivals before the 2001 change in the EPO’s information policy is
not significantly different from that afterwards. In addition, the graphs in figure
III.8 show that there was no economically significant change in the frequency of
oppositions against patents which had not been accelerated. As the frequency of
oppositions against patents which had not been accelerated should not be affected
by the EPO’s 2001 policy change, this is an indication that there also were no
structural breaks in the behavior of applicants and rivals during our observation
period.
Put together, we argue that for our quasi-experimental setting it holds that both the
composition of applicants and rivals before the 2001 change in EPO’s information
policy is not significantly different from the composition afterwards, and that apart
from the EPO’s 2001 policy change there were no other shocks which systematically
influenced firms’ propensities to accelerate respectively oppose patents. Thus, we
conclude from the data from our quasi-experiment that there is a causal link be-
tween the EPO’s 2001 decision to conceal information about applicants’ acceleration
requests and the observed changes in acceleration and opposition frequencies.
 Evidence for opaqueness of the European patent system. Our model
predicts that in case the European patent system is opaque with respect to the value
of patents, in reaction to the EPO’s 2001 policy change the frequency of requests
for accelerated examination should increase and the frequency of oppositions should
decrease. These were hypotheses one and two we derived above. Our data confirms
the predictions of our model: In reaction to the EPO’s 2001 policy change we
indeed observe the acceleration frequency to increase and the opposition frequency to
decrease. This supports our assumption that the European patent system is opaque
with respect to patent value. That is, without a signal transporting information
9For example, during our observation period the distribution of applications over the ten most
frequent residence countries did not significantly change. Also, there was no major change in the
distribution of applications over the ten most frequent technical fields around the year 2001: Apart
from a slight increase in the fraction of applications from the field of information technology, the
distribution of applications over the technical fields remains nearly unchanged. A breakdown of
applications by residency and technical field is given in appendix C.3.
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about patent value rivals seem to have difficulties to identify a patent’s contribution
merely from the conventional data generated by the patent office.10
 Welfare implications of opaqueness. According to our model, the welfare
implications of the fact that the European patent system is opaque with respect
to the value of patents depend on the distribution of high- and low-value patents.
Above, in order to derive hypotheses H1 and H2, we assumed that the majority of
patents is of low-value. As our data fits the predictions of our model, our results
support this assumption. Proposition 3 states that in case the probability that a
patent is of high value is low, aggregate welfare of applicants and rivals is (weakly)
higher in case the patent system is opaque than in case the patent system is trans-
parent. The reason for this somewhat counterintuitive result is that in case the
occurrence of high-value patents is unlikely and the patent system is opaque, appli-
cants can hide high-value patents among the bulk of low-value patents. As discussed
in section III.3, from an aggregate welfare perspective this saves either acceleration
costs (in case patents are weak) or opposition costs (in case patents are strong). We
conclude that for the case of the European patent system opaqueness with respect
to patent value might not be detrimental to the aggregate welfare of applicants and
rivals. However, as our model focuses on the interplay between applicants and rivals
during the patent application process, this of course is a partial welfare result only.
It abstracts completely from the implications of opaqueness of the patent system on
the innovation process in society.
 Welfare implications of concealment of acceleration information. We
established that the European patent system is opaque with respect to patent value.
In section III.3, we discussed that for the case of an opaque patent system the im-
plications of the EPO’s 2001 decision to conceal acceleration information depend on
the values of the underlying structural parameters. The patterns we observe in the
data support our assumption that in the European patent system the occurrence
of a high-value patent is rather unlikely. For low probabilities of high-value patents
the implications of concealment of acceleration information on the aggregate welfare
of applicants and rivals are ambiguous: In case patents are weak, our model pre-
dicts aggregate welfare to decrease, whereas in case patents are strong, it predicts
aggregate welfare to increase.
10However, note that the graphs in figure III.8 show that after the EPO concealed informa-
tion about acceleration requests in 2001, we still observe accelerated patents to be opposed more
frequently than non-accelerated patents. If we entertain the assumption that acceleration is only
worthwhile for high-value patents, this indicates that the European patent system transmits some
information about the value of patents, but that the transmission mechanism is imperfect.
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As discussed in more detail in section III.3, the reason for this ambiguity is that
in case of weak patents concealment of acceleration information allows applicants
to accelerate their high-value patents in disguise, which, from an aggregate welfare
perspective, produces unnecessary acceleration costs. In case of strong patents,
concealment of acceleration information no longer allows rivals to target high-value
patents. Thus, rivals refrain from opposition, and this saves opposition costs (from
an aggregate welfare perspective).
Figure III.6 shows that the boundary line which separates weak from strong patents
(that is, subset I from subset III) runs through the area of the parameter space where
we expect most of the application processes in our data to lie. (This area is marked
by the grey shading in figure III.6.) As just stated, in case acceleration information
gets concealed, for weak patents we expect aggregate welfare to decrease, whereas for
strong patents we expect it to increase. Thus, we cannot give a definite answer to the
question how the EPO’s 2001 decision to conceal acceleration information affected
aggregate welfare of applicants and rivals. The answer to this question is determined
by the location of the boundary line between subset I and subset III relative to the
mass of application processes. This location depends on how much the value of a
patent increases in case it is accelerated. Unfortunately, the value of acceleration is
the one model parameter about which information is very scarce in the literature.
Therefore, we are quite uncertain with respect to the exact location of the boundary
line. To produce figure III.6, we made the assumption that acceleration doubles the
value of a high-value patent. If in fact the value of a patent increases by less than
the factor two when it is accelerated, then the position of the boundary line would
be further to the right, and we would conclude that the EPO’s 2001 policy change
decreased aggregate welfare. In contrast, if acceleration increased the value of a
patent by more than the factor two, the boundary line would move to the left, and
we would conclude that the EPO’s 2001 policy change increased aggregate welfare.
That is, in order to give a reliable answer to the question how the EPO’s 2001
decision to conceal information about acceleration requests affected the aggregate
welfare of applicants and rivals, we need to collect more information about the value
of patent acceleration.
III.5 Conclusion
This chapter adds to a better understanding of the fundamental deal between the ap-
plicant of a patent and society - that is, the granting of exclusion rights in exchange
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to disclosure of technical knowledge - by asking whether the European patent system
is indeed transparent with respect to the value of a patented innovation or instead
rather opaque. We try to give an answer to this question by exploiting a rule change
in the European patent system: While before December 2001 applicants’ requests
for accelerated search and examination were disclosed to the public, afterwards
these requests were treated as confidential information. We developed a model of
the patent application and opposition process which shows that concealment of the
acceleration signal leads to specific changes in the behavior of applicants and rivals
in case the European patent system is opaque with respect to patent value. In par-
ticular, in reaction to the EPO’s 2001 policy change, the frequency of acceleration
requests should increase and that of oppositions should decrease. These predictions
of our model are met by the data, which gives support to our presumption that the
European patent system is opaque with respect to the value of patents. That is,
the main conclusion we draw from our analysis is that it seems difficult to identify a
patent’s contribution solely on the basis of the conventional data generated by the
EPO.
Based on our main finding that the European patent system is opaque with re-
spect to patent value, we then took first steps towards an assessment of the welfare
implications of opaqueness and of the availability of a signal transporting value in-
formation. Perhaps surprisingly we find that a transparent patent system might
not always be preferable to an opaque one. In fact, in case of the European patent
system, opaqueness with respect to patent value seems to increase the combined
welfare of applicants and rivals, both for the case where there is a publicly observ-
able acceleration signal and the case where there is not. However, this is only a
partial welfare result, as our analysis focuses on the firms directly involved in the
patent application process and does not take into account the effects opaqueness
on the progress of innovation in society. Also, our theoretical analysis focuses on
opaqueness of the patent system with respect to the value of a given patent. If there
is another dimension of opaqueness of the patent system in the sense that firms have
to make considerable investments in order to identify potentially conflicting prior art
- that is, if there are substantial search costs, then a welfare evaluation of opaque-
ness solely based on the model presented in this chapter might be too limited in its
scope.
The welfare implications of the availability of a signal transporting value informa-
tion (given an opaque patent system) depend critically on how strongly a patent
applicant’s profits increase in case of accelerated patent examination. For the case
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of the European patent system, it seems that the stronger the increase in profits
from acceleration, the more likely it is that the EPO’s 2001 change in its information
policy increased aggregate welfare. In order to come up with a more substantiated
statement regarding the welfare implications of the EPO’s 2001 policy change, how-
ever, we need reliable estimates of the value of patent acceleration. Unfortunately,
to the best of our knowledge the issue of patent acceleration has not received much
attention in the literature yet. Thus, in order to assess the full implications of
opaqueness and the availability of a value signal, more research, especially on the
empirics of patent acceleration, is called for.
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Umbrella Branding and Consumer
Inertia
A.1 Details on the prior specification
I specify a two-stage prior as in Rossi et al. (2005) and Dube et al. (2010). The
reason for specifying a two-stage prior is that a two-stage prior is flexible in the
sense that it accounts for heterogeneity in the household-level parameters θh. Or,
in other terms: It a priori assumes households to be different and thus allows the
posterior to accommodate household heterogeneity far more efficient than a simple
one-stage prior.
In particular, I assume my model coefficients θh = (α
h, ηh, βh, γh) to be household-
specific and to follow a mixture of normals distribution:
p(θh|pi, {µk,Σk}) =
K∑
k=1
pikφ(θh|µk,Σk) (A.1)
Equation (A.1) represents the so-called first-stage prior for my model coefficients
θh: I assume my model coefficients to follow a mixture of K multivariate normal
distributions, each with mean µk and variance matrix Σk. Each multivariate normal
distribution is weighted with pik.
A so-called second-stage prior further specifies the components of the first-stage
prior. In particular, it specifies the number of components K, and that the pik, the
µk and the Σk are drawn from certain distributions with certain parameters. These
distributions are chosen in a way which simplifies computations in the iterations of
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the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm (in essence, these distributions are easy
to simulate from):
The pik shall be drawn from a multivariate Dirichlet distribution with concentration
parameter a > 0. The concentration parameter determines how on average the K
components are mixed. A concentration parameter above one has as consequence
that on average the mixture of normals is a balanced composition of all components,
a concentration parameter below one has as consequence that on average the mixture
of normals is dominated by a certain component.
Σk, the variance matrices of the multivariate normal components, shall be drawn
from an inverse Wishart distribution with scale matrix V and ν degrees of freedom.
It has to hold that ν > p − 1, where p equals the dimensions of Σk and V. The
expected value of Σk is
E[Σk] =
V
ν − p− 1 . (A.2)
µk, the means of the multivariate normal components, shall be drawn from a nor-
mal distribution with mean µ¯ and variance matrix ΣkA
−1
µ . Aµ is a matrix which
allows to scale the precision of the prior on the means of the multivariate normal
components: In general, the larger the entries of Aµ, the higher the precision of the
prior.
As prior values I choose K = 5, ν = 29, V = 10I, Aµ =
1
16
I, µ¯ = 0 and a = 0.1. I
stands for the unit matrix, 0 for the zero vector. With these my prior specifications
can concisely be written as
1st stage: p(θh|pi, {µk,Σk}) =
K∑
k=1
pikφ(θ
h|µk,Σk)
2nd stage: pi ∼ symm. Dirichlet(a)
µk|Σk ∼ N(µ¯,ΣkA−1µ )
Σk ∼ IW (ν,V)
K = 5, a = 0.1,Aµ = 1/16I,
µ¯ = 0, ν = 29,V = 10I
I choose the number of normal components to be 5 in order to being able to cap-
ture household heterogeneity without overfitting the data and without running into
computational troubles. The second-stage priors for ν, V, Aµ, µ¯ and a are chosen
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in a way which renders the first-stage prior on θh non-informative and diffuse in
expectation (in expectation, the prior mean of θh is zero, and the variance of each
normal component of each coefficient is five). In section I.5 these prior specifica-
tions and the robustness of my estimation results against different possible prior
specifications are discussed in more detail.
A.2 Details on MCMC algorithm
The posterior distribution of my model coefficients θh is given as
p(θ1, ...,θH |y1, ...,yH ,h) ∼
[∏
h
p(yh|θh)p(θh|τ )
]
· p(τ |h), (A.3)
where τ = (pi, {µk,Σk}) and h = (K, a,Aµ, µ¯, ν,V). yh denotes the data available
for household h. This posterior is of a form for which analytical results regarding
its moments and marginals are not available. Thus I have to retreat to the use
of simulations to get insights into its features. The simulation method used is a
Markov Chain Monte Carlo Method. The basic idea here is very simple: Starting
from initial conditions Θ0 = (θ01, ...,θ
0
H) the method uses certain rules to generate
a sequence Θ0,Θ1,Θ2, ... of household coefficients. The sequence rules ensure that
the long-run distribution of the Θr converges against the posterior distribution
p(Θ|y1, ...,yH ,h). As the long-run distribution of the Θr converges against the
posterior distribution p(Θ|y1, ...,yH ,h), I can use the sequence of the Θr to simulate
moments and marginals of the posterior.
The MCMC algorithm I use is a hybrid Markov chain algorithm. This algorithm
is described in great technical detail in Rossi et al. (2005). The algorithm makes
use of the fact that the prior on the household coefficients Θ is defined in two
stages: The distribution of the household coefficients Θ depends on the parameters
τ = (pi, {µk,Σk}) of the mixture of multivariate normals distribution. Via the
likelihood of the data the coefficients Θ are furthermore linked to the household
data y = (y1, ...,yH). On the second stage in turn the Θ can be interpreted as data
regarding the draw of household-level parameters. These conditional dependencies
can be written as
Θ | τ ,y (A.4)
τ | Θ. (A.5)
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The hybrid Markov chain algorithm proceeds in two steps: In the first step it uses
relationship (A.4) to draw household coefficients Θ using household data y and a
former draw of τ . The draw itself is done by a Metropolis algorithm, which employs
each households’ multinomial logit likelihood and an accept/reject like draw method.
In the second step it uses relationship (A.5) and the draw of Θ to draw τ . This
draw is done using a standard unconstrained Gibbs sampler. The second-stage prior
specifications ensure that the conditional distribution (A.5) is known and Gibbs
sampling is therefore possible. Starting from initial conditions, the hybrid Markov
chain algorithm iterates through steps one and two. It can be shown that in the
long-run the distribution of the draws generated by the algorithm converges against
the posterior distribution (A.3). This allows me to use the long-run sequence of
draws to estimate marginals and moments of the posterior.
The hybrid Markov chain algorithm is implemented in computer code which can be
found in a contributed R package called bayesm. This package is described in Rossi
et al. (2005) and has been developed by these authors. It can be found on the CRAN
network of mirror sites (http://cran.r-project.org). The function the algorithm is
implemented in is rhierMnlRwMixture. I modified this function to allow for varying
choice sets. Concretely, I modified the functions llmnl and mnlHess, which are
called by rhierMnlRwMixture, such that they are able to deal with a non-constant
choice set. For each function, the modification is straightforward - instead of using
fast matrix operations (which rely on a constant choice set) to compute the log-
likelihood respectively the Hessian of the multinomial model I use loops over all
units in order to be able to account for differing choice sets. The drawback with
my modification is that it drastically increases computation time. I produced my
results with the modified function. For the simulation of the posterior distributions
I used 10, 000 iterations with a burn-in period of 1, 000 iterations.
A.3 Bayesian model comparison
Comparison of different models is straightforward in the Bayesian framework. As
detailed in Rossi et al. (2005), model choice based on posterior model probabilities
is in line with decision theory if there is a zero-one loss function (0 in case the true
model is chosen, 1 otherwise). The posterior probability of a model Mi is given as
p(Mi|D) = p(D|Mi)p(Mi)
p(D)
. (A.6)
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p(Mi) denotes the prior probability of model Mi, p(D) the (unconditional) proba-
bility of observing the data at hand, and p(D|Mi) the marginal likelihood for Mi.
p(D) is independent of model Mi. If I assume equal prior probabilities for all the
models I want to compare, then it holds that
p(Mi|D) ∼ p(D|Mi). (A.7)
That means that under the assumption of equal prior model probabilities model
choice based on posterior model probabilities boils down to model choice based on
marginal model likelihoods.
The marginal model likelihood is defined as
p(D|Mi) =
∫
p(D|θ,Mi)p(θ|Mi)dθ. (A.8)
As shown by Dube et al. (2010), using the method of Newton and Raftery (1994)
the marginal model likelihood can be estimated as
pˆ(D|Mi) =
(
1
R
R∑
r=1
1
p(D|Θr,Mi)
)−1
. (A.9)
For the comparison of different models I use the logarithm of the marginal model
likelihood. Note finally that posterior model probabilities automatically correct for
different parameter dimensions.
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A.4 Robustness checks: Posterior distributions
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Figure A.1: Comparison of posterior distributions derived with different numbers of
normal components. Each graph depicts the pointwise posterior mean and the 95% credibility
region of marginal posterior densities. The left column depicts marginal posterior densities of
the intercept of product eight, the right column depicts those of the coefficient γh, which captures
household inertia in umbrella brand choice. The results were derived with different priors regarding
the number of normal components: one, five and ten normal components. Apart from the normal
components the prior specifications equal those detailed in appendix A.1. The results are based
on 5,263 purchasing observations of 775 households.
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a = 0.1 a = 1.5
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ηh: Price coefficient ηh: Price coefficient
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Figure A.2: Comparison of posterior distributions derived with different prior speci-
fications regarding the concentration parameter a. All graphs depict pointwise posterior
means and 95% credibility regions of marginal posterior densities. The graphs in the left column
depict results derived with my base prior specification, which assumes the concentration parameter
a to equal 0.1 My base prior specification is detailed in appendix A.1; these results are equal to
those depicted in figure I.3. The graphs in the right column depict results derived with a prior
specification which assumes the concentration parameter a to equal 1.5. The results are based on
5,263 purchasing observations of 775 households.
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Base prior specification Tighter prior specification
γh: Inertia in umbrella choice γh: Inertia in umbrella choice
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Figure A.3: Comparison of posterior distributions derived with base prior specifica-
tion to posterior distributions derived with tighter prior specification. All graphs depict
pointwise posterior means and 95% credibility regions of marginal posterior densities. The graphs
in the left column depict results derived with my base prior specification. My base prior specifica-
tion is detailed in appendix A.1; these results are equal to those depicted in figure I.3. The graphs
in the right column depict results derived with a prior specification which assumes the coefficient
variances to be in expectation a priori half as large as with the base prior specification. The results
are based on 5,263 purchasing observations of 775 households.
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Base Model:
ηh: Price coefficient γh: Inertia in umbrella choice
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Inclusion of store-specific intercepts:
ηh: Price coefficient γh: Inertia in umbrella choice
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Inclusion of advertising controls:
ηh: Price coefficient γh: Inertia in umbrella choice
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Figure A.4: Comparison of posterior distributions derived with the base model, the
base model extended by store-specific intercepts, and the base model extended by
advertising controls. All graphs depict pointwise posterior means and 95% credibility regions
of marginal posterior densities. Depicted are the marginal posterior distributions of the price
coefficient and the umbrella brand choice inertia coefficient. From top to bottom these posteriors
were derived from the base model (I.1), the base model extended by store-specific intercepts,
and the base model extended by advertising controls. All results were derived using the base
prior specifications given in appendix A.1 and are based on 5,263 purchasing observations of 775
households.
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A. Umbrella Branding and Consumer Inertia
Full sample of hhs. Subsample
of experienced hhs.
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ηh: Price coefficient ηh: Price coefficient
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Figure A.5: Comparison of posterior distributions derived with the full sample of
households to posterior distributions derived with a selected sample of experienced
households. All graphs depict pointwise posterior means and 95% credibility regions of marginal
posterior densities. The graphs in the left column depict results derived with the full sample of
households and the years 2001 to 2005. The sample consists of 5,263 purchasing observations of
775 households; the results are equal to those depicted in figure I.3. The graphs in the right column
depict results derived with a subsample of households and the years 2003 to 2005. The subsample
consists of 1,441 purchasing observations of 242 households. All results were derived with the base
prior specification (detailed in appendix A.1).
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Appendix B
Information Disclosure in Open
Non-Binding Procurement
Auctions
B.1 Illustration: No information structure
dominates the other
As the firms’ first order conditions given in (II.3) and (II.6) are transcendental given
any standard assumption about the distribution of the error terms i, it is impossible
to derive closed form solutions for the equilibrium prices in both the information
and the no information case. In order to demonstrate that no information structure
weakly dominates the other we thus resort to the use of numerical simulations.
We look at an auction with two bidding firms. The costs of the firms are c =
(c1, c2) = (0, 1). We make the assumption that the error terms i are iid type I
extreme value distributed, and that the distribution of quality f(qj) is discrete: q1
shall be drawn with probability 0.1, q2 with probability 0.9.
Then for q = (q1, q2) = (0, 1) we get EU − E˜U = 0.75. Thus, for these parameter
values the buyer prefers the information case over the no information case. In
contrast, for q = (0, 3) we get EU− E˜U = −0.34. With these parameter values the
buyer prefers the no information case over the information case.
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B.2 Derivation of analytical results
We assume 2 − 1 to follow a uniform distribution with mean zeor and variance ν,
and ˜2− ˜1 to follow a uniform distribution with mean zero and variance ν˜. It holds
that ν˜ ≥ ν. Accordingly, the cumulative distribution function of 2 − 1 is given as
F2−1(x) =

0 for x < −√12ν
1
2
+ 1√
12ν
x for −√12ν ≤ x < √12ν
1 for x ≥ √12ν,
(B.1)
and that of ˜2 − ˜1 as
F˜2−˜1(x) =

0 for x < −√12ν˜
1
2
+ 1√
12ν˜
x for −√12ν˜ ≤ x < √12ν˜
1 for x ≥ √12ν˜.
(B.2)
For the sake of exposition in the following we focus on the parameter space for which
we get interior solutions. That is the parameter space for which both −√12ν ≤
p∗2−q2−p∗1−q1 <
√
12ν and −√12ν˜ ≤ p˜∗2−p˜∗1 <
√
12ν˜. p∗i and p˜
∗
i are the equilibrium
prices in the information respectively the no information case. These conditions hold
if 0 ≤ c2− c1 < 3
√
12ν˜ and −3√12ν+ (c2− c1) < q2− q1 ≤ 3
√
12ν+ (c2− c1). Note
that for the parameter space depicted in figure II.1 we get interior solutions. In the
complementary parameter space the situation in at least one of the two information
cases turns deterministic, as due to the limited support of 2− 1 respectively ˜2− ˜1
randomness in the error terms no longer has an effect on the buyer’s decision (as
perceived by the bidders). This alters the position of the buyer’s indifference line
but has no effect on our basic finding that for large cost differences and small quality
differences the buyer prefers the information case, while for small cost differences
and large quality differences he prefers the no information case.
The firms’ winning probabilities in the information case are
P1(p,q) = P (2 − 1 ≤ p2 − q2 − p1 + q1) = F2−1(p2 − q2 − p1 + q1),
P2(p,q) = P (2 − 1 > p2 − q2 − p1 + q1) = 1− F2−1(p2 − q2 − p1 + q1).
If the Pj in the first order conditions (II.3) are expressed using the approximation
(B.2), it is straightforward to solve these systems after the equilibrium prices p∗:
p∗1 =
1
3
(2c1 + c2)− 1
3
(q2 − q1) +
√
3ν,
p∗2 =
1
3
(c1 + 2c2) +
1
3
(q2 − q1) +
√
3ν.
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The firms’ winning probabilities in the no information case are
P˜1(p,q) = P (˜2 − ˜1 ≤ p˜2 − p˜1) = F˜2−˜1(p˜2 − p˜1),
P˜2(p,q) = P (˜2 − ˜1 > p˜2 − p˜1) = 1− F˜2−˜1(p˜2 − p˜1).
Using the first order conditions (II.6), it follows that the equilibrium prices in the
no information case are given as
p˜∗1 =
1
3
(2c1 + c2) +
√
3ν˜,
p˜∗2 =
1
3
(c1 + 2c2) +
√
3ν˜.
From simply comparing (p∗1, p
∗
2) to (p˜
∗
1, p˜
∗
2), it follows that
p∗1 = p˜
∗
1 −
1
3
(q2 − q1)−
√
3(
√
ν˜ −√ν),
p∗2 = p˜
∗
2 +
1
3
(q2 − q1)−
√
3(
√
ν˜ −√ν).
According to Small and Rosen (1981) the change in the buyer’s expected utility
from a change in the information structure can be computed as
∆EU = EU− E˜U =
∫ (W1,W2)
(W˜1,W˜2)
{P1(W1,W2)dW1 + [1− P1(W1,W2)]dW2} ,
where W1 = q1 − p1, W2 = q2 − p2, (W˜1, W˜2) = (q1 − p˜∗1, q2 − p˜∗2), (W1,W2) =
(q1 − p∗1, q2 − p∗2) and P1(W1,W2) = 12 +
√
12ν(W1 −W2). Some algebra delivers
EU− E˜U = 1
3
√
12ν
(q2 − q1) [(c2 − c1)− 2(q2 − q1)]
+3(2
√
νν˜ + ν˜ − 3ν)
+(
√
ν˜
2
√
ν
− 1
2
)(c2 + c1 − q2 − q1),
as stated in the main body of the text.
131
Appendix C
Exploring the Opaqueness of the
Patent System - Evidence from a
Natural Experiment
C.1 Solution of the model
Table C.2 displays the normal form of the signaling game for information struc-
tures “public” and “private”. We look for all Perfect Bayesian equilibria of these
games which satisfy the “intuitive criterion” of Cho and Kreps (1987). The Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium concept is a refinement of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium con-
cept in the context of dynamic games with incomplete information, and Bayesian
Nash equilibria can be deduced from the normal form of dynamic games. In prac-
tice, the determination of Bayesian Nash equilibria from the normal form of dynamic
games is based on payoff comparisons.
In the following we first establish relationships between the payoffs of firm and
between that of firm B. These relationships turn out to be dependent on specific
parameters. As a second step we therefore divide the piah-p-θ parameter space into
subsets where the payoff relationships are non-ambiguous. Third, for each of these
subsets we then derive all Bayesian Nash equilibria. Fourth, we check for every
Bayesian Nash equilibrium whether if fulfills the criteria of a Perfect Bayesian Nash
equilbrium (Bayesian beliefs and sequential rationality). Fifth, We check for every
Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium whether it satisfies the “intuitive criterion”. For
reasons of brevity, we will describe steps three to five exemplarily for one subset of
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the piah-p-θ parameter space only. The approach for all other subsets is completely
analogous.
 Relationships between payoffs. The first step in solving our game for both
information structures is to find all Bayesian Nash equilibria. Essentially, the search
for Bayesian Nash equilibria can be reduced to simple payoff comparisons, and these
payoff comparisons can be traced back to comparisons of the payoffs in case both the
value of firm A’s patent and firm A’s acceleration decision are public knowledge.
We denote this information structure by “full”. Note that information structure
“full” describes the situation where the patent system is transparent with respect to
patent value (and firm A’s acceleration decision). The normal forms for information
structure “full” are given in table C.1. We start with comparing the payoffs of the
signaling game for information structure “full”.
θ = h (o, o) (o,¬o) (¬o, o) (¬o,¬o)
a ppiah −
ca − co
−ppiah −
co
ppiah −
ca − co
−ppiah −
co
piah − ca −piah piah − ca −piah
¬a ppi¬ah −
co
−ppi¬ah −
co
pi¬ah −pi¬ah ppi¬ah −
co
−ppi¬ah −
co
pi¬ah −pi¬ah
θ = l (o, o) (o,¬o) (¬o, o) (¬o,¬o)
a ppil −
ca − co
−ppil −
co
ppil −
ca − co
−ppil −
co
pil − ca −pil pil − ca −pil
¬a ppil − co −ppil −
co
pil −pil ppil − co −ppil −
co
pil −pil
Table C.1: Payoffs for full information. The upper table shows the payoffs for full information
in case θ = h. The lower table shows the payoffs for full information in case θ = l.
For firm A if the patent is of high value (θ = h) the payoff comparisons are
ppiah − ca − co vs. ppi¬ah − co, (C.1)
ppiah − ca − co vs. pi¬ah , (C.2)
piah − ca vs. ppi¬ah − co, (C.3)
piah − ca vs. pi¬ah , (C.4)
and if the patent is of low value (θ = l) the comparisons are
ppil − ca − co vs. ppil − co, (C.5)
ppil − ca − co vs. pil, (C.6)
pil − ca vs. ppil − co, (C.7)
pil − ca vs. pil. (C.8)
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For firm B the payoff comparisons if the patent is of high value (θ = h) are
−ppiah − co vs. −piah, (C.9)
−ppi¬ah − co vs. −pi¬ah , (C.10)
and if the patent is of low value (θ = l) the comparions are
−ppil − co vs. −pil. (C.11)
The relationship between the payoffs in C.3 to C.8 is directly determined by our
assumptions A1 to A4. For each other comparison there exists a certain cut-off value
p(·) at which the payoffs are equal. For all p smaller respectively larger then these
p(·) there exists a clear relationship between the underlying payoffs which follows
directly from our assumptions A1 to A4. With “·|·” denoting the relationship left
respectively right of the cut-off value p(·), we have for firm A if the patent is of high
value (θ = h)
ppiah − ca − co ≶ ppi¬ah − co, defines pA1 , < | >,
ppiah − ca − co ≶ pi¬ah , defines pA2 , < | >,
piah − ca > ppi¬ah − co,
piah − ca > pi¬ah .
For firm A if the patent is of low value (θ = l) we have
ppil − ca − co < ppil − co,
ppil − ca − co < pil,
pil − ca > ppil − co,
pil − ca < pil.
For firm B if the patent is of high value (θ = h) we have
−ppiah − co ≶ −piah, defines pB3 , > | <,
−ppi¬ah − co ≶ −pi¬ah defines pB2 , > | <,
and if the patent is of low value (θ = l)
−ppil − co ≶ −pil, defines pB1 , > | < .
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The cut-off values are defined as follows:
pA1 =
ca
piah − pi¬ah
,
pA2 =
ca + co + pi
¬a
h
piah
,
pB1 =
pil − co
pil
,
pB2 =
pi¬ah − co
pi¬ah
,
pB3 =
piah − co
piah
.
The payoffs for information structures “public” and “private” are composed from
the payoffs for information structure “full”. Thus, with information about the rela-
tionships between the payoffs for information structure “full” it is easy to derive the
relationships between the payoffs for information structures “public” and “private”.
Each row in table C.2 corresponds to a strategy of firm A, and each column to a
strategy of firm B. First, we determine the best reactions of firm A to each possible
strategy of firm B. Based on our results for the payoffs of firm A for information
structure “full” and our assumptions A1 to A4 we find for information structure
“public”:
1st column: 4th row if p < pA1 , 2nd row if p > p
A
1 .
2nd column: 4th row if p < pA2 , 2nd row if p > p
A
2 .
3rd column: 1st row.
4th column: 2nd row.
The results for firm A and Information structure “private” are:
1st column: 4th row if p < pA1 , 2nd row if p > p
A
1 .
2nd column: 2nd row.
With that, the relationships between the payoffs of firm A are fully determined.
The results for firm B and information structure “public” are:
2nd row: 1st column if 0 < p < pB1 , 2nd column if p
B
1 < p < p
B
3 , 4th column
if pB3 < p < 1.
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3rd row: 1st column if 0 < p < pB1 , 3rd column if p
B
1 < p < p
B
2 , 4th column if
pB2 < p < 1.
For the 1st row of information structure “public” and the 1st and 2nd row of infor-
mation structure “private” the same payoffs have to be compared. The comparison
to be made is
−(1− θ)ppil − θppiah − co vs. − (1− θ)pil − θpiah.
The relationship between these payoffs depends on the relationship between p and
θ. With
pθ,1 = 1− co
θpiah + (1− θ)pil
, (C.12)
we have equality for p = pθ,1. For values of p smaller than pθ,1 the former payoff is
larger than the latter, and vice versa. For θ = 0 pθ,1 equals p
B
1 , and for θ = 1 pθ,1
equals pB3 . We denote the inverse function of pθ,1(θ) by θ1(p). The situation for the
4th row of information structure “public” and the 3rd and 4th row of information
structure “private” is analogous: The comparison to be made is
−(1− θ)ppil − θppi¬ah − co vs. − (1− θ)pil − θpi¬ah .
The relationship between these payoffs depends on the relationship between p and
θ. With
pθ,2 = 1− co
θpi¬ah + (1− θ)pil
, (C.13)
we have equality for p = pθ,2. For values of p smaller than pθ,2 the former payoff is
larger than the latter, and vice versa. For θ = 0 pθ,2 equals p
B
1 , and for θ = 1 pθ,2
equals pB2 . We denote the inverse function of pθ,2(θ) by θ2(p). With that we can
complete the payoff comparisons for firm B. For information structure “public” we
have:
1st row: 1st and 2nd column if < pθ,1, 3rd and 4th column if p > pθ,1.
4th row: 1st and 3rd column if p < pθ,2, 2nd and 4th column if p > pθ,2.
For information structure “private” the results are:
1st row: 1st column if < pθ,1, 2nd column if p > pθ,1.
2nd row: 1st column if < pθ,1, 2nd column if p > pθ,1.
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Figure C.1: p-θ subsets for the piah subset Π6.
3rd row: 1st column if < pθ,2, 2nd column if p > pθ,2.
4th row: 1st column if p < pθ,2, 2nd column if p > pθ,2.
With that, the relationships between the payoffs of firm B are fully determined.
 Subsets of the piah-p-θ parameter space. From assumptions A1 to A4 it follows
that pA1 < p
A
2 and p
B
1 < p
B
2 < p
B
3 . The relationship between the boundaries of firm
A (pA1 , p
A
2 ) and that of firm B (p
B
1 , p
B
2 , p
B
3 ) depends on the value of pi
a
h. We can
define different subsets Π(·) for piah:
Π1 : ca + pi
¬a
h < pi
a
h <
pil
pil − co ca + pi
¬a
h
Π2 :
pil
pil − co ca + pi
¬a
h < pi
a
h < ca + co + pi
¬a
h
Π3 : ca + co + pi
¬a
h < pi
a
h < ca + 2co + pi
¬a
h
Π4 : ca + 2co + pi
¬a
h < pi
a
h <
pi¬ah
pi¬ah − co
[ca + co + pi
¬a
h ]
Π5 :
pi¬ah
pi¬ah − co
[ca + co + pi
¬a
h ] < pi
a
h <
pil
pil − co [ca + co + pi
¬a
h ]
Π6 :
pil
pil − co [ca + co + pi
¬a
h ] < pi
a
h
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For each subset Π(·) there follows a clear relationship between the boundaries of firm
A (pA1 , p
A
2 ) and that of firm B (p
B
1 , p
B
2 , p
B
3 ) from our assumptions A1 to A4 :
Π1 : 0 < p
B
1 < p
A
1 < p
B
2 < p
B
3 < 1
Π2 : 0 < p
A
1 < p
B
1 < p
B
2 < p
B
3 < 1
Π3 : 0 < p
A
1 < p
B
1 < p
B
2 < p
B
3 < p
A
2 < 1
Π4 : 0 < p
A
1 < p
B
1 < p
B
2 < p
A
2 < p
B
3 < 1
Π5 : 0 < p
A
1 < p
B
1 < p
A
2 < p
B
2 < p
B
3 < 1
Π6 : 0 < p
A
1 < p
A
2 < p
B
1 < p
B
2 < p
B
3 < 1
For each subset Π(·), the curve pθ,1 runs from (p = pB1 , θ = 0) to (p = p
B
3 , θ = 1),
and the curve pθ,2 from (p = p
B
1 , θ = 0) to (p = p
B
2 , θ = 1).
To this point we have separated the 3-dimensional piah-p-θ parameter space into
several subsets. Figure C.1 exemplarily displays the p-θ subsets for the piah subset
Π6.
 Bayesian Nash equilibria. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies
for which firm A’s strategy is a best response to firm B’s strategy given his own type
and his beliefs about firm B’s type, and vice versa. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium
can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium of an expanded game, where the firms’
pure strategies are type-contingent. Thus, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a pair of
strategies of the expanded game for which firm A’s strategy is a best response to
firm B’s strategy and vice versa.
The payoff matrices in table C.2 are payoff matrices of expanded games. Each
possible strategy of firm A is represented by a row, and each possible strategy of
firm B by a column. In order to determine Bayesian Nash equilibria, we have to
determine the best reaction of firm A to each strategy of firm B and vice versa. In
practice, that means for each column of the matrices in table C.2 we first have to
find the row with the highest payoff for firm A (respectively for each row the column
with the highest payoff for firm B). A Bayesian Nash equilibrium then corresponds
to a cell in the output matrix for information structure “public” (respectively to a
cell in the output matrix for information structure “private”) which contains both
the highest payoff of firm A in the respective column and the highest payoff of firm
B in the respective row.
As the relationships between the payoffs depend on which subset of the piah-p-θ
parameter space we are in, we have to determine Bayesian Nash equilibria separately
139
C. Exploring the Opaqueness of the Patent System
for every subset of the piah-p-θ space. The procedure thereby is always the same.
Thus, for reasons of brevity we will exemplarily demonstrate the determination of
Bayesian Nash equilibria (and the subsequent determination of Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibria and the application of the intuitive criterion) for one subset of our
parameter space. We marked this subset as subset “L” in figure C.1.
Full, h (o, o) (o,¬o) (¬o, o) (¬o,¬o)
a
¬a
Full, l (o, o) (o,¬o) (¬o, o) (¬o,¬o)
a
¬a
Public (o, o) (o,¬o) (¬o, o) (¬o,¬o)
(a, a)
(a,¬a)
(¬a, a)
(¬a,¬a)
Private o ¬o
(a, a)
(a,¬a)
(¬a, a)
(¬a,¬a)
Table C.3: Bayesian Nash equilibria. Displayed are schematic payoff matrices for information
structures “full”, “public” and “private” and subset “L” of the parameter space (see figure C.1).
In each matrix the highest payoffs of firm A in each column and of firm B in each row are marked.
Bayesian Nash equilibria are cells which contain both the highest payoff of firm A and firm B.
In the schematic payoff matrices in table C.3 the highest payoffs of firm A in each
column and of firm B in each row are marked for each payoff structure. Bayesian
Nash equilibria are cells which contain both the highest payoff of firm A and firm
B. In case the patent system is transparent and the patent is of high value there are
two Bayesian Nash equilibria: [a; (o, o)] and [a; (o,¬o)]. In case the patent system
is transparent and the patent is of low value there are three equilibria: [¬a; (o,¬o)],
[a; (¬o, o)] and [¬a; (¬o,¬o)]. For information structure “public” there are two
equilibria: [(a,¬a); (o,¬o)] and [(a, a); (¬o, o)]. For information structure “private”
there is one equilibrium: [(a,¬a);¬o].
 Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. For information structures “public” and
“private” we check for every Bayesian Nash equilibrium whether it fulfills the cri-
teria of a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium - that is, whether there is a belief
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structure which is consistent with this equilibrium. We exemplarily demonstrate
the procedure for the two equilibria of information structure “public” in subset “L”.
For the separating equilibrium [(a,¬a); (o,¬o)] a belief structure of firm B which is
consistent with this equilibrium is as follows: Firm B puts probability one on the
event “firm A’s patent is of high value” if it observes acceleration. If it does not
observe acceleration it puts probability one on the event “firm A’s patent is of low
value”. It is easy to show that this belief is consistent with the equilibrium: If firm
B believes that firm A’s patent is of high value, it is optimal for firm B to oppose
firm A’s patent. The reason is that for p < pB3 =
piah−co
piah
(which is the case for subset
“L”) firm B’s payoff in case it opposes an accelerated high-value patent of firm A
(−ppiah − co) is larger than its payoff in case it does not oppose (−piah). If firm B
believes that firm A’s patent is of low value it is optimal for firm B not to oppose
firm A’s patent. The reason is that for p > pB1 =
pil−co
pil
(which is the case for subset
“L”) firm B’s payoff in case it does not oppose a non-accelerated low-value patent of
firm A (−pil) is larger than its payoff in case it does not oppose (−ppil − co). Given
that firm B opposes an accelerated patent, firm A only benefits from accelerating a
high-value patent. The reason is that in subset “L” in case firm A has a low-value
patent its payoff in case it does not accelerate the patent (pil) is obviously larger
than its payoff in case it accelerates the patent (ppil − co). (Note that p < 1.) In
contrast, in case firm A has a high-value patent its payoff in case it accelerates the
patent (ppiah − co − ca) is larger than its payoff in case it does not accelerate the
patent (pi¬ah ). (In subset “L” it holds that p > p
A
2 =
pi¬ah +ca+co
piah
. Thus, in subset “L”
it holds that ppiah − co − ca ≥ pi¬ah .)
For the pooling equilibrium [(a, a); (¬o, o)] a belief structure of firm B which is
consistent with this equilibrium is as follows: Off the equilibrium path firm B puts
probability one on the event “firm A has a high-value patent”. On the equilibrium
path firm B puts probability θ on the event “firm A has a high-value patent” and
probability 1 − θ on the event “firm A has a low-value patent”. Given this belief
structure, on the equilibrium path firm B’s payoff in case it does not oppose ((1 −
θ)(−pil)+θ(−piah)) is larger than its payoff in case it does oppose ((1−θ)(−ppil−co)+
θ(−ppiah−co)). The reason is that in subset “L” it holds that p > pθ,1 = 1− coθpiah+(1−θ)pil :
p > 1− co
θpiah + (1− θ)pil
⇔
co > (1− p)θpiah + (1− p)(1− θ)pil ⇔
(1− θ)(−pil) + θ(−piah) > (1− θ)(−ppil − co) + θ(−ppiah − co)
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As in subset “L” it holds that p < pB2 =
pi¬ah −co
pi¬ah
, off the equilibrium path firm B’s
payoff in case it opposes (−ppi¬ah ) is larger than its payoff in case it does not oppose
(−pi¬ah ). Given that in case firm B would observe acceleration it would oppose, firm
A is better off accelerating both high-value and low-value patents. The reason is that
both for high-value patents and for low-value patents the payoff of firm A in case it
does accelerate and firm B does not oppose is larger than its payoff in case it does
not accelerate and firm B does oppose (pil − ca > ppil − co and piah − ca > ppi¬ah − co).
 Intuitive criterion. For some subsets of the piah-θ-p parameter space we find
several Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria for information structures “public” and
“private”. We use the “intuitive criterion” introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987) to
reduce the number of equilibria. The “intuitive criterion” uses a forward induction
argument: It eliminates equilibria when firm A would be better off if it deviated from
the equilibrium. We demonstrate the use of the “intuitive criterion” exemplarily for
information structure “public” and subset “L” of our parameter space. There we
have two equilibria which fulfill the criteria of a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
These are the separating equilibrium [(a,¬a); (o,¬o)] and the pooling equilibrium
[(a, a); (¬o, o)]. For the separating equilibrium there is no deviation which would
make firm A better off. However, the pooling equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion:
For the pooling equilibrium [(a, a); (¬o, o)] to be sequentially rational firm B has
to believe that firm A has a high-value patent if it does not accelerate. However,
this belief is not plausible: If firm A has a high-value patent, in equilibrium it gets
piah − ca. When firm A deviates, it only gets pi¬ah . Yet, if firm A has a low-value
patent, it has an incentive to deviate: In equilibrium, firm A gets pil − ca if it has
a low-value patent. However, if firm A deviates and convinces firm B that it has a
low-value patent, it gets pil (because if convinced firm B would not oppose). Thus,
firm B should put zero probability on firm A having a high-value patent when firm
A does not accelerate. However, in this case firm B would play ¬o in reaction to
¬a, which upsets the equilibrium. That is, the pooling equilibrium [(a, a); (¬o, o)]
fails the intuitive criterion.
 Results. We summarize our results in figure C.2 and table C.4. Figure C.2
displays all subsets of the piah-θ-p parameter space with specific relationships between
the payoffs of firm A and firm B. We marked these subsets by romanic upper-case
letters. For each of these subsets and each information structure table C.4 displays
all Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria which fulfill the intuitive criterion introduced
by Cho and Kreps (1987). Note that we did not display the subsets for very low
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Figure C.2: Subsets of the piah-θ-p parameter space. Each graph displays the complete θ-p
parameter space for a subset Π(·) of the piah parameter space. We marked subsets of the pi
a
h-θ-
p parameter space with specific payoff relationships by romanic upper-case letters. For each of
these subsets and each information structure all Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria which fulfill the
intuitive criterion are given in table C.4.
gains from acceleration (Π1 and Π2). The reason is that cases where there are no
economically significant gains from acceleration are uninteresting for our analysis.
From the equilibrium strategies of the firms it is easy to derive expected outcomes
for each subset of the parameter space and each information structure. It shows
that for some of the subsets marked in figure C.2 outcomes are the same for all
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A B C D
Full, h ¬a; (o, o) a; (o, o) a; (¬o,¬o) a; (o, o)
Full, l ¬a; (o, o) ¬a; (o, o) ¬a; (¬o,¬o) ¬a; (¬o,¬o)
Public (¬a,¬a); (o, o) (a,¬a); (o, o) (a,¬a); (¬o,¬o) (¬a,¬a); (o,¬o)
Private (¬a,¬a); o (a,¬a); o (a,¬a);¬o (a,¬a);¬o
E F G H
Full, h a; (o, o) a; (o, o) ¬a; (o,¬o) ¬a; (o,¬o)
Full, l ¬a; (¬o,¬o) ¬a; (¬o,¬o) ¬a; (¬o,¬o) ¬a; (¬o,¬o)
Public (¬a,¬a); (o,¬o) No eq. (¬a,¬a); (o,¬o) (¬a,¬a); (o,¬o)
Private (a,¬a); o (a,¬a); o (a,¬a);¬o (a,¬a); o
I J K L
Full, h a; (¬o,¬o) a; (o,¬o) a; (o,¬o) a; (o, o)
Full, l ¬a; (¬o,¬o) ¬a; (¬o,¬o) ¬a; (¬o,¬o) ¬a; (¬o,¬o)
Public (a,¬a); (¬o,¬o) (a,¬a); (o,¬o) (a,¬a); (o,¬o) (a,¬a); (o,¬o)
Private (a,¬a);¬o (a,¬a);¬o (a,¬a); o (a,¬a);¬o
M N O
Full, h a; (o, o) a; (o, o) a; (o, o)
Full, l ¬a; (¬o,¬o) ¬a; (¬o,¬o) ¬a; (o, o)
Public (a,¬a); (o,¬o) (a,¬a); (o,¬o) (a,¬a); (o, o)
Private (a,¬a); o (a,¬a); o (a,¬a); o
Table C.4: Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria which fulfill the intuitive criterion for all
subsets of the piah-θ-p parameter space and all information structures. For each subset of
the parameter space and each information structure firm A’s strategy is given before the semicolon,
and firm B’s strategy is given after the semicolon. In case firm A’s actions (“accelerate” or “not
accelerate”) are contingent on the draw of the patent value, the first entry in the parentheses gives
firm A’s action in case the patent is of high value, and the second entry gives firm A’s action in
case the patent is of low value. In case firm B’s actions (“oppose” or “not oppose”) are contingent
on firm A’s acceleration decision, the first entry in parentheses gives firm B’s action in case firm
A accelerates, and the second entry gives firm B’s action in case firm A does not accelerate.
information structure. Thus, with respect to outcomes we can combine some of the
subsets. In result we get the graphs in figures III.3 and III.4, which display the
outcomes for every subset of the parameter space.
C.2 Welfare calculations
Table C.5 displays the differences in firms’ expected payoffs between information
structures “public”, “private” and “full” for subsets I to IV (see figures III.3 and
III.4). Information structure “full” denotes the case of full transparency of the
patent system with respect to patent value (and firm A’s acceleration decision).
The differences are computed for each firm individually and for both firms in aggre-
gation. In case firms are considered in aggregation table C.5 shows that whether the
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displayed differences in payoffs are positive or negative is clear from our assumptions
A1 to A4. In case firms are considered individually also most of the payoff differ-
ences are of a clear sign. However, there are some payoff differences which critically
depend on p and which we consider separately in the following:
Firm A Firm B
Full I, II - Public I, II θ[ppiah − pi¬ah − ca − co] (−) θ[pi¬ah − ppiah − co] (+|−)
Full III, IV - Public III, IV 0 (0) 0 (0)
Full I, III - Private I, III −θ[(1− p)piah + co] (−) θ[(1− p)piah − co] (+)
Full II, IV - Private II, IV (1− θ)[(1− p)pil + co] (+) (1− θ)[−(1− p)pil + co] (+)
Public I - Private I −θ[piah − pi¬ah − ca] (−) θ[piah − pi¬ah ] (+)
Public II - Private II θ[pi¬ah − ppiah + ca] θ[−pi¬ah + ppiah]
+co + (1− θ)(1− p)pil (+) +co − (1− θ)(1− p)pil (−|+)
Public III - Private III −θ[(1− p)piah + co] (−) θ[(1− p)piah − co] (+)
Public IV - Private IV (1− θ)[(1− p)pil + co] (+) (1− θ)[−(1− p)pil + co] (+)
Firm A + Firm B
Full I, II - Public I, II −θ(ca + 2co) (−)
Full III, IV - Public III, IV 0 (0)
Full I, III - Private I, III −2θco (−)
Full II, IV - Private II, IV (1− θ)2co (+)
Public I - Private I θca (+)
Public II - Private II θca + 2co (+)
Public III - Private III −2θco (−)
Public IV - Private IV (1− θ)2co (+)
Table C.5: Payoff Differences. Displayed are the differences in payoffs between subsets I to
IV and information structures “public”, “private” and “full” for firms A and B individually and
considered together. Information structure “full” means full transparency of the patent system.
The subsets I to IV are marked in figures III.3 and III.4. The payoff difference for firm B between
information structures “full” and “public” and subsets I and II is positive if p <
pi¬ah −co
piah
and
negative otherwise. The payoff difference for firm B between information structures “public” and
“private” and subset II is negative if p <
θpi¬ah +(1−θ)pil−co
θpiah+(1−θ)pil and positive otherwise.
 Full I, II - Public I, II. In subsets I and II it holds that p < pA2 =
pi¬ah +ca+co
piah
.
With that it follows directly that the payoff difference for firm A is negative. The
sign of the payoff difference for firm B remains ambiguous: It is (weakly) positive
if p ≤ pi¬ah −co
piah
and negative otherwise. Depending on the exact relationship between
co, pil and pi
¬a
h the cut-off
pi¬ah −co
piah
lies either between pB1 and p
A
2 or is smaller than p
B
1 .
(Our assumptions A1 to A4 allow both.)
 Full II, IV - Private II, IV and Public IV - Private IV, firm B. In subsets
II and IV it holds that p > pB1 =
pil−co
pil
. It follows that 1 − p < co
pil
. With that it is
clear that the payoff difference is positive.
 Public II - Private II. In subset II it holds that p < pA2 =
pi¬ah +ca+co
piah
. Given
that relation and assumption A4 (ca ≤ co), it follows directly that the payoff dif-
ference for firm A is positive. Whether the payoff difference for firm B is positive
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or negative is not clear: It is (weakly) negative if p ≤ θpi¬ah +(1−θ)pil−co
θpiah+(1−θ)pil
and positive
otherwise. Depending on the exact relationship between co, pil and pi
¬a
h the cut-off
value pW =
θpi¬ah +(1−θ)pil−co
θpiah+(1−θ)pil
lies either between pθ,1 and pθ,2 or is smaller than pθ,2.
(Our assumptions allow both.)
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C.3 Breakdown of applications by residency and
technical field
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Figure C.3: Breakdown of applications by residency. Source: Own computations based on
EPASYS data of the EPO.
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
10 IPC classes with largest numbers of applications
Others
C 08
F 16
B 60
C 12
C 07
G 01
H 01
G 06
H 04
A 61
Figure C.4: Breakdown of applications by IPC classes. C08: Organic macromolecular com-
pounds; F16: Engineering elements; B60: Vehicles in general; C12: Biochemistry; C07: Organic
Chemistry; G01: Measuring, Testing; H01: Basic electric elements; G06: Computing; H04: Elec-
tric communication technique; A61: Medical or veterinary science. Source: Own computations
based on EPASYS data of the EPO.
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